STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Mecklenburg County
Nos. 98 CRS 40712-13
ALVIN VERNON HAYWOOD, 98 CRS 152234-35
Defendant. 99 CRS 129012-15
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Richard L. Harrison, for the State.
Robert W. Ewing, for defendant-appellant.
HUDSON, Judge.
Defendant was found guilty of two counts each of felony
breaking and entering and larceny, and was sentenced as an habitual
felon to a single term of 120-153 months imprisonment. We issued
a writ of certiorari on 13 June 2002, for the purpose of reviewing
his convictions.
Defendant first claims the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to police
following his arrest on 31 August 1998. Since defendant concedes
that the trial court's findings of fact were supported by competent
evidence at the suppression hearing, we need only determine whether
the court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law. SeeState v. Lane, 334 N.C. 148, 154-55, 431 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1993). The
relevant findings and conclusions of the trial court follow:
5. That these cases arose out of break-ins
which occurred at approximately 5:30 a[.]m[.]
on August 31, 1998. The first took place at
5940 General Commerce Drive and the second at
1715 Orr Industrial Court . . . in Charlotte,
NC.
6. That Officer J.F. Reeves, Charlotte
Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) responded
to a call at the Orr Industrial Court location
and observed the defendant walking away from a
car with a flowerpot in his hands.
. . .
8. That as Reeves approached, the defendant
said that he was “with the cleaning crew.”
. . .
11. That the defendant dropped the flower pot
and began running and that Reeves gave
pursuit, radioing for assistance as he chased
the defendant.
12. That CMPD Officers D.R. Faulkenberry,
S.W. Blackwell, and R.L. Baker quickly joined
in the foot pursuit of the defendant . . .
down some railroad tracks.
13. That the defendant, either intentionally
or as a result of stumbling on some gravel,
slid under a steel guardrail . . . .
14. That the defendant struck his head on the
steel rail resulting in a cut.
15. That Faulkenberry cuffed the defendant's
hands behind his back as he lay facedown on
the ground.
16. That the defendant was under arrest at
this point.
. . .
18. That Blackwell heard the defendant say,
“[that] he did not break into the building,that he was a lookout for Keyo.”
. . .
20. That the defendant was transported to the
University Medical Center Emergency Room for
treatment of his head wound.
. . .
23. That while waiting for treatment in the
emergency room the defendant asked Reeves if
they caught the other two guys and stated that
he wasn't alone that he had been with Keyo
Cousart and Boobie Baker.
. . .
25. That the defendant was given a local
anesthesia by injection and the cut was closed
with twelve staples.
26. That the defendant was released from the
hospital after about two hours . . . .
27. That at no time did the defendant lose
consciousness.
28. That the defendant was in pain from the
head injury but never screamed, groaned or
cried.
29. That at all times the defendant appeared
to be normal to the officers.
30. That at all times the defendant's speech
was clear and intelligible to the officers.
32. That the defendant was not under the
influence of any intoxicating substances.
33. That the defendant was not groggy or
disoriented.
34. That [the officers] made no promises or
threats to the defendant.
. . .
36. That none of the four officers advised
the defendant of his Miranda rights.
. . .
1. That none of the defendant's constitutional
rights, either Federal or State, was violated
by his arrest.
. . .
4. That the statements of the defendant . . .
were spontaneous utterances and not the result
of any interrogation or questioning by any law
enforcement officer.
5. That the statements . . . were made freely
and voluntarily by the defendant.
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider
whether the “pain from his injury to his head directly affected his
mental condition as to 'destroy the voluntariness' of his
confessions.” Absent a “specific finding by the court that Mr.
Haywood's head injuries did not affect his mental condition[,]”
defendant claims the court erred in concluding that his statements
were voluntary.
We find no error by the trial court. Inasmuch as defendant's
statements were not the product of an interrogation or similar
procedure by the police, his Fifth Amendment rights “were neither
implicated nor violated.” State v. Taylor, 332 N.C. 372, 384, 420
S.E.2d 414, 421 (1992) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
486, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 387 (1981)). Moreover, the court's detailed
findings regarding the limited effects of defendant's head injury
were sufficient to support its conclusion that his statements were
voluntary and, therefore, admissible. See State v. Pleasant, 342
N.C. 366, 371-72, 464 S.E.2d 284, 287 (1995); State v. Biggs, 292
N.C. 328, 336-37, 233 S.E.2d 512, 516-17 (1977). Defendant next challenges the admission of evidence that the
composition of glass particles found inside his shoes were
“consistent” with glass found at the two break-in sites. State's
witness Timothy French, a glass analyst with the Charlotte
Mecklenburg Police Department's crime laboratory, offered this
opinion based upon his comparison of the density and refractive
light index of the glass in defendant's shoes with glass samples
taken from the crime scenes. French acknowledged that he could not
quantify the likelihood that any two samples actually came from the
same pane or batch of glass, explaining, “You can't put statistics
on glass. It's like hair examination because you don't have a
finite number of batches of glass or certain mixtures of glass.”
After hearing evidence on voir dire, the trial court announced it
had “weighed this matter under [N.C.R. Evid.] 403" and concluded
that “the probative value of his testimony sufficiently outweighs
the likely unfair prejudicial effect upon this defendant[.]”
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” N.C.R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is
generally admissible at trial, N.C.R. Evid. 402, but “may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
risk of unfair prejudice.” N.C.R. Evid. 403. The decision to
admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403 lies “within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling should
not be overturned on appeal unless the ruling was 'manifestlyunsupported by reason or [was] so arbitrary that it could not have
been the result of a reasoned decision.'” State v. Hyde, 352 N.C.
37, 55, 530 S.E.2d 281, 293 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1114,
148 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2001), (quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279,
285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988)).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
evidence of the glass comparisons performed by French. The
similarity between the glass in defendant's shoes and the glass
found at the break-ins tended, however slightly, to connect
defendant to the crime scenes. See State v. Payne, 328 N.C. 377,
401-02, 402 S.E.2d 582, 595-96 (1991). The fact that the glass in
defendant's shoes could also have come from other locations “goes
to the weight, not the admissibility, of this evidence.” Id. We
note defense counsel vigorously cross-examined French on this
issue, effectively neutralizing any risk that the jury attached
undue importance to his findings.
The record on appeal contains additional assignments of error
not addressed by defendant in his brief to this Court. By rule, we
deem them abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
No error.
Judges STEELMAN and THORNBURG concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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