NO. COA03-1285
Appeal by parent from order filed 24 March 2003 by Judge Regan
A. Miller in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court
of Appeals 15 June 2004.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General M.
Janette Soles, for the State.
David Childers for the respondent-appellant.
BRYANT, Judge.
D.M.
(See footnote 2)
(parent of juvenile respondent) on behalf of K.P.P.
(respondent) appeals an order filed 24 March 2003. The order
committed juvenile to Department of Juvenile Justice for an
indefinite period of time, not less than six (6) months and not to
exceed juvenile's eighteenth (18th) birthday.
On 31 July 2001, respondent admitted to allegations of assault
on a government employee. On 25 September 2001, respondent was
found to be a delinquent juvenile for the assault allegation, aswell as for allegations of misdemeanor assault and assault with a
deadly weapon. Respondent was sentenced as a Level 2 offender and
placed on probation for twelve months. Respondent was ordered to
remain on good behavior, attend school, not use or possess any
controlled substances, not associate with any co-defendants, take
anger management classes, perform 100 hours of community service,
abide by a 7:00 p.m. curfew, report to counselors, spend 14 days in
detention, and consult the behavioral health center.
On 26 October 2001, a motion for review was filed alleging
respondent had violated her probation. Respondent admitted the
allegations. On 17 December 2001, respondent was continued on
probation and ordered to cooperate with a mental health assessment,
with the Behavioral Health Center, and anger management.
On 20 March 2002, a juvenile petition was filed against
respondent alleging four charges of assault on a government
employee. Respondent admitted to two of the charges, and the other
two charges were dismissed. On 2 May 2002, respondent was
adjudicated delinquent.
On 19 June 2002, another motion for review was filed alleging
respondent had violated her probation. Specifically, it was
alleged that respondent had been discharged from the partial
hospitalization program in violation of the conditions of her
probation. On 8 July 2002, respondent admitted the violation and
was committed to training school for a minimum of six months.
Respondent was released from training school on 7 January 2003.
On 6 January 2003, another petition was filed againstrespondent alleging that she was a delinquent juvenile for having
committed the offense of assault on a government employee. On 21
January 2003, respondent admitted the allegation. A dispositional
hearing was held on 24 March 2003. On 25 March 2003, the trial
court returned respondent to training school for a minimum of six
months, not to exceed her eighteenth birthday. Respondent appeals.
____________________________
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court
erred by failing to adequately consider alternative dispositions
when committing juvenile to training school for a minimum of six
months.
Respondent argues that the trial court erred because it did
not exhaust all alternatives before sentencing her to a period of
detention. Respondent contends the trial court had an affirmative
obligation to consider alternative dispositions, and failed to make
any findings that alternatives were inappropriate.
In re Robinson, 151 N.C. App. 733, 736-37, 567 S.E.2d 227, 229
(2002), this Court stated that:
Juvenile dispositions in delinquency
proceedings are controlled by N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-2500 et seq. For offenses occurring on
or after 1 July 1999, courts are no longer
bound by the language of former N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7A-646 (1998). Under the new Code, the
directives found in former section 7A-646 that
the trial court “select the least restrictive
disposition” which is appropriate and that
“[a] juvenile should not be committed to
training school or to any other institution if
he can be helped through community-level
resources” have been deleted. The trial court
is now required to “select the most
appropriate disposition,” one that is designedto “protect the public and to meet the needs
and best interests of the juvenile,” based on
a list of enumerated factors. A textual
analysis shows a more balanced statutory
design emphasizing appropriate dispositions,
with some limitations, rather than what had
been interpreted as a mandate for the least
restrictive alternative under the
circumstances.
(citations omitted). Thus, the trial court was not required to
select the least restrictive alternative.
Furthermore, the evidence here supports the trial court's
disposition committing respondent to training school. The
seriousness of the offense and respondent's history of delinquency
authorized a Level 2 or 3 disposition. “[I]n those instances where
there is a choice of [disposition] level, there are no specific
guidelines solely directed at resolving that issue. Accordingly,
choosing between two appropriate dispositional levels is within the
trial court's discretion. Absent an abuse of discretion, we will
not disturb the trial court's choice.”
Id. at 737, 567 S.E.2d at
229.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2500:
the trial court should develop a disposition
in each case that:
(1) Promotes public safety;
(2) Emphasizes accountability and
responsibility of both the parent,
guardian, or custodian and the
juvenile for the juvenile's conduct;
and
(3) Provides the appropriate
consequences, treatment, training,
and rehabilitation to assist the
juvenile toward becoming anonoffending, responsible, and
productive member of the community.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2500 (2003).
Here, the respondent had a history of multiple assaults,
including an assault committed when she was in training school,
while she was pregnant, two days before she gave birth. Despite
being on probation since March 2001 and having previously spent
time in training school, her behavior had not improved.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by committing respondent to training school.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McGEE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Footnote: 1