RICKEY E. JOYCE,
Plaintiff,
v
.
Stokes County
No. 02 CVD 177
LILLIE MAE JOYCE,
Defendant.
Rickey E. Joyce, plaintiff-appellant, pro se.
Stover & Bennett, by Michael R. Bennett, for defendant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Rickey E. Joyce (plaintiff) appeals from an order entered 16
May 2003 granting summary judgment in favor of Lillie Mae Joyce
(defendant) and denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment,
motion to strike defendant's summary judgment motion, and motion to
compel discovery. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.
Plaintiff commenced the underlying litigation by filing pro se
an action against defendant, who is plaintiff's mother, on 19 March
2002. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that in October 1978,
defendant and her husband directed their attorney to prepare a
general warranty deed conveying to plaintiff all right, title and
interest in their home (the subject property), “in return for[plaintiff's] promise to make payments of taxes due upon [the
subject property], as well as to keep the premises insured and in
a suitable state of repair.” Although the purported deed was
promptly executed by defendant and her husband and recorded with
the Stokes County Register of Deeds, defendant has apparently
continued to live in the home at all times since.
(See footnote 1)
Plaintiff's
complaint alleges that for approximately the next twenty years he
paid the property taxes and insurance premiums on the subject
property, and that he spent substantial amounts of his own time and
money making repairs to the premises. Plaintiff contends that he
made these expenditures because he believed that he owned the
subject property, and his complaint seeks, apparently on a theory
of unjust enrichment, “compensation” or “restitution” from
defendant for plaintiff's payment of these sums.
The record reveals that on 10 December 1998, plaintiff
executed a general warranty deed whereby he purported to convey the
subject property to Sylvia B. McKinney. Defendant contested this
purported conveyance and on 31 January 1999, defendant filed an
action against plaintiff and McKinney (the 1999 action), apparently
seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1978 deed which purportedly
conveyed the subject property to plaintiff was void, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The 1999 action was tried, and on 10 September
1999 the jury returned a verdict (1) declaring the 1978 deed voidon the grounds that defendant lacked sufficient mental capacity at
the time of its execution, and (2) awarding defendant compensatory
damages in the amount of $50,000.00 and punitive damages in the
amount of $20,001.00 on her emotional distress claims against
plaintiff and McKinney. On 21 September 1999, judgment was entered
on the jury verdict which, inter alia, declared the 1978 deed
invalid and ordered that it be stricken. The record indicates that
between 18 October 1999 and 31 December 2001, plaintiff and
McKinney repeatedly sought appellate review of the judgment
rendered in the 1999 action by filing numerous appeals, petitions
for relief, and motions with this Court and with the North Carolina
Supreme Court, each of which was denied. Throughout this period,
defendant tried unsuccessfully to collect on the judgment entered
in 1999 against plaintiff and McKinney.
Thereafter, on 19 March 2002 plaintiff filed pro se his action
against defendant (the 2002 action), thereby commencing the
litigation which gives rise to the present appeal. In the 2002
action, plaintiff, as noted above, sought damages from defendant on
a theory of unjust enrichment. The record indicates that plaintiff
did not assert a counterclaim for unjust enrichment in answering
defendant's complaint against him in the 1999 action; plaintiff's
unsuccessful defense in the 1999 action appears to have been solely
based on his argument that the purported 1978 conveyance of the
subject property to him by defendant was valid. On 19 April 2002,
defendant filed her answer, wherein she denied the material
allegations of the complaint, asserted counterclaims for abuse ofprocess and malicious prosecution, and moved for sanctions pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 11.
On 16 May 2002, defendant filed her motion for summary
judgment, which was initially set for hearing on 30 May 2002.
However, on 20 May 2002, plaintiff served his first set of
interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for
production of documents (collectively, the discovery requests).
The trial court thereafter continued the hearing on defendant's
summary judgment motion pending defendant's response to plaintiff's
discovery requests. After initially moving for a protective order,
defendant voluntarily served her responses to the discovery
requests in October 2002. On 17 October 2002, plaintiff filed (1)
a motion to compel discovery, alleging that defendant's “responses
are manifestly inadequate and incomplete;” (2) a motion to strike
defendant's summary judgment motion; and (3) his own motion for
summary judgment.
On 4 December 2002, the trial court heard the parties' cross-
motions for summary judgment, as well as plaintiff's motion to
strike and motion to compel discovery. On 16 May 2003, the trial
court entered an order (1) denying plaintiff's motion to strike,
motion for summary judgment, and motion to compel discovery, and
(2) allowing defendant's summary judgment motion. From this order,
plaintiff appeals.
By his first assignment of error, plaintiff contends the trial
court erred in denying his motion to compel discovery. We
disagree. With respect to the scope and limits of discovery, our
Legislature has provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending
action . . .
The frequency or extent of use of the
discovery methods set forth in section (a)
shall be limited by the court if it determines
that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or . . . (iii) the
discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive .
. .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2003). “Whether or not the
party's motion to compel discovery should be granted or denied is
within the trial court's sound discretion and will not be reversed
absent an abuse of discretion.” Wagoner v. Elkin City Schools' Bd.
of Education, 113 N.C. App. 579, 585, 440 S.E.2d 119, 123, disc.
review denied, 336 N.C. 615, 447 S.E.2d 414 (1994).
In the present case, the discovery at issue consisted of the
following: (1) 68 separate requests for admission, whereby
plaintiff requests that defendant admit, for each year between 1978
and 1999, that plaintiff paid all property taxes, insurance
premiums, and repair costs related to the subject property, all
without any contribution from defendant; (2) eight document
production requests, whereby plaintiff seeks production of
“receipts or cancelled checks or other indicia of payment” for any
property taxes, insurance premiums, and repair costs related to the
subject property paid by defendant between 1978 and 1999, as well
as certain of defendant's federal and state income tax returns
during that period; and (3) three interrogatories, wherebyplaintiff seeks the date and cost of each repair or improvement to
the subject property commissioned or performed by defendant between
1978 and 1999, as well as the identity of each insurance agent from
whom defendant obtained insurance on the subject property during
that period.
Our review of the record indicates that defendant responded
appropriately to these broad and voluminous discovery requests.
Defendant either admitted, denied, or denied upon information and
belief each of the 68 separate requests for admission. In response
to plaintiff's document production requests, defendant produced
receipts from the Stokes County tax collector's office, as well as
invoices, estimates, statements, and cancelled checks relating to
various improvements and repairs to the subject property made
during the relevant time period. Where defendant was not in
possession of the requested documents, defendant indicated as much
in her responses and promised to supplement them if and when the
documents were located. Finally, defendant's responses to the
interrogatories contained the requested information and referred
plaintiff to the documents produced by defendant for further
information. We also find it significant that because plaintiff's
discovery requests relate to issues which were thoroughly litigated
in the 1999 action, plaintiff, through discovery and testimony in
connection with that litigation, presumably obtained much, if not
all, of the information he now claims to seek in his present
discovery requests. We are unable to conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to compeldiscovery. Accordingly, plaintiff's first assignment of error is
without merit.
Plaintiff next contends the trial court erred by granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment. We disagree. “[T]he
standard of review on appeal from summary judgment is whether there
is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Bruce-Terminix Co.
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 130 N.C. App. 729, 733, 504 S.E.2d 574, 577
(1998); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2003). The evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
In the present case, the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of defendant on the grounds, inter alia, that “[t]he
applicable statute of limitations that would apply to Plaintiff's
claims expired prior to the institution of his action in the
instant case[.]”
(See footnote 2)
Our Supreme Court has stated that “an action to
recover for money had and received, under the doctrine of unjust
enrichment, is an action on implied contract.” Dean v. Mattox, 250
N.C. 246, 251, 108 S.E.2d 541, 546 (1959). Accordingly, the
limitations period applicable to plaintiff's unjust enrichment
claim is three years. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(1) (2003) (three-year statute of limitations period for an action arising out of a
contract, express or implied).
Regarding expiration of the applicable limitations period as
the basis for summary judgment, our Supreme Court has stated as
follows:
Ordinarily, the question of whether a cause of
action is barred by the statute of limitations
is a mixed question of law and fact. However,
when the bar is properly pleaded and the facts
are admitted or are not in conflict, the
question of whether the action is barred
becomes one of law, and summary judgment is
appropriate.
Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 491, 329
S.E.2d 350, 353 (1985) (citations omitted). When the party moving
for summary judgment pleads the statute of limitations, the burden
is then placed upon the non-movant to forecast evidence showing
that the action was commenced within the permissible period after
the cause of action accrued. Id.
Our examination of the record indicates that in her answer,
defendant asserted as an affirmative defense that “[t]he claims
raised by Plaintiff in his Complaint are barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.” It is undisputed that (1) plaintiff
purported to convey all right, title, and interest he claimed to
hold in the subject property to a third party on 10 December 1998,
and (2) defendant commenced the 1999 action against plaintiff by
filing her complaint on 31 January 1999, each of these events
occurring over three years before plaintiff filed his complaint on
19 March 2002. Moreover, the record contains no evidence that
plaintiff paid any portion of the property taxes, insurancepremiums, or repair costs related to the subject property after the
calendar year 1998. Thus, plaintiff has failed to forecast any
evidence that he commenced his action for unjust enrichment within
three years of making his last expenditure related to the subject
property which allegedly benefitted defendant. The trial court did
not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.
Affirmed.
Judges MCGEE and MCCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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