In re: A.L. and N.W. Mecklenburg County
No. 2000-J-967, 968
Connelia Houston, Associate County Attorney, for petitioner-
appellee Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services.
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara for respondent-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Respondent-mother, C.B.B., appeals the district court's order
terminating her parental rights to two of her four children, A.L.,
born December 1998, and N.W., born February 1991.
Respondent-mother (mother) is the natural mother of four
girls, two of which are the subject of this appeal. Each of the
children have different fathers, none of which have established
paternity or have been involved in the children's lives. The girls
have a long history of placement in foster care. Starting in 1986,
Social Services in New Jersey began providing family services.
Between 1989 and 1991, the girls were adjudicated neglected and
removed from the home on several occasions. Social Services in NewJersey placed them in foster care, however, on each occasion the
children were returned to their mother.
Mecklenburg County Youth and Family Services (YFS) became
involved with the family in January 1996 after receiving a report
alleging that an older sibling had been sexually molested by a
cousin's boyfriend. Thereafter, YFS received a string of referrals
alleging the mother was abusing the children. These referrals
included a February 1996 referral alleging the mother whipped A.L.
and cut her skin, that the child came to school dirty, and she
often smelled of urine. YFS was unable to substantiate the
allegations and the case was closed. In February 1999, YFS
received another referral claiming the mother beat and whipped her
children and slammed one child down on the floor, leaving cuts and
bruises. Upon the mother signing a protection plan agreeing not to
use inappropriate discipline on the children, YFS closed the case.
Mecklenburg DSS became involved with the family again in May 2000.
The mother had gone to Mexico and had left the children with a
friend she had only known for a short time. When the mother
returned from her trip and came to retrieve the girls, they refused
to go with her. The mother only regained custody of her children
after police intervention. Later that month, YFS received several
abuse referrals, alleging the mother beat the children with a bat,
threw things at them, slammed one child on the floor, and otherwise
maltreated them. YFS substantiated the referral for neglect based
on inappropriate discipline and an injurious environment.
Thereafter, YFS began providing treatment services to the family. However, the mother was resistant to the services and told one
social worker “if you can't help me get supplies, then I'm not
talking to you.” Despite the fact the mother received benefits for
her four children and YFS provided food and supplies to the family,
the mother consistently failed to have adequate supplies in the
home.
On 26 September 2000, YFS received a neglect referral alleging
mother had beaten the eldest child with a stick, leaving bruises
and welts on her body, while the eldest child was holding her own
baby. YFS substantiated the claims of physical abuse on the two
oldest siblings, and also substantiated claims of neglect as to
A.L. and N.W. Two days later, YFS filed a petition for custody of
all four of the children alleging they were abused, neglected, and
dependent. All of the children were placed in foster care. The
trial court held an initial hearing on 3 October 2000, and ordered
the children remain in foster care and allowed the mother
supervised visitation with her children.
The trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on 7 December
2000 and 8 January 2001. At the hearing the trial court found
there was a chronic, consistent, and severe history of physical
abuse by the mother. The trial court found that the mother hit the
children with various objects including: a wooden rolling pin, a
telephone, switches, broom handles, sticks, cloths hangers, bats,
curtain rods, lotion bottles, and pretty much “anything else she
could get her hands on.” On at least one occasion the mother tied
up A.L., placed a rag in her mouth, hung her upside down, and beather in the presence of the other siblings. The court also found
the children to be emotionally abused. As a result of the evidence
and documentation presented at the hearing, the court adjudicated
the children to be abused, neglected, and dependent within the
meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101. As a result of the mother's
improper behavior during prior visits with her children, the court
denied her further visitation and prohibited her from having
contact with the children. The court held a dispositional hearing
on 21 March 2001. During this hearing the court adopted the case
plan presented by YFS. Reunification with mother was not
recommended due to her failure to follow through with parent
education services provided by YFS.
On 13 September 2001, the court held a review hearing. As
part of the trial court's order, it required the mother to “engage
in individual therapy” prior to having visitation with the
children. YFS had no contact with the mother until the 29 November
2001 review hearing. It was not until approximately five months
following the review hearing that the mother had any contact with
YFS.
In February 2002, YFS filed a motion seeking termination of
parental rights of the children, and on 10 May 2002 the trial court
entered an order granting that motion. As part of the order, the
trial court took judicial notice of and incorporated by reference
the findings of fact made in the adjudication order. The trial
court then went on to make further detailed findings of fact.
Based on those findings, the trial court terminated the parentalrights of the mother and the putative fathers. In its order the
court cited five of the nine statutory grounds listed in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111 as separate bases for terminating parental rights.
The mother appeals.
The mother contends the trial court erred in entering the
termination of parental rights order as the findings of fact were
not supported by the evidence and, in turn, the findings do no not
support the conclusions of law. We disagree.
A trial court has the authority to terminate parental rights
upon a finding of any one of the enumerated circumstances listed in
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a). Where the court's findings are
supported by competent evidence, those findings are binding on
appeal, even if there is evidence to the contrary. In re
Williamson, 91 N.C. App. 668, 674, 373 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1988). The
petitioner has the burden of proving such facts which would justify
termination by “clear and convincing evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(b) (2003). See In re Faircloth, 153 N.C. App. 565, 575,
571 S.E.2d 65, 72 (2002) (noting the clear and convincing standard
of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(b) is synonymous with the clear,
cogent, and convincing standard of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(f)).
After careful review of the record and transcripts, we hold that
the findings of fact were supported by clear and convincing
evidence.
Since we have determined the trial court's findings were
supported by the evidence, we now consider whether those findings
support the conclusions of law. As one of the grounds forterminating parental rights, the court cited N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
111(a)(2). This provision states that a trial court may terminate
parental rights upon a finding that “the parent has willfully left
the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more
than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court
that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in
correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the
juvenile.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2003). The twelve-
month period referenced in this statute refers to the twelve months
leading up to the filing of the petition for termination of
parental rights. In re Pierce, 356 N.C. 68, 75, 565 S.E.2d 81, 86
(2002). The trial court may find the parent acted willfully even
though they made some attempt to regain custody of the child, where
the parent failed to demonstrate reasonable progress or a positive
response towards the efforts of the agency attempting to help them.
In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693, 700, 453 S.E.2d 220, 225 (1995).
“Positive response” means more than the parent made some efforts
towards improving the situation which led to the removal of the
children. Id. Implicit in the meaning of “positive response” is a
requirement that the efforts taken have procured positive results.
Id. However, “extremely limited progress is not reasonable
progress.” Id at 700, 453 S.E.2d at 224-25.
The findings of fact clearly establish that the children have
been in YFS's care for the twelve months proceeding the termination
of parental rights hearing. Further, those findings demonstrate
that their mother willfully left them in foster care during thisperiod. The trial judge found that (1) the mother only attended
the first day of the adjudicatory hearing and did not attend the
dispositional hearing; (2) the mother went long periods of time
without contacting YFS or the court regarding her children; (3) she
failed to provide YFS with a legitimate address or means of
contacting her; and (4) on several occasions her whereabouts were
unknown.
The trial judge also made findings demonstrating that the
mother failed to make reasonable progress in correcting the
conditions which led to the removal of her children. At the review
hearing held on 12 July 2001, the mother expressed a desire to be
reunified with her children. As a result, the court ordered YFS to
conduct a staffing conference to discuss a case plan for the
mother. In its order entered 13 September 2001, the court adopted
the case plan YFS presented. The case plan called for mother to
participate in parenting classes and individual therapy including
anger management through either The Family Center or CMC Randolph.
However, the trial court found that:
24. The mother has continually placed blame
on the children for their abuse. The mother
also fails to take responsibility for her
actions and constantly attributes fault to the
children.
. . . .
28. The mother has not engaged in any
individual therapy. Although the mother
continually indicates she has received all the
services she needs “through parenting
classes,” the Court does not find that
training to be appropriate. The Court notes
that the parenting classes were a fifteen-hour
video-based class that did not include one-on-
one services or specify any particular type of
treatment. There has been no evidencepresented that the parenting class provided
any in-depth treatment for anger management or
individual therapy as needed by the mother.
29. The Court also notes that the mother
indicates she completed these classes in May
of 2001. The mother still has not
demonstrated that those classes were
equivalent to the classes that would be
required by The Family Center or CMC Randolph.
30. The mother's testimony today acknowledges
that she was abusive to her children. The
mother further acknowledged that this was
based in part on abuse she had suffered as a
child. The mother indicates she has not
engaged in any counseling or therapy to
specifically deal with those issues.
31. The mother has not attended nor has she
participated in the children's therapy. The
Court further finds that the mother has
specifically worked against the therapy of the
children and has violated repeated requests of
the therapist not to contact the children.
32. There is no evidence that the mother has
ever received a recommendation from any
therapist that it is appropriate for her to
have unsupervised contact with her children.
Although the mother acknowledges the abuse she
suffered as a child and acknowledges that the
abuse effected [sic] her, she continues to
deny her need for therapy.
33. The mother's continued contact with the
children outside the therapeutic setting
demonstrates that she has no understanding of
her children's needs. She has not
demonstrated appropriate decision making
skills in that regard.
In further support of the mother's lack of “positive
response,” the trial court found that the mother had a hostile
attitude towards YFS, refused to sign case plans, and refused to
provide contact information. Consequently, the mother's extremely
limited progress was not reasonable progress. We hold that thetrial court's findings of fact were sufficient to support its
conclusion that respondent's lack of progress during the twelve
months preceding YFS's petition justified termination of her
parental rights under section 7B-1111(a)(2). Having concluded that
the findings of fact support at least one ground for termination of
parental rights, we need not address the additional grounds found
by the trial court. See In re Brim, 139 N.C. App. 733, 743, 535
S.E.2d 367, 373 (2000).
The mother also challenges the trial court's determination
that it was in the children's best interests for the parent's
parental rights to be terminated.
After the court finds that grounds for terminating parental
rights are present, the court then proceeds to the disposition
stage to consider if it is in the children's best interests to
terminate the parental rights. In re Yocum, 158 N.C. App. 198,
206, 580 S.E.2d 399, 404, aff'd per curium, 357 N.C. 568, ___
S.E.2d ___ (2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2003). We review the
trial court's decision to terminate parental rights applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Id.
In its conclusions of law the trial court stated:
10. It is in the best interests of each of
these children that the parental rights of
their respective parents be terminated. The
probability over time that the parents will
improve is slim. The children can not wait
for the parents to learn appropriate parenting
and to utilize those skills. These children
are young, have spent a significant percentage
of their lives in foster care, need stability
and safety in their lives, and are adoptable.
After careful review, we hold the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in terminating the mother's parental rights as evidenced
by the fact that: (1) the record shows the children were previously
adjudicated abused, neglected, and dependent as to the mother; (2)
which evidence demonstrated a “chronic, consistent and severe
history of physical abuse by the mother[;]” (3) the mother
continues to place blame on the children for their abuse and fails
to take responsibility for her actions; and (4) the mother has also
failed to recognize her own need for therapy.
In light of the evidence presented, we hold that the trial
court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights to
the minor children. We therefore affirm the order of the trial
court.
Finally, we note that most of pages 26-28 of appellant's brief
were copied verbatim from our opinion in In re Weiler, 158 N.C.
App. 473, 477-78, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003). We admonish
appellant's counsel that it was inappropriate to copy such a large
block of text without clearly showing that it was a direct
quotation, and making a proper citation to the source of the
material. Counsel shall submit a copy of this opinion along with
any application for fees presented to the trial court in this
matter.
AFFIRMED.
Judges TYSON and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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