An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA03-1376


Filed: 18 May 2004


         v.                        Franklin County
                                Nos.    02 CRS 50987-51013
STAN ARTHUR SNEED                        02 CRS 52015-18

    Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 19 November 2002 by Judge Henry W. Hight, Jr. in Franklin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 May 2004.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Michael D. Youth, for the State.

    Ligon and Hinton, by Lemuel W. Hinton, for defendant- appellant.

    MARTIN, Chief Judge.

    Defendant pled guilty to thirty-one counts of forgery on 2 July 2002. The trial court consolidated the offenses into four judgments, imposing suspended consecutive sentences of eight to ten months' imprisonment, and placed defendant on supervised probation for twenty-four months. In addition to the regular conditions of probation, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b) (2003), defendant was ordered to pay $1,692.12 in restitution, $400 in fees and $460 in costs to the Clerk of Superior Court under a schedule established by his probation officer.
    On 4 October 2002, defendant's probation officer filed violation reports charging that defendant had “absconded to anunknown address on or about August 25, [20]02 [and] his whereabouts remain unknown[,]” and that he had made no payments on the monetary condition of probation and was $300 in arrears. At the revocation hearing, the probation officer testified that defendant had reported his address as 102 Mill Street in Franklinton, North Carolina, and had met the officer at that residence four times in July and August of 2002. On at least six occasions when the officer went to this residence, however, he was unable to locate defendant. Members of defendant's family who lived at 102 Mill Street informed the officer that defendant did not reside at the residence but came by only to meet the officer before returning to his actual residence once the officer had left. Defendant's family told the officer that they did not want him to come to the house any more, because defendant did not live there.
    The probation officer further testified that at the time of the violation reports defendant was two payments, amounting to $300, in arrears. Moreover, notwithstanding defendant's claims that he was “working every day” and “getting paid[,]” defendant “never made any effort to pay any money[.]” When the probation officer requested proof of his employment, defendant “said he was getting paid [but] wasn't paying taxes or whatever.” When the officer asked defendant's family members on Mill Street if he was working, “they said he doesn't work.”
    Defendant testified that he resided at 146 Oliver Harris Road but had given his probation officer his “mailing address” on Mill Street, because “I didn't think it mattered.” When asked how theofficer was supposed to keep in contact with him, defendant replied, “He had phone numbers and he know[s] me. He know[s] everywhere I be at.” When asked where he had been on the days that his probation officer could not locate him, defendant said he could not remember.
    As for his failure to make the scheduled payments toward restitution, defendant explained that at the time the violation reports were filed he had only been on probation for two months and “was only two [payments] behind.” He claimed he had found a job cutting trees and brush, but his employer refused to verify his employment, believing the probation officer “shouldn't need” verification. Defendant insisted his probation officer “kn[e]w all about his employment” and had agreed to give defendant two additional weeks to pay the restitution in full. Defendant noted he had been unable to make payments once he was taken into custody.     The trial court found that defendant had violated the terms of probation as alleged in the violation reports “willfully and without valid excuse[,]” and revoked defendants' probation and activated his suspended sentences. The judgments reflect that the court “consider[ed] the record. . . together with the evidence presented by the parties and the statements made on behalf of the State and the defendant” in making its determination. Defendant appeals.
    Defendant concedes on appeal “there is no question that [he] did not abide by the terms and condition[s] of his probation.” Hecontends, however, the trial court erred in finding that his non- compliance was willful. Defendant points to his hearing testimony that he was unaware that he was required to inform his probation officer of his physical address and that he had yet to receive any wages from his employer. Absent willful violations, defendant avers the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation.
    “[T]he scope of review on appeal is confined to a consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record on appeal. . . .” N.C.R. App. 10(a). The record on appeal submitted by defendant contains only the following assignment of error:
        The trial judge abused his discretion in revoking the defendant's probationary sentence.

Having failed to assign error to the trial court's determination that his violations were willful, defendant cannot challenge this finding on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 4 N.C. App. 681, 682, 167 S.E.2d 497, 498-99 (1969). To the extent defendant claims that the court abused its discretion under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) (2003), in choosing to revoke his probation in response to his violations, we find no such abuse of discretion.
    The trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence and are sufficient to reflect its consideration and evaluation of defendant's evidence and to support the revocation of probation. See State v. Jones, 78 N.C. App. 507, 509-10, 337 S.E.2d 195, 197 (1985) (citing State v. Williamson, 61 N.C. App. 531, 301 S.E.2d423 (1983)). As finder of fact, the court was free to disbelieve defendant's testimony and accept the testimony of his probation officer. Williamson, 61 N.C. App. at 535, 301 S.E.2d at 426. The State's proffer was sufficient to show defendant intentionally withheld the location of his residence from the officer and made no effort to comply with the monetary conditions of probation.
    Judges McGEE and BRYANT concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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