STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Franklin County
Nos. 02 CRS 50987-51013
STAN ARTHUR SNEED 02 CRS 52015-18
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Michael D. Youth, for the State.
Ligon and Hinton, by Lemuel W. Hinton, for defendant-
appellant.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Defendant pled guilty to thirty-one counts of forgery on 2
July 2002. The trial court consolidated the offenses into four
judgments, imposing suspended consecutive sentences of eight to ten
months' imprisonment, and placed defendant on supervised probation
for twenty-four months. In addition to the regular conditions of
probation, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b) (2003), defendant was
ordered to pay $1,692.12 in restitution, $400 in fees and $460 in
costs to the Clerk of Superior Court under a schedule established
by his probation officer.
On 4 October 2002, defendant's probation officer filed
violation reports charging that defendant had “absconded to anunknown address on or about August 25, [20]02 [and] his whereabouts
remain unknown[,]” and that he had made no payments on the monetary
condition of probation and was $300 in arrears. At the revocation
hearing, the probation officer testified that defendant had
reported his address as 102 Mill Street in Franklinton, North
Carolina, and had met the officer at that residence four times in
July and August of 2002. On at least six occasions when the
officer went to this residence, however, he was unable to locate
defendant. Members of defendant's family who lived at 102 Mill
Street informed the officer that defendant did not reside at the
residence but came by only to meet the officer before returning to
his actual residence once the officer had left. Defendant's family
told the officer that they did not want him to come to the house
any more, because defendant did not live there.
The probation officer further testified that at the time of
the violation reports defendant was two payments, amounting to
$300, in arrears. Moreover, notwithstanding defendant's claims
that he was “working every day” and “getting paid[,]” defendant
“never made any effort to pay any money[.]” When the probation
officer requested proof of his employment, defendant “said he was
getting paid [but] wasn't paying taxes or whatever.” When the
officer asked defendant's family members on Mill Street if he was
working, “they said he doesn't work.”
Defendant testified that he resided at 146 Oliver Harris Road
but had given his probation officer his “mailing address” on Mill
Street, because “I didn't think it mattered.” When asked how theofficer was supposed to keep in contact with him, defendant
replied, “He had phone numbers and he know[s] me. He know[s]
everywhere I be at.” When asked where he had been on the days that
his probation officer could not locate him, defendant said he could
not remember.
As for his failure to make the scheduled payments toward
restitution, defendant explained that at the time the violation
reports were filed he had only been on probation for two months and
“was only two [payments] behind.” He claimed he had found a job
cutting trees and brush, but his employer refused to verify his
employment, believing the probation officer “shouldn't need”
verification. Defendant insisted his probation officer “kn[e]w all
about his employment” and had agreed to give defendant two
additional weeks to pay the restitution in full. Defendant noted
he had been unable to make payments once he was taken into custody.
The trial court found that defendant had violated the terms of
probation as alleged in the violation reports “willfully and
without valid excuse[,]” and revoked defendants' probation and
activated his suspended sentences. The judgments reflect that the
court “consider[ed] the record. . . together with the evidence
presented by the parties and the statements made on behalf of the
State and the defendant” in making its determination. Defendant
appeals.
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Defendant concedes on appeal “there is no question that [he]
did not abide by the terms and condition[s] of his probation.” Hecontends, however, the trial court erred in finding that his non-
compliance was willful. Defendant points to his hearing testimony
that he was unaware that he was required to inform his probation
officer of his physical address and that he had yet to receive any
wages from his employer. Absent willful violations, defendant
avers the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his
probation.
“[T]he scope of review on appeal is confined to a
consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record
on appeal. . . .” N.C.R. App. 10(a). The record on appeal
submitted by defendant contains only the following assignment of
error:
The trial judge abused his discretion in
revoking the defendant's probationary
sentence.
Having failed to assign error to the trial court's determination
that his violations were willful, defendant cannot challenge this
finding on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 4 N.C. App. 681, 682, 167
S.E.2d 497, 498-99 (1969). To the extent defendant claims that the
court abused its discretion under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a)
(2003), in choosing to revoke his probation in response to his
violations, we find no such abuse of discretion.
The trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence
and are sufficient to reflect its consideration and evaluation of
defendant's evidence and to support the revocation of probation.
See State v. Jones, 78 N.C. App. 507, 509-10, 337 S.E.2d 195, 197
(1985) (citing State v. Williamson, 61 N.C. App. 531, 301 S.E.2d423 (1983)). As finder of fact, the court was free to disbelieve
defendant's testimony and accept the testimony of his probation
officer. Williamson, 61 N.C. App. at 535, 301 S.E.2d at 426. The
State's proffer was sufficient to show defendant intentionally
withheld the location of his residence from the officer and made no
effort to comply with the monetary conditions of probation.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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