Appeal by respondent from order entered 22 July 2003 by Judge
George R. Murphy in Lee County District Court. Heard in the Court
of Appeals 17 June 2004.
Tron D. Faulk, for Lee County Department of Social Services,
petitioner-appellee.
Eddie Winstead, Guardian Ad Litem-appellee.
Peter Wood for respondent-appellant.
THORNBURG, Judge.
Respondent TM appeals from an order terminating her parental
rights to TB (“the juvenile”). For the reasons stated herein, we
affirm the trial court.
Background
The juvenile was born 29 April 2002 to the respondent mother
and BB, the father. Pursuant to a report that respondent dropped
the juvenile while fighting with BB, the juvenile was placed in the
custody of petitioner Lee County Department of Social Services
(“DSS”) on 15 August 2002. An order adjudicating the juvenile
neglected was entered in Lee County District Court on 7 October
2002. On 3 January 2003, the district court entered an order
directing DSS to cease reunification efforts with respondent andBB. DSS filed a motion for termination of respondent's parental
rights on 18 March 2003.
(See footnote 1)
The motion alleged that respondent: 1)
neglected the juvenile and that it is probable that there would be
a repetition of the neglect; 2) has not provided child support for
the minor child since the juvenile has been in DSS custody; and 3)
willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six months
immediately preceding the filing of the motion. A hearing was held
on this motion on 24 June 2003. Upon consideration of the
evidence, the district court found and concluded that the first two
grounds alleged were supported by the evidence and terminated
respondent's parental rights. Respondent appeals.
Grounds for Termination
Respondent argues on appeal that the trial court erred in
finding and concluding that the juvenile was neglected. As an
initial consideration, we note that although respondent generally
assigned error to the trial court's “finding of fact that
[respondent] had neglected the [juvenile] when there were
insufficient facts to support the finding,” respondent does not, in
her brief, argue that any of the trial court's specific findings of
fact underlying the finding of neglect were unsupported by the
evidence. As respondent has not challenged the trial court's
specific findings of fact, they are binding on appeal.
In re
Padgett, 156 N.C. App 644, 648, 577 S.E.2d 337, 340 (2003). The trial court entered the following finding in regard to
neglect:
That the respondent mother has neglected the
juvenile within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat.
7B-101(15) and it is probable that there would
be a repetition of the neglect if the juvenile
were returned to the care of the parents in
that the parents have not corrected the
circumstances that necessitated the juvenile's
removal from the mother's care. Respondent
parents have a history of abusive behavior
when around each other which has led to injury
on one occasion to the juvenile. This type of
neglect necessitated the juvenile's removal
from the mother's care. The respondent mother
has not demonstrated that she can provide a
stable environment for the juvenile. Although
she has obtained a residence, she does not
live in the residence. She has trouble
maintaining employment and was dismissed from
her last job at Family Dollar after working
less than 2 weeks. Since the last court
session on February 4, 2003, she has missed at
least 4 appointments with Lee-Harnett Mental
Health. She has not gotten her GED and has
failed to comply with other Orders of this
Court. Furthermore, the respondent mother
denies [knowing] the whereabouts of the father
but she and the father were present at the
juvenile's ear surgery on March 31, 2003 and
the mother admitted in her testimony to giving
the father's probation officer information on
his whereabouts. She was also involved in an
altercation with the father on April 22, 2003.
The issue for our review is whether this finding supports the trial
court's conclusion that respondent neglected the juvenile.
In re
Beasley, 147 N.C. App. 399, 405, 555 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2001).
Under N.C. Gen Stat. § 7B-1111, the court may terminate
parental rights upon a finding that the juvenile is a neglected
juvenile. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)(2003). The juvenile
shall be deemed neglected if the court finds the juvenile to be a
“neglected juvenile” within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. §7B-101.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) defines “neglected juvenile”
as follows:
A juvenile who does not receive proper care,
supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's
parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or
who has been abandoned; or who is not provided
necessary medical care; or who is not provided
necessary remedial care; or who lives in an
environment injurious to the juvenile's
welfare . . . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15)(2003). Furthermore, “a prior
adjudication of neglect may be admitted and considered by the trial
court in ruling upon a later petition to terminate parental rights
on the ground of neglect.”
In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 713-14,
319 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1984). However, where evidence of prior
neglect is presented, “the trial court must also consider any
evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior
neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect.”
Id. at
715, 319 S.E.2d at 232.
In the instant case, the trial court's finding of fact clearly
indicates that the trial court considered evidence of both past
neglect and the probability of the repetition of neglect. Although
respondent presented some contrary evidence and urged the trial
court to make different inferences from the evidence, the trial
court was entitled to find as it did.
In re Hughes, 74 N.C. App.
751, 759, 330 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1985) (“The trial judge determines
the weight to be given the testimony and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom. If a different inference may be drawn from
the evidence, he alone determines which inferences to draw and
which to reject.”). Accordingly, we conclude that this finding issufficient to support the conclusion that respondent “neglected the
juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. 7B-101(15) by failing to
provide [the juvenile] with proper care, supervision and discipline
and by willfully failing to provide adequate financial support for
the juvenile.” This assignment of error is overruled.
“A finding of any one of the enumerated termination grounds is
sufficient to support the order of the trial court.”
In re Yocum,
158 N.C. App. 198, 204, 580 S.E.2d 399, 403-04 (2003),
aff'd, 37
N.C. 568, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2003). Thus, we need not address whether
the trial court's findings support termination on another ground.
Dispositional Phase
Respondent brings forth two assignments of error in reference
to the dispositional phase of the termination hearing. Respondent
first argues that the trial court erred in not holding a separate
hearing at which the best interests of the child could be
considered. This argument has already been rejected by this Court:
the trial court need only hold the single evidentiary hearing; it
is not necessary for the adjudication and dispositional stages to
be conducted at separate hearings. In re Carr, 116 N.C. App. 403,
407, 448 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1994).
Secondly, respondent suggests that the trial court may have
applied a best interests test in the adjudicatory phase, as well as
in the dispositional phase, but does not cite to any portion of the
record as support. Moreover, a review of the record does not
indicate that the trial court applied an incorrect standard. See
In re White, 81 N.C. App. 82, 85, 344 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1986) (“[I]tis presumed, in the absence of some affirmative indication to the
contrary, that the judge, having knowledge of the law, is able to
consider the evidence in light of the applicable legal standard and
to determine whether grounds for termination exist before
proceeding to consider evidence relevant only to the dispositional
stage.”), disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 283, 347 S.E.2d 470 (1986).
These assignments of error are overruled.
Based upon the foregoing, the order of the trial court
terminating respondent's parental rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges HUDSON and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Footnote: 1