IN THE MATTER OF:
M.L. and Cabarrus County
A.G., Nos. 02 J 43
Minor Children. 02 J 44
Kathleen Arundell Widelski, for petitioner-appellee Cabarrus
County Department of Social Services.
Susan J. Hall for respondent-appellant.
THORNBURG, Judge.
M.L. was born on 3 February 2000. A.G. was born on 8 July
2001. Respondent is their mother. A.G. weighed 13 pounds, three
ounces on 14 January 2002. On 27 February 2002, A.G. was admitted
into Northeast Medical Center weighing only 12 pounds, 2 ounces.
Additionally, she was apathetic, balding, had a loss of
subcutaneous fat and her skin was hanging from the bone. Her
hygiene was poor in that she was dirty, had dirt under her
fingernails and had diaper rash. She was diagnosed with failure to
thrive due to caloric depravation. After being admitted into the
hospital, she rapidly gained weight.
On 5 March 2002, the Cabarrus County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that M.L. and A.G. wereneglected and dependent juveniles. On 10 June 2002, nunc pro tunc
9 May 2002, the trial court adjudicated the children as neglected
and dependent juveniles. The court determined that it was not in
the children's best interests to be returned to respondent's care
and ordered that DSS not make reasonable efforts to return the
children to their home. On 10 September 2002, DSS filed a motion
to terminate respondent's parental rights.
On 13 March 2003, hearings were held on the motion to
terminate respondent's parental rights. The trial court found that
the children were neglected and dependent juveniles. Accordingly,
the trial court found that grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (6) to terminate respondent's parental
rights, and that it was in the best interests of the children that
respondent's parental rights be terminated. Respondent appeals.
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that she neglected her children. Respondent contends
that at the time of termination she had visited her children on a
consistent basis. During these visitations, respondent argues that
she did no harm to the children, did not interfere with their
remedial care and that the children were properly clothed and fed.
Respondent further argues that the trial court erred in finding
that she was incapable of providing for the proper care and
supervision of the children. While respondent concedes she is
mildly mentally retarded, she argues that she has adequate family
support available in raising the children. After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of
the parties, we affirm. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 sets out the
statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. A finding of
any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to
support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387
S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning for the
termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
that grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights exist.”
In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997).
In the instant case, the trial court concluded that the
children were dependent juveniles, in that respondent was unable to
provide appropriate care and supervision for the children. The
trial court found that the children were raised in an unsanitary
manner, in that the children were often dirty and smelled, A.G. had
a very bad diaper rash when she was admitted to the hospital in
February 2002 and an inspection of A.G.'s baby bottle showed that
the nipple was distorted, macerated and had mold inside it.
The trial court also found that M.L. was not properly cared
for or supervised. M.L. was often inappropriately dressed for cold
weather, being without shoes on one occasion and without socks,
shoes, coat or hat on another. He also was observed to be out of
control, with bouts of kicking and screaming. During a home visit,
M.L. threw items around the room, including a toy truck that
jeopardized his sister's safety. Respondent admitted to being
unable to control his behavior. The trial court further found that A.G. was not properly cared
for. On 27 February 2002, she had to be admitted to the hospital
for failure to thrive due to caloric depravation. Respondent also
failed to fill prescriptions needed for A.G.'s care.
The trial court further found as fact that “efforts to return
the children to the mother's home would clearly be futile and would
be inconsistent with the children's health, safety, and need for a
safe permanent home within a reasonable period of time.” The court
based its findings on evidence that respondent had an IQ of 57, was
determined to be mildly mentally retarded, and scored in the 4th
percentile or lower in general intelligence ability tests. The
court found that there had not been a substantial improvement in
respondent's cognitive abilities prior to the court hearing. Due
to her mental retardation, respondent would be expected to have
difficulties in problem solving. Because of these limitations,
respondent would have difficulty comprehending medical details and
risks of failing to follow a medical regimen.
The court also made findings which supported a conclusion that
respondent continued to be unable to care for her children. The
court cited evidence that despite repeated instructions, respondent
would bring Doritos and soft drinks to visits with the children,
although A.G. was too young to eat solid food. Respondent would
also have to be reminded that the children needed clean diapers and
would occasionally put the wrong diapers on the wrong child.
Respondent did not have a stable home, as she moved back and forth
between a sister's and her current boyfriend's residences. Respondent's sister had her own children removed because her home
was not a safe environment for her children to live. Accordingly,
we conclude that there was clear, cogent and convincing evidence to
support the trial court's conclusion that the children were
dependent children within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(6).
Since grounds exist pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(6) to support the trial court's order, the remaining
ground found by the trial court to support termination need not be
reviewed by the Court. Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at
233-34.
Once the trial court has found that grounds exist to terminate
parental rights, “the court shall issue an order terminating the
parental rights of such parent with respect to the juvenile unless
the court shall further determine that the best interests of the
juvenile require that the parental rights of the parent not be
terminated.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2003). The trial
court's decision to terminate parental rights at the disposition
stage is discretionary. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110,
316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984).
Here, respondent argues that she loves her children, has
social security benefits available to her, has a stable residence
and visited the children regularly. Thus, she contends that it was
not in the best interests of her children that her rights be
terminated. However, while the children were in respondent's care,
they were dirty, improperly supervised and A.G.'s life wasendangered. Since being placed in foster care, A.G. has gained
weight and is developmentally on target. Considering respondent's
history of being unable to care for her children's basic welfare,
as well as her cognitive limitations and inability to follow basic
instructions on caring for her children, the trial court could
properly conclude that termination of respondent's parental rights
was in the children's best interests. Accordingly, the order
terminating respondent's parental rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges HUDSON and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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