An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced
ure.
NO. COA03-1583
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 7 December 2004
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Wake County
Nos. 94 CRS 26574
ANG XANONH 94 CRS 26575
94 CRS 26576
94 CRS 26577
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 25 August 1995 by
Judge Stafford G. Bullock in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 16 September 2004.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General David Roy Blackwell, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate
Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
Ang Xanonh (defendant) appeals from judgments entered after
a jury found him to be guilty of two counts of first-degree murder
and two counts of robbery with a firearm. We hold that any error
at trial was non-prejudicial.
I. Background
The State presented evidence to show that in October 1994,
Ballard and Maxine Satterfield (collectively, the victims) were
retired and resided on New Hope Road in Raleigh, North Carolina.
Around 4:30 p.m. on 29 October 1994, Bill Satterfield
(Satterfield), the victims' adult son, visited his parents' house
after his father failed to meet him for a scheduled golf game. Satterfield let himself in the back door of his parents' home with
a key, walked upstairs, and observed some purses strewn across the
bed and some papers on the floor. Satterfield discovered his
father's body in the bedroom, covered by a bedspread and with a
wound in his temple. Satterfield immediately called 911 and waited
in the front yard.
Law enforcement officers responded to the scene and found Mrs.
Satterfield lying face down with her hands under her chest in the
foyer inside the front door. She was grasping a small red booklet,
described as a personal Bible, in her right hand. City-County
Crime Bureau Crime Scene Investigator Herman Colvin (Investigator
Colvin) observed no sign of forced entry. The front door and
storm door were closed, but unlocked. The house was neat and
orderly, with the exception of one bedroom where a number of
pocketbooks and papers were strewn on the bed. The pocketbooks
were empty.
Investigator Colvin recovered a .22 caliber shell casing near
Mrs. Satterfield's right elbow and a second shell casing from the
floor in the bedroom where Mr. Satterfield's body was located.
Autopsies showed that the victims both died instantaneously from a
single gunshot wound to the head.
Three days later on 1 November 1994, Investigator Colvin found
seven small red Bibles, similar to the one found in Mrs.
Satterfield's hands, in a drainage ditch near the victims' and
defendant's homes. Other similar Bibles were recovered fromseveral neighbors who had turned them into the police department
after reading about the murders in the newspaper.
Investigators found fingerprints belonging to J.M. on the door
and on a wall in the victims' home. J.M. was fifteen-years-old and
lived with his mother and brother, Germaine Miles, directly across
the street from the victims' house. The victims had previously
complained to their son about the kids across the street playing
loud music. Germaine was also identified as a suspect because at
one time, his friend Vance Boose, had possessed approximately
thirteen of the red Bibles similar to the one found in Mrs.
Satterfield's hand.
At trial, J.M. testified that he had pleaded guilty to two
counts of second-degree murder and two counts of armed robbery as
a result of his involvement in the victims' murders. J.M. and
defendant were best friends. J.M. testified that around 10:00
a.m. on 29 October 1994, defendant visited J.M.'s house and
displayed a small, black gun. Defendant stated, Get up, and let's
go, to [the pool hall] or whatever. J.M. got out of his bed and
walked outside with defendant. Defendant proceeded to put gloves
on his hands as he walked across the street towards the victims'
house. Defendant stated, I need to get something from these
people.
Defendant and J.M. walked up the victims' driveway, and
defendant rang the doorbell. J.M. stood about four or five feet
behind defendant. When Mrs. Satterfield answered the door,
defendant handed her a little red Bible he had obtained from J.M.'shouse. After Mrs. Satterfield took the little red Bible, defendant
brandished a gun to her head, entered the victims' home, and asked
for her husband. J.M. followed defendant into the house and
remained about three or four steps inside the victims' home.
J.M. overheard defendant scream real loud from upstairs and
say, Wake up, old man. J.M. then heard one gunshot. Defendant
ran back downstairs, asked Mrs. Satterfield for the keys, and shot
her once in the head. Defendant asked J.M. if he [saw] anything
[he] wanted. J.M. responded, No, and accompanied defendant up
the stairs inside the house. Defendant and J.M. looked through
some pocketbooks upstairs. J.M. found approximately twenty
dollars, which he kept. Upon defendant's request, J.M. went into
the other bedroom to see if the old man [was] dead. Defendant
and J.M. also obtained some money from Mr. Satterfield's wallet,
which was located in the room where his body was found. After
defendant and J.M. exited the residence, defendant gave J.M. around
forty-five to fifty dollars.
Raleigh Police Department Detective Charlie Branch (Detective
Branch) testified regarding his investigation of the victims'
murders. During his investigation, he met with J.M. because of
fingerprints that matched J.M. were found in the victims' home.
While at the police station, Detective Branch escorted J.M. to the
restroom. Once inside, J.M. started crying . . . [and] mentioned
that he would tell me who the person was that shot the
Satterfields. J.M. wrote the name Ang on a sheet of paper and
would not say the name aloud as he was afraid . . . of theconsequences. J.M. further stated he was afraid because he
thought the Suicidal Town Gang would harm him or his family.
J.M. [h]ung out with some of the guys in the gang, and stated
that defendant was a member of that gang. Detective Branch
testified that, according to J.M., to become a gang member, it was
nothing to take a life. That was part of their initiation, to take
a life.
Other evidence was presented, including testimony by
Investigator Colvin that he found six cartridges to a gun in
defendant's bedroom. Investigator Colvin also took possession of
a loaded .22 long rifle semi-automatic pistol that defendant's
brother had owned in October 1994. Defendant's brother remembered
cleaning the gun near the day of the murders and he noticed two
bullets were missing. At least two cartridges found in the weapon
discovered by Investigator Colvin were identical to those found in
defendant's home.
Defendant presented evidence that none of the latent
fingerprints collected from the victims' home belonged to him. The
jury convicted defendant on all counts. The trial court sentenced
defendant to two consecutive life sentences without parole for the
first-degree murder convictions and also sentenced him for sixty-
nine to ninety-two months for each armed robbery, to be served
concurrently with the two life sentences. After this Court granted
defendant's motion for writ of certiorari, defendant appeals.
II. Issues
The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by:
(1) giving an additional instruction on acting in concert after the
jury had been instructed and retired to deliberate; (2) admitting
photographs depicting young Asian men displaying weapons in a
gangster-type style that was seized from defendant's bedroom; and
(3) allowing Detective Branch to testify to J.M.'s statement that
initiation to the Suicidal Town Gang required taking a life.
III. Jury Instructions
A. Acting In Concert
The State did not request and the trial court did not give an
instruction on acting in concert as a possible theory of guilt.
However, after the jury charge, the State asked why the trial court
did not instruct on acting in concert as part of the felony murder
charge. Defendant objected and stated, I would have objected to
the acting in concert instruction had it been offered to be
presented to the jury. The trial court responded that no such
instruction had been given because the State failed to timely
request it.
During jury deliberations, the jury presented a question to
the court that stated, If Ange [sic] was found not guilty, what if
any changes could be made in [J.M.]'s plea bargain transcript?
After the jury had asked the question but prior to bringing the
jury back into the courtroom, the trial court stated to counsel
that it would instruct on acting in concert. Although defendant
had objected when the State originally requested the instruction
after the trial court had instructed the jury, defendant did notrenew or preserve his objection. After bringing the jury back into
the courtroom, the trial court responded:
Members of the jury, this is not a question
that's before you. We're here trying to find
facts to make a determination as to whether or
not the defendant is guilty or not guilty of
that which he has been charged with. I am
unable to answer your question because I do
not engage in plea bargaining; this is a
matter between the defendant and the State.
So I have no answer for you to that charge.
However, in lieu of that question . . . , I'd
like to give an additional charge which was
requested as soon as we had left the Court
earlier, and perhaps this will shed some light
and help you in your decision process.
The charge is acting in concert. For a person
to be guilty of a crime, it is not necessary
that he himself to [sic] do all of the acts
necessary to constitute the crime. If two or
more persons act together with a common
purpose to commit robbery with a dangerous
weapon and are actually or actively or
constructively present at the time the crimes
are committed, each of them is responsible for
the acts of the other done in the commission
of robbery with a dangerous weapon.
So I charge that if you find from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the
alleged date, Ang Xanonh, acting either by
himself or acting together with [J.M.], had in
his possession a firearm and took and carried
away property from the person and the presence
of the person without his voluntary consent by
endangering or threatening the life with the
use or threatened use of a firearm, the
defendant, knowing that he was not entitled to
take the property and intending to deprive
that person of its use permanently, it would
be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of
robbery with a firearm.
Following this instruction and while the jury was still
deliberating, the trial court acknowledged that defendant had notconsented to the instruction and that it want[ed] the record to
reflect that [the trial judge] did it on [his] own motion.
Defendant does not argue the instruction on acting in concert
was unsupported by the evidence. Defendant argues that by framing
the instruction on acting in concert as a direct response to the
jury's question about what would happen to J.M. if defendant were
acquitted, the trial court directly signaled to the jury that it
should convict defendant of the charges against him.
B. Expression of Opinion by Trial Judge
A trial judge is prohibited from expressing an opinion in the
presence of the jury regarding any question of fact to be decided
by the jury. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1222 (2003). In evaluating
whether a judge's comments cross into the realm of impermissible
opinion, a totality of the circumstances test is utilized. State
v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 155, 456 S.E.2d 789, 808 (1995)
Not every ill-advised expression by the trial
judge is of such harmful effect as to require
a reversal. The objectionable language must
be viewed in light of all the facts and
circumstances, and unless it is apparent that
such infraction of the rules might reasonably
have had a prejudicial effect on the result of
the trial, the error will be considered
harmless.
State v. Holden, 280 N.C. 426, 430, 185 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1972)
(quoting State v. Perry, 231 N.C. 467, 57 S.E.2d 774 (1950); State
v. Hoover, 252 N.C. 133, 113 S.E.2d 281 (1960)).
Here, following submission of the jury's question, the trial
court clearly informed the jury that their question is not a
question that's before you. The trial court further explained, Ihave no answer for you to that charge. The trial court also
stated, I'd like to give an additional charge . . . and perhaps
this will shed some light and help you in your decision, and
subsequently instructed the jury on acting in concert.
Under these facts, we hold the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on its own motion after the jury had retired
to deliberate and as a direct response to a question from the jury.
Defendant has failed to show, under the totality of the
circumstances, this improper action expressed an impermissible
opinion regarding defendant's guilt to warrant a new trial.
Larrimore, 340 N.C. at 155, 456 S.E.2d at 808.
IV. Photographs
Defendant argues the trial court improperly admitted into
evidence photographs depicting young Asian men bearing weapons in
a gangster-type style. Defendant asserts the photographs were
irrelevant and were not linked by any reasonable inference to
these crimes. We disagree.
Under the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, relevant
evidence is defined as, evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2003).
Relevant evidence is admissible, while [e]vidence which is not
relevant is not admissible. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 402
(2003). If the proffered evidence has no tendency to prove a fact
in issue in the case, the evidence is irrelevant and must beexcluded. State v. Coen, 78 N.C. App. 778, 780-81, 338 S.E.2d
784, 786 (citing State v. Perry, 298 N.C. 502, 259 S.E.2d 496
(1979)), disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 709, 347 S.E.2d 444 (1986).
In criminal cases, [e]very circumstance that is calculated to
throw any light upon the supposed crime is admissible. The weight
of such evidence is for the jury. State v. Parker, 354 N.C. 268,
288, 553 S.E.2d 885, 899 (2001) (quotations omitted), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 1114, 153 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2002).
The existence of a motive is, however, a
circumstance tending to make it more probable
that the person in question did the act, hence
evidence of motive is always admissible where
the doing of the act is in dispute. . . .
Motive may be proved by declarations and other
conduct of the person himself, or by evidence
of facts which would naturally give rise to a
relevant motive and from which such a motive
may therefore reasonably be inferred.
1-4 Henry Brandis, Jr. and Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis and Broun on
North Carolina Evidence § 110 (5th ed. 2004) (citations omitted).
Detective Branch testified without objection that J.M. had
stated that defendant was a member of the Suicidal Town Gang,
which was out of California and that to take a life was to become
_ to become a gang member . . . that was part of their initiation.
J.M. also testified, without objection, that defendant was a member
of the Suicidal Town Gang. Defendant assigns error to the
admission of three photographs seized during a search of the
bedroom defendant shared with his brother. The photographs, which
were not included in the record on appeal, were described by the
prosecutor outside the presence of the jury as depicting young men,
mostly Asian or Laotian, displaying weapons in a very gangster-type style. The trial court admitted the photographs, over
defendant's objection, because they had been authenticated as
matters that were found in [defendant's] room, and [the] purpose
for allowing it is they were found in the room _ in the same room
the weapon was in, and that he occupied that room. . . . They were
items that were found in that particular room.
The photographs found in defendant's room, along with
Detective Branch and J.M.'s testimony regarding defendant's gang
activity, could allow the jury to reasonably infer defendant's
motive in the murders. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding the photographs were relevant.
The trial court may exclude relevant evidence if:
its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule
403 (1992). The decision whether to exclude
relevant evidence under Rule 403 is a matter
left to the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 308,
406 S.E.2d 876, 893 (1991).
State v. Collins, 335 N.C. 729, 734-35, 440 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1994).
Defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion because the
photographs were highly inflammatory and likely to cause the jury
to presume guilt on an improper basis. Defendant argues, the
evidence was certain to predispose the jurors to believe that
defendant was like the people depicted in the photographs, that he
was or wanted to be a member of a gang, and that a gang member was
more likely to commit a murder than someone who was not involvedwith gangs. Defendant concedes the State presented evidence that
defendant's brother was a member of the Suicidal Town Gang, and
that defendant and J.M. engaged in activities with members of the
gang. This evidence was presented and received without objection
by defendant.
Defendant failed to include the photographs in the record on
appeal. His argument that the photographs were unfairly
prejudicial is without merit considering the other evidence and
testimony presented by the State and received without any objection
by defendant. Defendant has failed to show the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting the photographs into evidence. This
assignment of error is overruled.
V. Hearsay Evidence
Defendant contends the trial court committed plain error by
allowing Detective Branch to testify regarding statements made to
him by J.M. We disagree.
Detective Branch testified, without objection, that during his
investigation, J.M. told him, there were quite a few of the gang
members and they were out of California and that to take a life was
to become -- to become a gang member, it was nothing to take a
life. That was part of their initiation, to take a life. J.M.
also testified at trial. He was cross-examined regarding the
violent nature of the Suicidal Town Gang and acknowledged that a
prospective gang member had to be beat in. Under the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence, hearsay statements are inadmissibleunless the statement is permitted by statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
8C-1, Rule 802 (2003).
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. N.C.G.S. §
8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1999). [W]henever an
extrajudicial statement is offered for a
purpose other than proving the truth of the
matter asserted, it is not hearsay. State v.
Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 15-16, 316 S.E.2d 197,
205, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963, 83 L. Ed. 2d
299 (1984).
State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 190, 531 S.E.2d 428, 447 (2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130, 148 L. Ed. 2d 797 (2001).
We agree with defendant's argument that the State offered this
testimony to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Detective
Branch's testimony neither corroborated J.M.'s testimony nor falls
under any recognized exception within the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence.
Defendant, however, failed to object to Detective Branch's
testimony at trial. Based on his failure to object, we apply a
plain error analysis to determine whether defendant is entitled to
a new trial.
[T]he plain error rule . . . is always to be
applied cautiously and only in the exceptional
case where, after reviewing the entire record,
it can be said the claimed error is a
fundamental error, something so basic, so
prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that
justice cannot have been done, or where [the
error] is grave error which amounts to a
denial of a fundamental right of the accused,
or the error has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice or in the denial to appellant of a
fair trial or where the error is such as to
seriously affect the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings orwhere it can be fairly said the instructional
mistake had a probable impact on the jury's
finding that the defendant was guilty.
State v. Lemons, 352 N.C. 87, 96-97, 530 S.E.2d 542, 548 (2000)
(alteration in original) (citations and quotations omitted), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1091, 148 L. Ed. 2d 698 (2001). Before deciding
that an error by the trial court amounts to 'plain error,' the
appellate court must be convinced that absent the error the jury
probably would have reached a different verdict. State v.
Harrison, 328 N.C. 678, 685, 403 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1991) (citation
omitted).
Defendant has failed to prove this statement prejudiced his
trial. J.M. accompanied defendant when he committed the murders
and testified to the events surrounding the victims' deaths.
Detective Branch corroborated J.M.'s testimony. Excluding
Detective Branch's testimony that initiation into the Suicidal
Town Gang required taking a life, the State presented other
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. We are not convinced
that but for the trial court's error in admitting this portion of
Detective Branch's testimony, the jury would have reached a
different verdict. Id.
VI. Conclusion
The trial court did not express an impermissible opinion by
giving the additional jury instruction on acting in concert after
the jury had retired to deliberate.
Larrimore, 340 N.C. at 155,
456 S.E.2d at 808. Defendant failed to renew his objection to the
acting in concert instruction. The trial court did not err byadmitting the photographs found in defendant's bedroom. The trial
court erred in admitting hearsay statements during Detective
Branch's testimony. J.M. testified and was cross-examined by
defendant's counsel. The trial court's error does not constitute
plain error and does not warrant a new trial. Defendant received
a fair trial free from prejudicial error.
No Prejudicial Error.
Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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