IN THE MATTER OF: Yadkin County
JBC and CLC No. 01 J 111
No. 01 J 112
Richard N. Randleman, P.A., by Richard N. Randleman, for
Yadkin County Department of Social Services petitioner-
appellee.
Hall & Hall Attorneys at Law, PC, by Susan P. Hall, for
respondent-appellant.
Lora B. Greene for the attorney advocate guardian ad litem.
THORNBURG, Judge.
Respondent TTC appeals from an order terminating his parental
rights with respect to juveniles JBC and CLC. For the reasons
stated herein, we affirm the order of the trial court.
The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows:
Respondent is the biological father of JBC, born 24 November 1996,
and CLC, born 1 August 1999. Pursuant to a report from a Florida
social services agency alleging drug use and domestic violence,
petitioner Yadkin County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)
initially became involved with the family on 15 October 2001. On
9 November 2001, DSS filed a petition alleging that the juvenileswere neglected in that they were living in an environment injurious
to their welfare. The juveniles were adjudicated neglected as a
result of a hearing on 26 November 2001 in Yadkin County District
Court.
The underlying termination of parental rights petition was
filed by petitioner on 23 April 2003. In reference to respondent's
parental rights, the petition alleged three grounds for termination
under N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-1111 (2003): 1) respondent neglected
the juveniles as that term is defined in G.S. . 7B-101(15); 2)
respondent is the father of children born out of wedlock and has
not established paternity, or legitimated said children or provided
any substantial support for them; and 3) respondent has willfully
left his children in foster care for more than 12 months without
showing that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been
made in correcting those conditions which led to their removal.
After a hearing on the matter, the trial court concluded that all
three of these grounds existed and terminated respondent's parental
rights. Respondent appeals.
Respondent brings forth four assignments of error for this
Court's review. First, respondent argues that the trial court
erred
(See footnote 1)
by not conducting a separate dispositional hearing.
However, the record reveals that respondent did not make any motion
or lodge any objection at the termination hearing in reference tothis argument. Accordingly, this issue is not preserved for our
review. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1)(2003); see In re O.W., __ N.C.
App. __, __, 596 S.E.2d 851, 852 (2004)(holding that the respondent
failed to preserve the argument that the trial court erred by
consolidating the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings because
the respondent did not object to DSS's motion to consolidate the
hearings).
Respondent's next two assignments of error assert that the
findings of fact are not sufficient to support the termination of
respondent's parental rights and that the conclusions of law are
not supported by evidence. However, these assignments of error do
not address or identify specific findings of fact or conclusions of
law. "A single assignment [of error] generally challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support numerous findings of fact,
as here, is broadside and ineffective." Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C.
App. 372, 375-76, 325 S.E.2d 260, 266 (1985), disc. review denied,
313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985). As respondent failed to
specifically assign error to any of the trial court's findings of
fact supporting its order, those findings are deemed to be
supported by competent evidence and are conclusive on appeal.
Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991);
N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(1) (2003). Accordingly, this Court is “left
to determine whether the trial court's findings support its
conclusion[s] of law.” In re Beasley, 147 N.C. App. 399, 405, 555
S.E.2d 643, 647 (2001). After a careful review of the findings and conclusions in the
termination order, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
concluding that respondent neglected the juveniles pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. . 7B-1111(a)(1)(2003).
The trial court's order contains the following relevant
findings:
The parents of these children had a
history of domestic violence and drug use in
the State of Florida dating from at least 1999
and were being investigated by authorities in
that state when they moved with the children
to Yadkin County in September or October of
2001; that on October 17, 2001, after
receiving a report, a Social Worker . . .
discovered that this family had recently come
to Yadkin County from the State of Florida and
had . . . moved to the Sleep Inn in
Yadkinville; that the father was not employed
but the mother was employed at the Sleep Inn
and at a local restaurant and that the family
had no transportation and only $150.00; that
an offer to help arrange bus transportation
back with other family members or
transportation to a homeless shelter were
refused, but they did accept help in
relocation to Holcomb's Trailer Park in
Yadkinville and both parents were tested for
drugs; ... the father's [sic] tested positive
for marijuana and both parents signed a
Protection Plan to keep the children away from
drug use; that on November 8, 2001 a Social
Worker and Officer of the Yadkinville Police
Department went to the family residence where
the father, both children and another man were
present and the residence had a strong odor of
marijuana smoke and both drugs and drug
paraphernalia were found; that the father was
arrested . . .; that both parents refused to
sign a Treatment Plan and the following day
the Department of Social Services took custody
pursuant to a non-secure Order; that on
November 26, 2001, both children were
adjudicated neglected children pursuant to
G.S. 7B-101 (15), and the Court continued the
legal and physical custody of said childrenwith the Yadkin County Department of Social
Services.
That on January 30, 2002, the Court
reviewed this case in the foster care
placement of the children, and found that the
father's Substance-Abuse Assessment resulted
in a diagnosis of Cannabis Abuse and placed
him in the high probability for chemical
dependence classification and, a psychological
evaluation reflected a recommendation of
substance abuse treatment for the father; that
the Court found that although the mother was
making progress in accepting services offered
by petitioner, the father was being less
cooperative, and the Court directed a trial
placement of the children with the mother if
the father would agree and comply with
specific requirements contained in the Court's
Order.
That at the next Court Review on July
22, 2002, the Court found that the parents had
failed to take advantage of the trial
placement permitted in its prior Order, and
that the father was in jail in Guilford County
facing charges of Felonious Robbery with a
Dangerous Weapon; that the Court further found
that the father refused to be drug tested or
complete his Family Services Case Plan; the
Court relieved the petitioner from further
reasonable efforts toward reunification.
That the case was again reviewed by the
Court on November 4, 2002, and the father was
still incarcerated awaiting trial; . . . .
That a Permanency Planning Review was
held February 24, 2003, and the Court . . .
found that it was in the best interests of
these children to change the plan to
termination of the rights of both parents, and
the children's Guardian Ad Litem concurred in
that change.
That prior to being released from
reasonable efforts, the Yadkin County
Department of Social Services had offered
extensive services to both parents, but the
father missed six out of twelve parenting
classes offered to him, was removed from
anger-management classes for failure to payfor the same, refused to give the social
worker the names of his relatives who could
provide family support or services, did not
maintain regular employment or consistent
housing for his family, disrupted his
psychological evaluation so the same could not
be completed, refused to make appointments for
testing but was diagnosed to have mental
problems for which medication was recommended
but refused to follow up with taking that
medication.
That even while incarcerated, the father
only attempted to contact his children through
the social worker one time, although he claims
to have made several attempts through their
mother who would not respond to his letters. .
. . [A]lthough [respondent] has provided
support for [the juveniles] in the past, [he]
has not done so since they were removed from
his custody in November, 2001.
We conclude that these findings support the trial court's
conclusion that grounds exist for the termination of respondent's
parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. . 1111(a)(1)(2003).
Under N.C. Gen Stat. § 7B-1111, the court may terminate
parental rights upon a finding that the juvenile is a neglected
juvenile. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)(2003). The juvenile
shall be deemed neglected if the court finds the juvenile to be a
“neglected juvenile” within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-101. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) defines “neglected juvenile”
as follows:
A juvenile who does not receive proper care,
supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's
parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or
who has been abandoned; or who is not provided
necessary medical care; or who is not provided
necessary remedial care; or who lives in an
environment injurious to the juvenile's
welfare . . . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15)(2003). Furthermore, “[w]here evidence
of prior neglect is presented, 'the trial court must also consider
any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of
prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect.'” In
re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 250, 485 S.E.2d 612, 616 (1997)(quoting In
re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1997).
In the instant case, the trial court's findings of fact
clearly indicate that the trial court considered evidence of both
past neglect and the probability of the repetition of neglect. The
above-quoted findings show that the juveniles lived in an injurious
environment with a lack of proper supervision due to respondent's
drug use, violence and unemployment. Furthermore, prior to his
incarceration respondent actively resisted DSS's efforts to assist
the family. After being incarcerated, respondent only made minimal
efforts to contact his children. See Whittington v. Hendren (In
re Hendren), 156 N.C. App. 364, 368, 576 S.E.2d 372, 375-76 (2003)
(noting that “in determining whether neglect has occurred, the
trial judge may consider the parent's failure to provide the
personal contact, love, and affection that inheres in the parental
relationship” and that “[i]ncarceration alone . . . does not negate
a father's neglect of his child”) (citations omitted).
Although respondent presented some contrary evidence and urged
the trial court to make different inferences from the evidence, the
trial court was entitled to find as it did. In re Hughes, 74 N.C.
App. 751, 759, 330 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1985) (“The trial judge
determines the weight to be given the testimony and the reasonableinferences to be drawn therefrom. If a different inference may be
drawn from the evidence, he alone determines which inferences to
draw and which to reject.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the
findings made by the trial court are sufficient to support the
conclusion that respondent neglected the juveniles within the
meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-101(15).
“A finding of any one of the enumerated termination grounds is
sufficient to support the order of the trial court.” In re Yocum,
158 N.C. App. 198, 204, 580 S.E.2d 399, 403-04 (2003), aff'd per
curiam, 357 N.C. 568, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2003). Accordingly, we need
not address whether the trial court's findings support termination
on another ground. This assignment of error is overruled.
Respondent's final argument is that the trial court erred in
failing to appoint a guardian ad litem for respondent. Respondent
asserts that because DSS and the trial court believed that
respondent was suffering from substance abuse problems and
“possibly other disorders,” he was entitled to have a guardian ad
litem appointed to represent his interests. Our juvenile code
provides that a guardian ad litem shall be appointed to represent
a parent in a termination hearing where it is alleged that a
parent's rights should be terminated pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. .
7B-1111(a)(6)(2003), and the inability to provide proper care and
supervision pursuant to that provision is the result of substance
abuse, mental retardation, mental illness, organic brain syndrome,
or a similar condition. N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-1101 (2003). N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-1111(a)(6) is the provision of the
juvenile code which provides for termination of parental rights
when the parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and
supervision of the juvenile such that the juvenile is a dependent
juvenile. Thus, a trial court need not appoint a guardian ad litem
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-1101 unless (1) the petition or
motion to terminate parental rights alleges dependency and (2) the
majority of the dependency allegations tend to show that a parent
or guardian is incapable as the result of some debilitating
condition listed in the statute of providing for the proper care
and supervision of his or her child. In re H.W., 163 N.C. App.
438, 447, 594 S.E.2d 211, 216 (2004), disc. review denied, 358 N.C.
543, 599 S.E.2d 46 (2004)(interpreting an analogous provision for
the appointment of a guardian ad litem at a termination of parental
rights proceeding)(citing In re Estes, 157 N.C. App. 513, 518, 579
S.E.2d 496, 499, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 459, 585 S.E.2d 390
(2003).
In the instant case none of the grounds in the juvenile
petition alleged that the juveniles were dependent juveniles.
Rather the grounds alleged in reference to respondent's rights were
neglect, failure to legitimate the juveniles, and willfully leaving
the juveniles in foster care for more than 12 months. As the
petition did not allege dependency that is the result of
respondent's substance abuse, mental retardation, mental illness,
organic brain syndrome, or other similar cause or condition, thetrial court was not required to appoint a guardian ad litem for
respondent. This assignment of error is overruled.
Affirmed.
Judges GEER and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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