STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Onslow County
Nos. 02 CRS 56365-67,
DALLAS EUGENE CLARK 56470
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General E. Burke Haywood, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, for defendant-appellant.
LEVINSON, Judge.
On 10 December 2002, defendant Dallas Clark was indicted on
three counts of attempted murder, two counts of assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill, one count of assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and
one count of discharging a weapon into occupied property. The case
was tried at the 31 March 2003 Criminal Session of Onslow County
Superior Court.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following:
On 14 June 2002, Armando Lanclos, Jamal Davenport, Joshua Meadows
and Todd Hill drove to the Party Zone, a club on Highway 24 in
Jacksonville, North Carolina. At approximately 3 or 3:30 a.m., agroup comprised of the defendant, Antonio Hill, Ernest Rhodes,
Tavon Brown, Tristin McElroy and Angelo Brown entered the club.
The two groups were familiar and cordial with each other. A short
time after the second group arrived, the club closed and the two
groups of men left the club. In the parking lot, Antonio Hill and
Lanclos had a brief disagreement, but the matter did not escalate.
Before leaving, Rhodes pulled up in a van alongside Lanclos'
green Dodge Caravan. The two groups made plans to meet up later.
Meanwhile, Davenport had to urinate and decided to do so in between
the two vans. As he started to do so, defendant stuck his head out
of the window and asked Davenport what he was doing. Davenport got
into Lanclos' van without urinating. As he got into the van,
Lanclos told Davenport that defendant had said something, but he
could not understand because the music was too loud.
Rhodes pulled his van out of the parking lot onto Highway 24,
and Lanclos pulled out behind him. As Lanclos' van passed the van
driven by Rhodes, defendant leaned out of the van and shot at
Lanclos' van. The first bullet caused the driver's side window to
shatter. The glass hit Meadows in the face and knocked him
unconscious, and the bullet hit Lanclos in the neck and he slumped
over on the steering wheel. Defendant fired a second shot that hit
Lanclos in the back, and Lanclos slumped over to the passenger side
seat. Davenport took hold of the wheel and drove the van to the
hospital.
After the shooting, Rhodes stopped the van, which was owned by
defendant, and everybody got out. Antonio Hill took the gun fromdefendant and threw it away. The defendant then drove the van away
at a fast rate of speed. The remainder of the group went to the
hospital and told police what had happened.
Defendant testified that he had been drinking on the night of
the shooting, and that he was drunk. Defendant denied
intentionally shooting at Lanclos' van or knowing who was in the
van. Defendant stated that he simply heard a bang and a light
flash, grabbed his gun and started shooting. Defendant stated that
he remembers firing about five times.
Defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill, one count of assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and
discharging a weapon into occupied property. Defendant appeals
from judgments and sentences entered upon these convictions.
We first consider whether there was sufficient evidence that
defendant assaulted the victims with an intent to kill. Defendant
cites his testimony that he did not know that the victim was in the
van next to him, the fact that he had been drinking, and argues
that he did not intend to assault the victims with an intent to
kill.
After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of
the parties, we find no error. To survive a motion to dismiss, the
State must present substantial evidence of each essential element
of the charged offense. State v. Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 716-17, 483
S.E.2d 432, 434 (1997). “'Substantial evidence is relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to supporta conclusion.'” Id. at 717, 483 S.E.2d at 434 (quoting State v.
Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1992)). When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he trial court must
consider such evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference to be
drawn therefrom.” State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 450, 439
S.E.2d 578, 585 (1994)(citation omitted).
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence that
he intended to kill the victims.
An intent to kill is a mental attitude, and
ordinarily it must be proved, if proven at
all, by circumstantial evidence, that is, by
proving facts from which the fact sought to be
proven may be reasonably inferred. The nature
of the assault, the manner in which it was
made, the weapon, if any, used, and the
surrounding circumstances are all matters from
which an intent to kill may be inferred.
Moreover, an assailant must be held to intend
the natural consequences of his deliberate
act.
State v. Grigsby, 351 N.C. 454, 457, 526 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2000)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, prior to
the shooting, several witnesses heard defendant refer to Lanclos
and state that he did not like light-skinned black people with
dredlocks, this indicating a possible motive for the assault.
Moreover, the circumstances of the assault permit a reasonable
inference that defendant possessed an intent to kill. The State's
evidence tends to show that defendant leaned out of his van as it
pulled alongside the Lanclos' van and deliberately fired several
shots at it, emptying the pistol and hitting the van multiple
times. See State v. Cain, 79 N.C. App. 35, 47, 338 S.E.2d 898, 905(1986)(“The requisite 'intent to kill' can be reasonably inferred
by the defendant's use of a .357 magnum revolver, fired numerous
times.”). Afterwards, defendant fled the scene. Furthermore, he
showed little remorse when he learned Lanclos would be paralyzed
from the neck down, telling an investigator the day of the
shooting, “I don't care. F--- him. It's only my first offense
anyways, and I have a lawyer.” Based on all the evidence,
considered in the light most favorable to the State, a jury could
reasonably conclude that defendant assaulted the victims with an
intent to kill. Accordingly, the assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury on transferred intent. Defendant contends
that the evidence tended to show that if the defendant intended to
kill anyone, it was Lanclos, and thus an instruction on transferred
intent served only to confuse the jury. Defendant argues that
there was no evidence of an intent to kill a person other than
Lanclos. We are not persuaded.
Our Supreme Court has stated:
under the doctrine of transferred intent, it
is immaterial whether the defendant intended
injury to the person actually harmed; if he in
fact acted with the required or elemental
intent toward someone, that intent suffices as
the intent element of the crime charged as a
matter of substantive law.
State v. Hales, 344 N.C. 419, 427, 474 S.E.2d 328, 332 (1996)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the
instruction was proper because there was evidence that Jamal
Davenport may have been defendant's intended victim. Davenport wasin the car with the victim, and there was evidence that defendant
was angry at Davenport for urinating on his van. Although
defendant contends that the trial court's instruction on
transferred intent was “flawed” because it failed to specify an
intended victim, “[i]t is not necessary that someone be named in
the trial court's instructions.” State v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1, 38,
506 S.E.2d 455, 476 (1998). Thus, the jury was properly instructed
on the doctrine of transferred intent. Accordingly, we find no
error.
No error.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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