IN THE MATTER OF: Pitt County
R.P., P.P. and M.P., Nos. 00 J 206
Minor Children 00 J 207
00 J 208
THORNBURG, Judge.
Respondent appeals a permanency planning order that continued
custody of her children with the Pitt County Department of Social
Services (DSS) and changed the permanent plan for the children to
one of adoption.
Prior to 1997, respondent lived in Connecticut. While living
in Connecticut, respondent had two children, R.P., born 21 June
1990, and D.P., born 11 July 1993. D.P. tested positive for
cocaine at his birth. D.P. was placed in foster care and R.P. was
placed with respondent's nephew. After her nephew was
incarcerated, respondent and R.P. moved to North Carolina in July
1997. Respondent's parental rights to D.P. were terminated by the
Connecticut Superior Court on 14 January 1998. DSS became involved with respondent in July 1997, based on a
report that was unsubstantiated. A second report was received on
22 June 1998, that alleged that respondent was neglecting R.P.
This report was substantiated and DSS began offering respondent
services in September 1998. DSS continued to receive reports that
respondent was not addressing concerns about R.P.'s schooling, that
she was leaving R.P. with people and in stores without returning,
that respondent was using cocaine and that P.P., born 11 August
1999, and M.P., born 10 October 2000, were both born with cocaine
in their systems.
Prior to her arrest in November 2000, DSS assisted respondent
in obtaining stable housing. DSS helped respondent to address
R.P.'s issues at school. DSS worked with respondent, helping her
with money management issues, developing treatment plans and
teaching respondent how to provide for R.P.'s physical, medical and
educational needs. DSS also obtained a mentor for R.P. Despite
DSS's help, respondent tested positive for cocaine on five
occasions in 2000. She failed to follow through with substance
abuse treatment and failed to maintain stable employment due to
absenteeism and drug use.
In November 2000, respondent was arrested on numerous felony
and misdemeanor charges. Respondent's neighbors, the Stephens,
began caring for the children upon respondent's arrest. On 12
December 2000, DSS filed petitions alleging that the children were
neglected and dependent children. Respondent was incarcerated from November 2000 until January
2001. The children continued to reside with the Stephens after
respondent's release. In January 2001, respondent was evicted from
her apartment. She tested positive for cocaine usage in March of
2001. Respondent did not attend some of her scheduled visits with
the children. DSS had trouble contacting respondent during this
time because respondent did not inform DSS of her current address.
On 4 October 2001, the children were adjudicated neglected,
pursuant to respondent's consent at a hearing conducted on 18-19
July 2001.
Between the July hearing and the review hearing conducted on
20 September 2001, respondent continued to use cocaine and engage
in criminal activity, failed to participate in mental health and
substance abuse treatment, failed to maintain employment or housing
and failed to visit consistently with her children. All visitation
with the children was suspended in September 2001, due to
respondent's continued cocaine usage. Respondent was arrested
again on 20 September 2001, immediately following the review
hearing, and incarcerated until May 2002.
On 14 March 2002, a review hearing was conducted while
respondent was incarcerated. The trial court ordered that legal
custody of the children remain with DSS. In order for the
permanent plan to remain reunification with respondent, the trial
court ordered respondent, upon her release, to attend an inpatient
drug clinic, attend Narcotics Anonymous, provide DSS with a new
address, avoid any additional criminal charges or incarceration,obtain negative results on random drug screens, submit to any
search requested by DSS, law enforcement or the guardian ad litem
and show general improvement. The trial court also ordered a home
study of the maternal grandmother's home in New York.
The matter was reviewed at a permanency planning hearing that
was conducted on 8 August 2002. The hearing was continued until
the home study in New York could be completed. The hearing resumed
on 7 November 2002 and 14 November 2002. On 18 March 2003, the
trial court entered an order relieving DSS of further reunification
efforts and changed the children's permanent plan to one of
adoption. Respondent appeals.
In this case, respondent has not taken exception to any of the
findings of fact made by the trial court. Respondent argues on
appeal that: (1) the trial court erred in concluding that DSS had
made reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for placement; (2)
the trial court erred in concluding that it was in the best
interest of the children to remain in DSS custody; and (3) the
trial court erred in ordering that the permanent plan be changed to
adoption.
Respondent contends that DSS did not make reasonable efforts
to work with her to return the children to her custody and that it
was error for the trial court to conclude that reasonable efforts
had been made. “Reasonable efforts” is a term of art defined by
statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(18) defines “reasonable efforts”
as:
The diligent use of preventive or
reunification services by a department ofsocial services when a juvenile's remaining at
home or returning home is consistent with
achieving a safe, permanent home for the
juvenile within a reasonable period of time.
If a court of competent jurisdiction
determines that the juvenile is not to be
returned home, then reasonable efforts means
the diligent and timely use of permanency
planning services by a department of social
services to develop and implement a permanent
plan for the juvenile.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(18) (2003).
As we noted before, this is an appeal from a permanency
planning order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907. Where “the
court continues the juvenile's placement in custody or placement
responsibility of a county department of social services, the
provisions of G.S. 7B-507 shall apply to any order entered under
this section.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(c) (2003). N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-507(a) states:
An order placing or continuing the placement
of a juvenile in the custody or placement
responsibility of a county department of
social services, whether an order for
continued nonsecure custody, a dispositional
order, or a review order:
. . . .
(2) Shall contain findings as to
whether a county department of
social services has made reasonable
efforts to prevent or eliminate the
need for placement of the juvenile,
unless the court has previously
determined under subsection (b) of
this section that such efforts are
not required or shall cease . . . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(a) (2003). The determination of whether
“reasonable efforts” have been made by DSS is a conclusion of lawas it requires the exercise of judgment. In re Helms, 127 N.C.
App. 505, 510-11, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997).
“When a trial court is required to make findings of fact, it
must make the findings of fact specially.” In re Harton, 156 N.C.
App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003). The trial court's
findings must consist of more than a recitation of allegations; the
trial court must find ultimate facts necessary to support the
conclusions of law through “processes of logical reasoning from the
evidentiary facts.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 97, 564
S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (quoting Appalachian Poster Advertising Co.
v. Harrington, 89 N.C. App. 476, 479, 366 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1988)).
Moreover, “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury .
. ., the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the
appropriate judgment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1)
(2003).
In the instant case, the order issued by the trial court lacks
any findings of fact or conclusions of law that DSS made
“reasonable efforts” in preventing or eliminating the placement of
respondent's children. The record is replete with competent
evidence that would have supported findings of fact regarding DSS's
efforts in this case, which in turn would have supported the
conclusion made by the trial court. However, the trial court
failed to make even one direct finding regarding the services that
DSS provided to respondent during the nearly four-year period in
which DSS had been involved with this family. Therefore, we vacatethe permanency planning review order and remand this case to the
trial court to specially make the required findings of fact and
conclusions of law under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b). Due to our
disposition of this case, we do not reach the issues of whether the
trial court erred in concluding that it was in the best interest of
the children to remain in DSS custody and in ordering that adoption
be the permanent plan for the children.
Vacated and remanded.
Judges WYNN and HUNTER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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