IN THE MATTER OF
P.R.G. Alamance County
No. 01 J 84
Minor Child
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Judith Tillman, for the State.
Marjorie S. Canaday for respondent-appellant.
LEVINSON, Judge.
In March of 2003, a juvenile petition was issued against
respondent P.R.G., age 16, charging him with felony larceny. The
petition alleged respondent “did unlawfully and willfully steal,
take and carry away: 1997 Dodge Van the personal property of Yadkin
Valley Economic Development having a value of $4000.00.” The
matter came before the trial court on 10 April 2003. At the
hearing, respondent admitted to felony breaking and entering a
vehicle. Based upon respondent's admission, the trial court
concluded “as a matter of law that [respondent] is a delinquent
juvenile by reason of having committed this serious offense[.]”
The State then moved to amend the petition to reflect a charge of
breaking or entering a motor vehicle. The trial court granted themotion and instructed the State to write “[o]n the same petition
but show it as a breaking and entering a motor vehicle[.]” The
trial court subsequently found that respondent had seven
delinquency history points and that the current offense was
classified as serious. The trial court imposed a Level III
disposition, committing respondent to a youth development center
for a minimum of six months and a maximum of fifteen months.
Respondent appeals.
Respondent contends the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea and adjudicate him
delinquent on the charge of breaking or entering a motor vehicle
when the petition charged him with felony larceny. We agree.
Although respondent did not raise this issue at his
adjudication hearing, jurisdiction may be challenged at any time.
State v. Call, 353 N.C. 400, 429, 545 S.E.2d 190, 208 (2001).
“[T]o sustain a conviction, an indictment needs 'to give defendant
sufficient notice of the charge against him, to enable him to
prepare his defense, and to raise the bar of double jeopardy in the
event he is again brought to trial for the same offense.'” State
v. Hutchings, 139 N.C. App. 184, 190, 533 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2000)
(quoting State v. Ingram, 20 N.C. App. 464, 466, 201 S.E.2d 532,
534 (1974). These same due process concerns extend to juvenile
proceedings. See In re Chavis and In Re Curry and In Re Outlaw, 31
N.C. App. 579, 580, 230 S.E.2d 198, 199 (1976).
This Court considered a similar issue in In re Davis, 114 N.C.
App. 253, 441 S.E.2d 696 (1994). In Davis, the juvenile was chargedwith the unlawful setting of fire to a public building in violation
of N.C.G.S. § 14-59 in a juvenile petition. The trial court,
however, allowed the State to proceed on the theory of setting fire
to personal property in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-66. The trial
court then adjudicated the juvenile delinquent on the grounds that
he set fire to personal property. This Court held that
adjudicating the juvenile delinquent for an offense which is
neither the crime charged in the juvenile petition nor a lesser
included offense of the crime charged violated the juvenile's due
process right to advance written notice of the charge to be
considered by the trial court. The provisions of N.C.G.S. §7A-627
(now N.C.G.S. §7B-2400) did not provide a basis to save the
adjudication, as a juvenile petition may be amended only if the
amended petition does not charge the juvenile with a different
offense. This Court rejected the State's argument that the
juvenile consented to jurisdiction because “jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a proceeding cannot be conferred by consent,
waiver, or estoppel.” Id. at 256, 441 S.E.2d at 698.
This case is governed by the principles of Davis. Because the
amendment was not authorized by N.C.G.S. §7B-2400, the trial court
was without subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate P.R.G.
delinquent for breaking and entering a motor vehicle. Accordingly,
the order entered must be
Vacated.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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