NO. COA04-174
Defense counsel has shown to the satisfaction of this Court
that he has complied with the requirements of Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 924, 18 L.
Ed. 1377 (1967) and State v. Kinch, 314 N.C. 99, 331 S.E.2d 665
(1985) by advising defendant of his right to file written arguments
with this Court and providing him with documents necessary for him
to do so. On 23 June 2004, defendant filed a pro se supplemental
brief with this Court.
Pursuant to Anders and Kinch, we must determine from a full
examination of defendant's pro se supplemental brief and all the
proceedings, whether this appeal is wholly frivolous.
Our General Statutes provide that proof of prior convictions
may be proven by stipulation of the parties.
See N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 15A-1340.14(f) (2003).
[A] worksheet, prepared and submitted by
the State, purporting to list a defendant's prior convictions is,
without more, insufficient to satisfy the State's burden in
establishing proof of prior convictions.
State v. Eubanks, 151
N.C. App. 499, 505, 565 S.E.2d 738, 742 (2002). Oral statements by
defense counsel at sentencing regarding a prior record level
worksheet may constitute a stipulation to the existence of the
convictions listed therein.
See id. Such a stipulation, however,
may not extend to whether out-of-state convictions are
substantially similar to corresponding North Carolina felony
offenses pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(e).
See State
v. Hanton, 140 N.C. App. 679, 690, 540 S.E.2d 376, 383 (2000).
In
Hanton, this Court determined that defense counsel's
statement that he did not disagree with the worksheet constituted
an admission by defendant that he had been convicted of the other
charges appearing on the worksheet submitted by the prosecution.
This Court, however, found that it was not clear that defendant
was stipulating that the out-of-state convictions were
substantially similar to felony charges under North Carolina law.
Id. Because defense counsel's statement could not be construed as
a stipulation to the similarity element, this Court remanded the
case for resentencing.
Id.
Similarly, in
State v. Morgan, ___ N.C. App. ___, 595 S.E.2d
804 (2004), the
defendant was sentenced as a Level IV felon based
on North Carolina and out-of-state prior convictions appearing in
a worksheet. During sentencing
the following colloquy occurred: THE COURT: Are we ready for sentencing in
this matter?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes.
THE COURT: What are the prior record points
of this defendant?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: We have a number of
convictions on here. The first time would be
a larceny case from 2/25/1983 in New Jersey.
The next would be -- no, excuse me. First in
time was aggravated assault on a police
officer out of New Jersey, that was in 1978,
and we have a larceny in 1983 I just
mentioned. There was a homicide in the third
degree in New Jersey, that was 6/15/1987. We
have a felony larceny that was mentioned on
the stand from 6/3/93, and we have a 10/1/02
New Hanover County communicating threats.
That happened while she was in jail. I also
have, as best I can find out, the definition
of homicide in New Jersey. I did not find the
definition calling this third degree homicide.
What I do have on the definition of homicide,
manslaughter. It appears that New Jersey
makes a distinction between homicide as an
intentional act and manslaughter as an
unintentional act. I have, therefore, and
would contend that the homicide in the third
degree cannot be any less than voluntary
manslaughter, pursuant to North Carolina law.
I don't think it's any more than that, but it
certainly can't be any less than that and, as
such, it's a Class F point value, assessed as
Class F point value. That would give her a
total of nine points.
THE COURT: Mr. Davis?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, if I can
approach and hand that up to the court.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I have gone
over this with my client. We would contend
that was an unintentional homicide. My client
described that to me and, again, we don't have
the equivalency here. We would contend it's
unintentional. It would make it, perhaps, a
lesser charge in terms of points that we
assign.
THE COURT: So that you're contending that
[Defendant] is a level three?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.
THE COURT: Rather than a level four?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: I have handed to the court
- - you may want to mark it for identification
purposes, but I have handed to the court, as
best I can find, the definition from New
Jersey law from that period of time and, like
I said, I've looked at it. I cannot find
anything they call homicide in the third
degree, but if you look through those
definitions, homicide is a voluntary act and,
if you go on through those definitions,
they've got manslaughter defined as a reckless
-- so, again, I would contend anything defined
in New Jersey as a homicide would be an
intentional act and couldn't be any less than
voluntary manslaughter. That's my argument.
I would also --
THE COURT: Let counsel approach the bench,
please.
(AN OFF-THE RECORD BENCH CONFERENCE WAS HELD.)
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I will defer to the court.
My obligation is to give you what information
I have, and I've done that, and whatever the
court feels is appropriate, I have no --
THE COURT: Of course, sir. I was just
looking at the statute. It appears to the
court that involuntary manslaughter is a Class
F. So if -- and the worksheet shows that
prior conviction, homicide conviction, up in
New Jersey as --
[THE PROSECUTOR]: I counted it for F.
THE COURT: You've already counted it F;
therefore the court is going to find that the
prior record points of the defendant are nine.
Id.
at ___, 595 S.E.2d at 810-11.
This Court
concluded defendant's
attorney conceded the existence of the convictions by arguing thatDefendant should be sentenced at a level III on the basis of her
prior record.
Id. at ____, 595 S.E.2d at 811. Citing
Hanton,
this Court further concluded that comments made by defendant's
attorney could not be interpreted as a stipulation that the out-of-
state offenses were substantially similar to offenses in North
Carolina since the State presented no evidence that the out-of-
state misdemeanor offenses were substantially similar to offenses
classified as Class A1 or 1 misdemeanors in North Carolina.
Id.
(citing
Hanton, 140 N.C. App. at 690, 540 S.E.2d at 383). This
Court held that the trial court erred in sentencing defendant based
upon the prior record level worksheet assigning her prior out-of-
state misdemeanor convictions as Class A1 or 1 misdemeanor
convictions, and remanded the case for resentencing.
Morgan, ___
N.C. App. at ___, 595 S.E.2d at 811.
Likewise
, the State here did not present evidence that the
out-of-state offenses were substantially similar to offenses in
North Carolina. During sentencing, the State submitted a prepared
worksheet listing the purported prior convictions of defendant.
The worksheet showed defendant had been convicted of possession of
cocaine, possession of a handgun without a permit, and possession
of a controlled substance in New Jersey. The worksheet assigned
six points, as a Class I felony, for these convictions. After the
trial court accepted the worksheet, the following exchange
occurred:
[PROSECUTOR]: And do you stipulate and agree
for sentencing purposes that [defendant's] a
prior Record Level Four, and 13 points? I
think I previously notified you it was 14, butI found a point that I should not have added.
COURT: You don't want to agree that it's
fewer points?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I do want to agree that
it's few points.
THE COURT: If you don't want to agree it's
fewer points, we'll go with 14.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We would so stipulate.
THE COURT: I'm willing.
[PROSECUTOR]: I just went back and noticed
that I had a date wrong.
THE COURT: I would do it for you. No other
lawyer.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: A number of the
convictions are out of state and that always
gives me just a brief pause.
As in Morgan, the comments of defendant's attorney constituted
a stipulation as to the existence of the prior convictions listed
on the worksheet. The stipulation, however did not extend to
whether the New Jersey convictions were substantially similar to
corresponding North Carolina felony offenses.