STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Wake County
No. 03CRS57101
WILLIAM RUSSELL CONWAY
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Joseph E. Herrin, for the State.
Paul T. Cleavenger for defendant-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Defendant William Russell Conway was charged with the 6 July
2003 armed robbery of Rack Room Shoes, located on Capital Boulevard
in Raleigh. The evidence tended to show that on the date in
question defendant was seen by Rack Room store clerk Ronald
Peacock, standing in front of an adjacent store. Shortly
thereafter, defendant entered the store and later left with a bulge
under his shirt. Peacock assumed that the bulge was a pair of
sneakers and shouted for defendant to stop. Defendant continued
out of the store. Peacock gave chase, and caught up with
defendant after about 50-100 feet. Defendant then turned around
and asked Peacock: It mean that much to you? You know what I'msaying. Defendant then pulled a knife on Peacock and told him to
come and get the shoes. Fearful of being stabbed, Peacock turned
around and went back to the store. A co-worker had already called
the police.
Peacock gave Officer R.E. Nantz of the Raleigh Police
Department a description of the thief. Officer Nantz apprehended
defendant shortly thereafter. Defendant was wearing the stolen
sneakers at the time that he was apprehended. A frisk of
defendant's outer clothing revealed a knife. Officer Nantz then
took defendant back to the store, where Peacock positively
identified him as the thief. At trial, both Peacock and Stephen
Shearer, assistant manager at the Capital Boulevard Rack Room
store, identified defendant as the person who had been in the store
on 6 July 2003 and had been followed by Peacock.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. While he admitted to
the theft, and to pulling the knife out of his pocket after Peacock
chased him, defendant denied threatening Peacock with the knife.
Defendant insisted that he only showed [Peacock] the knife.
Defendant stated that after the knife was shown, Peacock went
back into the store, and abandoned his pursuit of defendant.
Defendant testified on cross-examination that he used the knife to
clean out [his] nails, and that he did not consider it a weapon.
At the close of the evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the
charge against him. The trial court denied the motion. The jury
subsequently found defendant guilty, and the trial court sentenced
defendant to an active term of 77-102 months imprisonment from thepresumptive range. Defendant appeals.
In his sole assignment of error, defendant contends that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. We disagree.
In reviewing the denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss,
this Court determines only whether the evidence adduced at trial,
when taken in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient
to allow a rational juror to find defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt on each essential element of the crime charged.
State v. Cooper, 138 N.C. App. 495, 497, 530 S.E.2d 73, 75, aff'd
per curiam, 353 N.C. 260, 538 S.E.2d 912 (2000). The State must be
given the benefit of every favorable inference to be drawn from the
evidence. Id. Contradictions and discrepancies must be resolved
in favor of the State. State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 581, 548
S.E.2d 712, 721 (2001).
In order to obtain a conviction of robbery with a dangerous
weapon pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87, the State must show
that defendant (1) unlawfully took or attempted to take personal
property from the person or in the presence of another (2) by use
or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon (3)
whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened. The
defendant's use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon must
precede or be concomitant with the taking, or be so joined by time
and circumstances with the taking as to be part of one continuous
transaction. State v. Brewton, 342 N.C. 875, 877-78, 467 S.E.2d
395, 397 (1996)(quoting Olson, 330 N.C. at 566, 411 S.E.2d at 597).
In the case sub judice, defendant argues that there was notsufficient evidence to show that he obtained the stolen shoes with
the requisite force or threat of force to sustain a conviction of
robbery with a dangerous weapon. In essence, defendant contends
that the display of the weapon did not precede nor was it
concomitant with the taking, so as to support a conviction of
robbery with a dangerous weapon.
This Court rejected a similar argument in State v. Barnes, 125
N.C. App. 75, 479 S.E.2d 236 (1997). In Barnes, the defendants
entered the victim's store, obtained merchandise and left without
paying for it. After being confronted outside by store personnel,
one of the defendants displayed a handgun, facilitating the two
defendants' escape. Defendants argued on appeal that the theft was
complete when they exited the store with the merchandise. This
Court rejected that argument and explained that, for purposes of
robbery, just because a thief has physically taken an item does
not mean that its rightful owner no longer has possession of it.
Barnes, 125 N.C. App. at 79, 479 S.E.2d at 238. The Court noted
that when a store employee is still actively attempting to retain
possession of the property taken from the merchant-employer, the
display of a weapon is considered necessary to complete the taking.
Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the attempt to take the
property from the store by force was inseparable from the rest of
the transaction, and upheld defendants' convictions for armed
robbery.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the evidence is uncontroverted
that defendant entered Rack Room Shoes on Capital Boulevard on 6July 2003, and left the store with a pair of sneakers without
paying for them. The evidence also shows that one of the store
employees gave chase, and that defendant, when confronted by the
employee some 50-100 feet away from the store, turned and pulled
out a knife. Upon seeing the knife, which was described at trial
as a fixed-blade, very sharp knife-- capable of inflict[ing]
serious injury, the store employee abandoned the chase and
returned to the store to await the arrival of law enforcement. We
conclude, as did the Court in Barnes, that the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to submit the
charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon to the jury.
Having so concluded, we hold that defendant received a fair
trial, free from prejudicial error.
NO ERROR.
Judges HUNTER and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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