An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced
ure.
NO. COA04-352
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 October 2004
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Gaston County
No. 99 CRS 50000
JAMES LINDELL SETZER, JR.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 29 November 2000 by
Judge Marcus L. Johnson in Gaston County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 4 October 2004.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Clara D. King, for the State.
William D. Auman, for defendant-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
James Lindell Setzer, Jr., (defendant) was convicted of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious
injury on 29 November 2000. He was sentenced to an active term of
imprisonment of sixty to eighty-one months. His petition for writ
of certiorari was allowed by this Court on 27 February 2003. We
find no error.
I. Background
The State's evidence tended to show that at approximately 4:45
p.m. on 7 December 1999, defendant was stopped in a line of traffic
at a traffic light on Marietta Street in Gastonia waiting to make
a left turn onto Franklin Boulevard. A van operated by Wanda Green
(Green) was traveling in the opposite direction and stopped tomake a left turn into the parking lot of the First Union Bank
located at the corner of Marietta Street and Franklin Boulevard.
Defendant's vehicle blocked Green's access. Green unsuccessfully
requested defendant to move his vehicle forward in order to make
the turn. The operator of the vehicle behind defendant's vehicle
motioned to Green to make the turn in front of her vehicle. As
Green made the turn, her vehicle scraped against a curb as she
entered the parking lot of First Union Bank. Green observed Brian
Holley (Holley) standing behind an automobile in the First Union
Bank's parking lot. Green lowered her window and explained to
Holley what happened. Holley looked toward the street, turned, and
resumed what he was doing. Green then heard a gunshot and saw
Holley collapse.
Holley testified that he was unloading food from the trunk of
his vehicle when he heard a noise. He turned around and saw
Green's vehicle entering the parking lot. Green lowered her window
and stated that a motorist was rude for not allowing her to turn.
He looked toward the street and saw a man, whom he later identified
as defendant, seated in a car at the traffic light. Defendant
possessed a gun and asked Holley whether he had a problem or
something to say. Stunned, Holley turned around and resumed
taking out bags of food. As he started around his car, a bullet
struck him in the upper buttock and he collapsed to the ground. He
underwent emergency surgery at Gaston Memorial Hospital to repair
damage to his stomach, colon, and intestines caused by the bullet.
Holley wore a colostomy bag for four months and had surgery a fewmonths later to remove part of his colon. He could not eat or
drink for weeks. As of the time of trial, Holley continued to
experience digestive problems.
Vernon Polson (Polson), a nationally registered paramedic,
testified that he responded to a dispatch of a shooting at the
First Union Bank. Upon arriving at the scene, he found Holley
lying on the ground. Holley had lost a significant amount of blood
due to a gunshot wound. Polson and a fellow paramedic stopped the
bleeding and transported Holley to Gaston Memorial Hospital.
Polson testified Holley's injuries were definitely life
threatening.
Three days later defendant voluntarily appeared, accompanied
by his father, at the police station and confessed to shooting a
man at the First Union Bank. Defendant and his father retrieved
the .38 caliber pistol defendant used from his automobile.
Defendant stated that after Green's vehicle turned into the parking
lot, a man in the parking lot looked back at him, pointed, and
turned back to the trunk of his vehicle. Not knowing what the man
was getting out of the trunk, defendant shot Holley.
Defendant testified that he was waiting to make a left turn
when the operator of a van made a left turn into the parking lot of
the First Union Bank. He glanced over and saw the driver of the
van talking to Holley, whom he had never met. Holley pointed at
defendant and then opened the trunk of his vehicle. These actions
spooked defendant. Thinking Holley was going for a weapon,
defendant fired his pistol. Defendant testified that he did notintend to shoot or kill Holley. After a jury's verdict and
judgement of the trial court, defendant appeals.
II. Issue
The sole issue presented is whether the trial court erred by
denying defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of all the
evidence.
III. Motion to Dismiss
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court must consider all
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving it
the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be drawn from
the evidence. State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585,
587 (1984). Contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence are
to be disregarded and left for resolution by a jury. State v.
Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). The trial
court determines whether substantial evidence establishes each
element of the offense charged and identifies the defendant as the
perpetrator. State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d
649, 651 (1982).
IV. Assault With a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Kill Inflicting
Serious Injury
The elements of the offense of assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to kill inflicting serious injury are: (1) an assault;
(2) with a deadly weapon; (3) an intent to kill; and (4) infliction
of a serious injury not resulting in death. State v. James, 321
N.C. 676, 687, 365 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1988). Defendant does not
dispute that a deadly weapon was used or that Holley suffered lifethreatening injuries. Defendant contends no evidence establishes
the third element, i.e., that he had the intent to kill Holley.
An intent to kill is a mental attitude, and ordinarily it
must be proved, if proven at all, by circumstantial evidence, that
is, by proving facts from which the fact sought to be proven may be
reasonably inferred. State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 708, 94
S.E.2d 915, 921 (1956). Facts to be considered include the injury
inflicted, the nature of the assault, the character of the weapon
used, and other surrounding circumstances. State v. White, 307
N.C. 42, 49, 296 S.E.2d 267, 271 (1982). The evidence at bar,
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, shows that
defendant deliberately fired a .38 caliber pistol at Holley and
inflicted life-threatening injury requiring emergency surgery. A
person who deliberately fires a pistol at a person must be held to
intend the normal and natural results of his deliberate act.
State v. Jones, 18 N.C. App. 531, 534, 197 S.E.2d 268, 270, cert.
denied, 283 N.C. 756, 198 S.E.2d 726 (1973). Defendant's
assignment of error is overruled.
V. Conclusion
Defendant's testimony that he did not intend to kill Holley
merely created a conflict in the evidence for the jury to resolve.
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss and
submitted the issue to the jury. We find no error in the trial
court's rulings or defendant's conviction and the judgment entered.
No error.
Judges WYNN and GEER concur. Report per Rule 30(e).
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