An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced
ure.
NO. COA04-558
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 October 2004
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Caldwell County
No. 03 CRS 03198
KEITH TOBIAS BANNER
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 8 January 2004 by
Judge Beverly T. Beal in Caldwell County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 4 October 2004.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Harriet F. Worley, for the State.
Bryan Gates, for defendant-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
Keith Tobias Banner (defendant) appeals from a judgment
finding him to have attained the status of being an habitual felon.
We affirm.
I. Background
By a true bill of indictment, defendant was charged with
possession with intent to sell and deliver a controlled substance
and sale and delivery of a controlled substance. In a separate
indictment, defendant was charged with having attained habitual
felon status. One of the three felonies which triggered the
habitual felon indictment was a 13 February 1991 conviction in
Caldwell County Superior Court for felony possession of cocaine.
Citing this Court's decisions in State v. Jones, 161 N.C. App. 60,588 S.E.2d 5 (2003) and State v. Sneed, 161 N.C. App. 331, 588
S.E.2d 74 (2003), defendant moved to dismiss the habitual felon
indictment on the grounds that his possession of cocaine conviction
is classified as a misdemeanor and could not be used as an
underlying felony in the habitual felon indictment. The trial
court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to the
sale of cocaine and to having attained the status of an habitual
felon. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant reserved his right
to seek appellate review of the trial court's denial of his motion
to dismiss the habitual felon indictment. After the trial court
sentenced defendant as a Class C felon to seventy-two to ninety-six
months imprisonment, defendant made an oral motion for appropriate
relief, again arguing that his possession of cocaine conviction
could not be used as an underlying felony in the habitual felon
indictment. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appeals.
II. Issue
Defendant contends his habitual felon indictment was invalid
because one of the three convictions relied upon by the State to
enhance his status to an habitual felon was for possession of
cocaine, which is classified as a misdemeanor under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 90-95(d)(2).
III. Possession of Cocaine is a Felony
Defendant cites our decisions in Jones and Sneed, as his
authority for his interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95 (d)(2).
This Court's decisions in Jones and Sneed were overruled by our
Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 473, 598 S.E.2d 125(2004). See also State v. Sneed, 358 N.C. 538, 599 S.E.2d 365
(2004) (reversed [p]ursuant to this Court's opinion in State v.
Jones, [358 N.C. 473, 598 S.E.2d 125 (2004)]). In Jones, our
Supreme Court makes it clear that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(d)(2)
classifies possession of cocaine as a felony and is sufficient to
serve as an underlying felony for an habitual felon indictment.
Jones, 358 N.C. 473, 598 S.E.2d 125. Defendant's assignment of
error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
The trial court properly sentenced defendant as an habitual
felon.
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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