1. Parties_necessary_homeowner's association_individuals
Necessary parties are those so vitally interested that a valid judgment finally determining
the controversy cannot be rendered without them. The trial court here did not err by concluding
that individual lot owners with easements over a common area taken by DOT are necessary; the
owners of the easements have a material interest in receiving just compensation for their
easements.
2. Parties_proper_individual lot owners_common area taken by DOT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that individual lot owners in a
subdivision were proper parties to an action involving the taking of common area property by
DOT.
3. Jurisdiction_standing_homeowner's association
A homeowner's association did not have standing to pursue individual lot owner's claims
where the individual lot owners were necessary parties.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Hilda Burnett-Baker and Special Deputy Attorney General W.
Richard Moore, for plaintiff-appellant.
Horsley & Peraldo, P.A., by Jeffrey K. Peraldo, and Smith
Moore LLP, by Bruce P. Ashley and R. James Cox, Jr., for
defendant-appellee.
WYNN, Judge.
A person is a necessary party to an action when he is so
vitally interested in the controversy involved in the action that
a valid judgment cannot be rendered in the action completely and
finally determining the controversy without his presence as a
party. Strickland v. Hughes, 273 N.C. 481, 485, 160 S.E.2d 313,
316 (1968). Plaintiff contends that the individual lot owners who
have a recorded easement in the condemned common area are not
necessary parties for a determination of the just compensation for
the common areas. As we hold those owners of the easement have a
material interest in the subject matter of the controversy,
receiving just compensation for their individual easement, and
their interest will be directly affected by the trial court's
decision, the trial court did not err in concluding they are
necessary and proper parties.
The procedural and factual history of the instant appeal is as
follows: On 15 January 2002, the Plaintiff, North Carolina
Department of Transportation (DOT), filed a complaint for
condemnation, declaration of taking, and notice of deposit in
Superior Court, Guilford County regarding certain property owned by
the Defendant Homeowner's Association, Stagecoach Village. The
property at issue was common area property owned by Stagecoach
Village in which each lot owner of the Stagecoach Village townhousedevelopment also owned an easement. In its answer to DOT's
complaint, Stagecoach Village asserted the individual lot owners
were necessary parties to the condemnation action inasmuch as each
lot owner's property rights were adversely affected by the taking.
On 9 October 2002, Stagecoach Village filed a motion pursuant to
section 136-108 of the North Carolina General Statutes for a
determination, inter alia, of whether the individual lot owners
were necessary parties to the condemnation action. The motion came
before the trial court on 16 December 2002, following which the
trial court entered an order joining as necessary parties every
record owner of a lot in the Stagecoach Village townhouse
development. DOT appealed from this order. This Court dismissed
the appeal as interlocutory and not affecting a substantial right.
See N.C. Dep't of Transp. v. Stagecoach Vill., 166 N.C. App. 272,
601 S.E.2d 279 (2004). The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed
this Court and held a substantial right existed because “[t]he
possible existence of an easement . . . is a question affecting
title[.]” See N.C. Dep't of Transp. v. Stagecoach Vill., 360 N.C.
46, 48, 619 S.E.2d 495, 496 (2005)
(See footnote 1)
. By opinion filed 7 October2005, our Supreme Court remanded to this Court to determine DOT's
appeal on the merits.
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On appeal, DOT argues that the trial court erred in concluding
as a matter of law that (1) each individual record owner of a lot
in the Stagecoach Village townhouse development must be joined as
defendants, and (2) Stagecoach Village does not have standing to
pursue each individual lot owner's claim.
[1] DOT contends that the trial court erred in concluding as
a matter of law that each individual record owner of a lot in the
Stagecoach Village townhouse development is a necessary and proper
party and must be joined as defendants. We disagree.
Rule 19 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for the necessary joinder of parties, in pertinent part:
“Subject to the provisions of Rule 23, those who are united in
interest must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants[.]” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 19(a) (2004). Necessary parties must be joined
in an action. Booker v. Everhart, 294 N.C. 146, 156, 240 S.E.2d
360, 365 (1978). Proper parties may be joined. Id. Whether
proper parties will be ordered joined rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Strickland, 273 N.C. at 485, 160
S.E.2d at 316. A person is a necessary party to an action when he is so
vitally interested in the controversy involved in the action that
a valid judgment cannot be rendered in the action completely and
finally determining the controversy without his presence as a
party. Id.; Manning v. Hart, 255 N.C. 368, 372, 121 S.E.2d 721,
725 (1961). “The term 'necessary parties' embraces all persons who
have or claim material interests in the subject matter of a
controversy, which interests will be directly affected by an
adjudication of the controversy.” Wall v. Sneed, 13 N.C. App. 719,
724, 187 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1972) (citation omitted). When a
complete determination of the matter cannot be had without the
presence of other parties, the trial court must cause them to be
brought in. Strickland, 273 N.C. at 485, 160 S.E.2d at 316. A
proper party is one whose interest may be affected by a decree, but
whose presence is not essential in order for the court to
adjudicate the rights of others. Id.
The parties in the instant action seek a determination of the
just compensation for DOT's taking of land whose record title is
held by Stagecoach Village and each lot owner in the development
has an easement in the entire common area. The trial court made a
finding of fact that each lot owner has an easement property right
of record in the condemned common area. The trial court also
concluded as a matter of law:
7. Each individual lot owner's claim is not
common with the entire membership and is not
shared equally. Depending upon the lot
owner's location in the development, the lot
owner may be more or less damaged by the
taking than other lot owners. Individualizedproof on each lot owner's damages will be
necessary. The proper parties to provide this
proof are the individual lot owners.
A suit as to the just compensation of the condemned land
cannot be resolved without the joiner of each lot owner in the
development who has an easement property right of record. Those
owners of the easement have a material interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, receiving just compensation for their
individual easement, and their interest will be directly affected
by the trial court's decision. See Wall, 13 N.C. App. at 724, 187
S.E.2d at 457; see also Rice v. Randolph, 96 N.C. App. 112, 114,
384 S.E.2d 295, 297 (1989) (action determining whether an easement
had been extinguished, record owners of lots in the subdivision,
who had user rights in the easement, were necessary parties).
[2] Moreover, the trial court concluded that each individual
lot owner is also a proper party. Whether proper parties will be
ordered joined rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Strickland, 273 N.C. at 485, 160 S.E.2d at 316. As the
trial court's decision is not manifestly unsupported by reason, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion.
[3] Finally, DOT argues that the trial court erred in
concluding as a matter of law that Stagecoach Village does not have
standing to pursue each individual lot owner's claim. We disagree.
This Court has previously set out:
'[A]n association has standing to bring suit
on behalf of its members when: (a) its members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization's
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted,nor the relief requested, requires the
participation of individual members in the
lawsuit.'
Creek Pointe Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Happ, 146 N.C. App. 159,
165, 552 S.E.2d 220, 225 (2001) (internal quotation omitted)
(emphasis added). As we have already determined that the
individual lot owners are necessary parties to the action, the
trial court did not err in concluding that Stagecoach Village does
not have standing to pursue each individual lot owner's claim. Id.
Affirmed.
Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur.
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