Landlord and Tenant_summary ejectment action_change of ownership_no agreement with
new owner
The trial court erred by ordering defendants to surrender possession of the property in a
summary ejectment action where the property had changed hands and there was no evidence that
defendants had entered into any lease with plaintiff, the new owner. Plaintiff's remedy is a
trespass action.
No brief for pro se, plaintiffs-appellees.
Priscilla Woods and Robert Woods, pro se, defendants-
appellants.
ELMORE, Judge.
Priscilla Woods and Robert Woods (defendants) appeal a
judgment from the district court ordering defendants to surrender
possession of their residence to Willie R. Adams (plaintiff).
Pursuant to a month-to-month lease agreement, defendants
occupied a house at 5011 Highway 301 South in Lucama, North
Carolina. Defendants demanded that the lessor, Zedechia Worrells,
make repairs to the property. Mr. Worrells refused to make the
specified repairs and then sold the property to plaintiff without
giving notice to defendants. Plaintiff and defendants did not
enter into any leasing agreement, but plaintiff sought to collectrent from defendants at the same rate as defendants had paid prior
to the change in ownership. When defendants refused to pay any
rent, plaintiff initiated a summary ejectment proceeding in the
small claims division of Wilson County District Court.
(See footnote 1)
Plaintiff's complaint consisted of the AOC-CVM-201 standard form,
“Complaint In Summary Ejectment.” The magistrate found for
plaintiff and ordered defendants to vacate the property and pay
$2,400.00 in back rent. Defendants appealed from the magistrate's
judgment to the district court for a trial de novo. The district
court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to recover back
rent from defendants because there was no enforceable contract
between the parties. However, the court ordered defendants to
surrender possession of the property to plaintiff. From this 28
October 2003 judgment of the district court, defendants appeal.
Defendants contend that the district court erred in failing to
dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
a proceeding. Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 164, 558 S.E.2d
490, 493 (2002). Thus, we must determine whether the district
court had jurisdiction to decide the summary ejectment action. The
summary ejectment remedy provided for in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26 isrestricted to situations where the relationship of landlord and
tenant exists. Jones v. Swain, 89 N.C. App. 663, 668, 367 S.E.2d
136, 138-39 (1988). The district court has jurisdiction to hear a
summary ejectment proceeding even if the plaintiff does not allege
a landlord-tenant relationship in the complaint, but this
relationship must be proven in order for the plaintiff's remedy to
be granted. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Chandler v. Savings and
Loan Assoc., 24 N.C. App. 455, 211 S.E.2d 484 (1975)). If the
record lacks evidence to support a finding of a landlord-tenant
relationship, the court must dismiss the plaintiff's cause of
action. See Hayes v. Turner, 98 N.C. App. 451, 454-55, 391 S.E.2d
513, 515 (1990).
Here, the Complaint In Summary Ejectment alleges that
defendants entered into possession of the property as a lessee of
plaintiff. Plaintiffs assert that defendants entered into a month-
to-month oral lease, with rent due on the first of each month.
However, the district court found that “[t]he Plaintiff, Mr. Adams,
and the Defendants never entered into any lease agreement.”
Therefore, the court concluded that “[t]here was never any
enforceable contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendants.”
The district court's finding of this fact is deemed conclusive on
appeal, as plaintiff has not assigned error to it.
(See footnote 2)
As noted
above, the jurisdiction of a court in summary ejectment proceedings
is derived from N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26. Where, as here, theplaintiff fails to prove the existence of a landlord-tenant
relationship, the district court lacks jurisdiction to enter
judgment in the proceeding. See Jones, 89 N.C. App. at 668-69, 367
S.E.2d at 138-39.
Our decision is bolstered by a similar determination by this
Court in College Heights Credit Union v. Boyd, 104 N.C. App. 494,
409 S.E.2d 742 (1991). In College Heights, the plaintiff sought to
summarily evict the defendants from property to which the plaintiff
claimed to have title. The plaintiff filed a standard AOC Summary
Ejectment form, alleging that the parties had entered into a lease
agreement. The evidence at trial contradicted the plaintiff's
allegation of the existence of a lease agreement; the evidence
showed that the plaintiff had acquired title to the property
through a tax sale purchase. Nonetheless, the district court
granted the relief requested by the plaintiff in the summary
ejectment proceeding. In vacating the judgment of the district
court, this Court stated as follows:
It is clear that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to decide the issue of title or
to order ejectment in this case. There was no
evidence presented by either party which would
support a finding of a landlord-tenant
relationship between the parties. There is no
evidence of any contract or lease between the
parties concerning the leasing or occupancy of
this property. . . . This is simply the wrong
action to quiet title and the wrong
circumstances under which to bring an action
in summary ejectment.
Id., 104 N.C. App. at 497, 409 S.E.2d at 743. Likewise, here,
there is simply no evidence that defendants entered into any lease
agreement with plaintiff. We note that plaintiff is not withoutremedy; as rightful owner of the property, he may file a trespass
action against defendants for invasion of his possessory rights.
See Barnard v. Rowland, 132 N.C. App. 416, 422, 512 S.E.2d 458, 463
(1999). For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the
district court and remand for dismissal of the summary ejectment
action.
Vacated and remanded.
Judges WYNN and HUDSON concur.
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