1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation_adoption assistance payments_received by
parent rather than child
The trial court acted within its discretion in departing from the guidelines and
determining child support in an action involving adopted children and adoption assistance
payments. Adoption assistance payments administered pursuant to North Carolina's adoption
assistance program are received by the child rather than the adoptive parent.
2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation_findings_departing from guidelines
The trial court made adequate findings of fact when departing from the child support
guidelines in a case involving adopted children and adoption assistance payments.
Cerwin Law Firm, by Todd R. Cerwin, for defendant-appellant.
Gaston County Department of Social Services, by Jill Y.
Sanchez, for plaintiff-appellee.
ELMORE, Judge.
April Miller (plaintiff) and Randy Miller (defendant) were
married on 25 September 1999. The parties adopted two children
during the marriage. Plaintiff and defendant entered into an
Adoption Assistance Agreement with the Guilford County Department
of Social Services (DSS). Pursuant to this agreement, based upon
their status as special needs children, the Miller children
received monthly adoption assistance payments in the amount of
$830.00 ($415.00 per child). The parties separated on 25 March2003, and plaintiff filed an action on 23 July 2003 seeking an
order for child support. Plaintiff is the custodial parent of the
two children and will continue to receive monthly adoption
assistance payments on behalf of the children until each child
reaches the age of eighteen. Plaintiff is not disabled but is
currently unemployed. Defendant is employed by the United States
Postal Service and receives Military retirement benefits, for a
total gross income of $4,607.41 per month.
On 17 September 2003 the district court held a hearing on
plaintiff's claims. The court applied the North Carolina Child
Support Guidelines (guidelines), which provided a presumptive
amount of $918.00 per month as defendant's support obligation. The
court then considered the relative abilities of each party to
provide support and the needs of the children. In considering
these factors pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c), the court
deviated from the guidelines. As support for this conclusion, the
court entered a specific finding that the presumptive amount under
the guidelines “would exceed the needs of the children due to the
children's separate income of $830.00 per month and the lack of
extraordinary expenses related to the needs of the children.” The
court found that the children were in the custody of defendant
twenty percent of the time. The court then considered the benefit
the children receive from the adoption assistance income while in
the care of defendant and accordingly reduced defendant's
obligation by twenty percent of the children's income, resulting in
a support obligation of $752.00 per month. On 2 October 2003 the
court entered its child support order, concluding that $752.00 permonth is a reasonable amount of support and directing defendant to
pay this amount beginning 1 September 2003. From this order,
defendant appeals.
[1] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing
to credit the adoption assistance payments against his child
support obligation. At the outset, we note that the trial court's
findings in a child support order are reviewed under a abuse of
discretion standard. Leary v. Leary, 152 N.C. App. 438, 441, 567
S.E.2d 834, 837 (2002). Thus, the trial court's ruling will be
reversed on appeal only upon a showing that it could not have been
supported by a reasoned decision. Id.
Defendant assigns error to the following finding of fact
entered by the court in the child support order:
12. That the Defendant introduced into
evidence that the children receive adoption
assistance income in the amount of $415.00 per
month per child.
Defendant argues that the evidence in the record does not support
the court's finding that the adoption assistance payments are the
income of the children. According to defendant, the adoption
assistance payments are not income of the children, but rather a
subsidy to plaintiff exceeding the needs of the children. Yet, the
language of the regulations governing the administration of
adoption assistance programs by county departments of social
services dictates otherwise. The North Carolina Administrative
Code states that “payments may be made to children who meet the
requirements set out in Rule .0402 of this Section.” N.C. Admin.
Code tit. 10A, r. 70M.0401 (June 2004) (emphasis added). Thus, the
regulations applicable to adoption assistance payments specify thatsuch payments are a resource of the adopted child, not a subsidy to
the parent. Furthermore, the Adoption Assistance Agreement between
Guilford County DSS and the Millers states, “[f]or the child
receiving a monthly cash payment, [the parties] understand and
agree that it is based upon the needs of the child and the
circumstances of [the adoptive parents] . . . .”
A decision rendered by the Arizona Court of Appeals, Hamblen
v. Hamblen, 54 P.3d 371 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002), addressed an issue
very similar to the one raised by defendant here. In Hamblen, the
defendant argued that the trial court erred in ruling that
adoption assistance subsidies for special needs children
constituted money received by the children. The appellate court
disagreed, explaining that the children are the recipients of the
funds and that the parents' agreement to receive the payments
pursuant to Arizona's adoption assistance program does not cause
the funds to become property of the parents. Hamblen, 54 P.3d at
374. This analysis provides additional support for our conclusion
that the child, rather than the adoptive parent, is the recipient
of adoption assistance payments administered pursuant to North
Carolina's adoption assistance program.
Defendant argues nonetheless that the court should have
applied the entire adoption assistance benefit against his child
support obligation in order to achieve equity. He contends that
the court's failure to credit the full amount of the payments in
reducing his obligation resulted in plaintiff receiving a windfall.
A trial court has the discretion to deviate from the guidelines if
it finds, by the greater weight of the evidence, that applying theguidelines would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of
the child. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c) (2003); Guilford County
Ex. Rel. Easter v. Easter, 344 N.C. 166, 473 S.E.2d 6 (1996).
Here, defendant presented evidence to the court of the children's
monthly adoption assistance payments. The record reveals that the
court considered whether the presumptive amount under the
guidelines would exceed the needs of the children in light of the
adoption assistance payments. The court acted within its
discretion in determining that $752.00 is a reasonable amount of
support, and defendant has not shown an abuse of that discretion.
[2] By his next assignment of error, defendant argues that the
court erred in failing to make the requisite findings of fact when
deviating from the guidelines. We disagree. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-
13.4(c)(2003) provides that when a trial court considers evidence
supporting a deviation from the guidelines, the court must “find
the facts relating to the reasonable needs of the child for support
and the relative ability of each parent to provide support.” Here,
the court specifically found that the children did not have any
extraordinary financial needs:
13. That although the children are considered
special needs children for the purpose of
receiving adoption assistance income, the
children do not have any additional or
extraordinary expenses relating to any
physical or emotional health needs,
educational needs, or other special needs that
should be considered by the court.
The court also made findings as to the parties' employment
circumstances and income sources. Cf. Gowning v. Gowning, 111 N.C.
App. 613, 619, 432 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1993) (remand for further
findings where trial court's findings failed to address needs ofchild or earning capacity and income of parties). Based upon these
findings, the court concluded that $752.00 was a reasonable amount
of support to meet the children's needs. As the trial court
entered adequate findings in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-
13.4(c), defendant's assignment of error is without merit.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUDSON concur.
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