1. Homicide_premeditation and deliberation_felled victim theory_absence of multiple
lethal wounds
The trial court did not err by denying defendant's request to have the jury consider the
lack of lethal blows after the killing as a factor in assessing premeditation and deliberation.
Although defendant argues that the absence of multiple lethal wounds negates premeditation and
deliberation if the presence of such wounds shows premeditation and deliberation (the felled
victim theory), the State established premeditation and deliberation by other evidence.
2. Criminal Law_closing arguments_failure to call witnesses
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling defendant's objection to the
State's closing argument where defendant had commented on the State's failure to call two
witnesses and the State's argument that defendant could have called the four-year-old witnesses
was appropriate to rebut defense counsel's remarks.
3. Evidence_autopsy photographs_projected onto screen
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a murder prosecution by admitting autopsy
photographs projected onto a screen to illustrate the medical examiner's testimony. The
photographs were not used in a repetitive manner and it was not excessive to project them onto a
screen so that they could be viewed more easily.
4. Homicide--first-degree murder_short-form indictment_constitutional
The short-form first-degree murder indictment is constitutional.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Ralf F. Haskell, for the State.
Nora Henry Hargrove, attorney for defendant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
Danny Lynn Snider (“defendant”) appeals his conviction of
first-degree murder. For the reasons stated herein, we find no
error in the trial.
The facts of this case are summarized as follows: On 7 July
2001, defendant attended a cook-out with his girlfriend, Lisa
Cersosimo (“Cersosimo”), and their son, William. At the cook-out,
defendant socialized with his neighbor, Steve Seagle (“Seagle”).
As defendant, Cersosimo and William left the event, Seagle
requested a ride home. Defendant and Cersosimo agreed to take
Seagle home. Seagle rode in the back seat of the car with William
and Seagle's twin nephews, Roger and Dale, who were invited to
spend the night with William.
During the drive home, Seagle pressed his fingernails into
William's knee and called William a “p*ssy.” When the group
arrived at the house shared by defendant and Cersosimo, Seagle
pulled one of the twins from the car by his arm and threw him to
the ground. As a result of Seagle's actions, defendant argued with
Seagle and a physical fight ensued whereby both men sustained knife
wounds. Cersosimo and the children went into the house, and
Cersosimo called the police. A short while later, defendant came
into the house, retrieved a rifle from the bedroom closet, returned
outside and shot Seagle in the chest. Seagle died as a result of
a single gunshot wound.
Defendant was arrested and charged with first-degree murder.
He was tried before a jury, which convicted him of the charge. The
trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without
parole. It is from this conviction that defendant appeals.
As an initial matter, we note that defendant's brief contains
arguments supporting only four of the original seventeen
assignments of error on appeal. The omitted assignments of error
are deemed abandoned pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2004).
We therefore limit our review to the assignments of error addressed
in defendant's brief.
The issues presented on appeal are whether (I) the trial court
erred by denying defendant's requested jury instruction; (II) the
trial court erred by overruling defendant's objection to the
State's closing argument; (III) the trial court erred by admitting
Seagle's autopsy photographs into evidence; and (IV) the short-form
first-degree murder indictment was constitutionally defective.
[1] Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by
denying defendant's request to instruct the jury on the felled
victim theory of premeditation and deliberation. We disagree.
During the charge conference, defendant requested that the
trial court include the phrase “infliction of lethal blows after
Steve Seagle was felled” in its jury instruction on the
circumstances from which premeditation and deliberation could be
inferred. The trial court refused to provide the requested
instruction and instructed the jury in pertinent part as follows:
Neither premeditation nor deliberation is
usually susceptible to direct proof. They may
be proved by circumstances from which they may
be inferred, such as the lack of provocation
by Steve Seagle, conduct of the defendant
before, during, and after the killing, threats
and declarations of the defendant, use of
grossly excessive force, brutal or viciousnature - brutal or vicious circumstances of
the killing, manner in which or means by which
the killing was done, and ill will between the
parties.
“The trial court is required to instruct the jury on all
substantial features of a case.” State v. Elliott, 344 N.C. 242,
273, 475 S.E.2d 202, 215 (1996) (citing State v. Rose, 323 N.C.
455, 458, 373 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1988)). The trial court should
honor a defendant's request for a jury instruction only if the
instruction is supported by the evidence and is a correct statement
of the law. See State v. Sams, 148 N.C. App. 141, 146, 557 S.E.2d
638, 642 (2001) (citing State v. Rogers, 121 N.C. App. 273, 281,
465 S.E.2d 77, 82 (1996)).
To prove first-degree murder, the State must provide evidence
of a “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-17 (2003).
[P]remeditation means that the act was thought
out beforehand for some length of time,
however short, but no particular amount of
time is necessary for the mental process of
premeditation. Deliberation means an intent
to kill, carried out in a cool state of blood,
in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge
or to accomplish an unlawful purpose and not
under the influence of a violent passion,
suddenly aroused by lawful or just cause or
legal provocation.
State v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1, 33, 506 S.E.2d 455, 472 (1998)
(citations omitted).
“[T]he premise of the 'felled victim' theory of premeditation
and deliberation is that when numerous wounds are inflicted, the
defendant has the opportunity to premeditate and deliberate from
one shot to the next.” State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276, 295, 357
S.E.2d 641, 653 (1987). The felled victim theory is typicallyadvanced by the State in first-degree murder cases where the
defendant is accused of inflicting multiple lethal wounds on the
victim. See State v. Leazer, 353 N.C. 234, 539 S.E.2d 922 (2000);
State v. Truesdale, 340 N.C. 229, 456 S.E.2d 299 (1995); State v.
Watson, 338 N.C. 168, 449 S.E.2d 694 (1994); State v. Brogden, 329
N.C. 534, 407 S.E.2d 158 (1991); State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276, 357
S.E.2d 641 (1987); State v. Sims, 161 N.C. App. 183, 588 S.E.2d 55
(2003). In such cases, the State argues that premeditation and
deliberation may be inferred by “'the dealing of lethal blows after
the deceased has been felled and rendered helpless,'” and “'the
nature and number of the victim's wounds.'” State v. Keel, 337
N.C. 469, 489, 447 S.E.2d 748, 759 (1994) (quoting State v.
Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 431, 340 S.E.2d 673, 693 (1986)).
In the present case, defendant argues that “if the presence of
[multiple lethal wounds] evidences premeditation and deliberation,
then the absence of such [wounds] negates premeditation and
deliberation.” We conclude that the absence of multiple lethal
wounds does not negate the elements of premeditation and
deliberation in this case because the State established the
elements of premeditation and deliberation by evidence other than
the number of shots fired. The State presented evidence that
defendant walked away from the argument with Seagle, entered the
house, retrieved the firearm from a bedroom closet, exited the
house, and shot Seagle. This evidence tends to show that defendant
formed the intent to shoot Seagle at some point between the time he
left the argument and the time of the actual shooting. Because the
evidence tends to show that defendant's actions were deliberate andpremeditated, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
denying defendant's request to have the jury consider the lack of
lethal blows after the killing as a factor in assessing
premeditation and deliberation.
[2] Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by
overruling defendant's objection to the State's closing argument.
We disagree.
Where a defendant timely objects to a prosecutor's closing
argument, this Court must determine “whether the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to sustain the objection.” State v.
Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 131, 558 S.E.2d 97, 106 (2002) (citing State
v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 111, 322 S.E.2d 110, 122 (1984)). A
prosecutor's argument is proper where it is consistent with the
record and does not espouse conjecture or personal opinion.
Counsel may argue to the jury the law, the facts in evidence, and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. State v. Alston, 341
N.C. 198, 239, 461 S.E.2d 687, 709 (1995). “When determining
whether the prosecutor's remarks are grossly improper, the remarks
must be viewed in context and in light of the overall factual
circumstances to which they refer.” State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667,
692-93, 473 S.E.2d 291, 306 (1996) (citing Alston, 341 N.C. at
239, 461 S.E.2d at 709).
In the present case, defense counsel made the following
pertinent remarks in his closing argument:
Sometimes silence speaks volumes. And I would
contend to you in this case that's very
true. . . . The State never called these twins
[Roger and Dale] to the witness stand to say
that what these folks claimed didn't happen.
. . . .
I contend to you that the absence of evidence
is very important here. And the absence of
the twins is important.
The State, in its closing argument, rebutted defense counsel's
remarks as follows:
And then, finally, Mr. Shuford said, Now,
silence is important. And the fact that they
didn't bring the two twins in here, you should
take account of that, and you can if you want
to, but don't forget . . . there was nothing
to prevent him from subpoenaing the parents to
bring those kids in here and have a chance to
see a four-year-old kid testify in front of a
jury.
It is to the aforementioned statements that defendant objected.
We conclude that the State's closing argument is consistent
with the record and does not espouse conjecture or personal
opinion. The State's remarks are appropriate to rebut defense
counsel's remarks about the fact that the State did not call Roger
and Dale as witnesses. Furthermore, the State's argument addresses
a reasonable inference from defendant's strategy, i.e., defendant's
failure to present additional witnesses to testify about the events
leading up to the shooting. Thus, we hold that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's objection.
[3] Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by
admitting autopsy photographs of Seagle into evidence. Defendant
asserts that the inflammatory nature of the photographs outweighs
their probative value. We disagree.
Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2003). The decision to admitphotographic evidence “lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and the trial court's ruling should not be overturned
on appeal unless the ruling [is] manifestly unsupported by reason
or [] so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision.” State v. Goode, 350 N.C. 247, 258, 512 S.E.2d
414, 421 (1999) (citing State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372
S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988)). Our appellate courts continue to
recognize “the long-standing rule that photographs of a murder
victim, though gory or gruesome, may be introduced for illustrative
purposes so long as they are not used in an excessive or
repetitious manner aimed exclusively at arousing the passions of
the jury.” State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 414, 508 S.E.2d 496, 516
(1998) (citing Hennis, 323 N.C. at 283, 372 S.E.2d at 526).
In the instant case, the trial court admitted three autopsy
photographs into evidence to illustrate the testimony of Dr.
Patrick Lantz, Forsyth County Medical Examiner. In the first
photograph, Seagle's left arm is raised to reveal two lacerations
on the left side of Seagle's torso and a laceration on his chest.
The second photograph shows a surgical incision on the right side
of Seagle's torso. The third photograph shows the same surgical
incision on the right side of Seagle's torso and a second surgical
incision on Seagle's right shoulder. Dr. Lantz testified that
Seagle suffered a knife wound on his right shoulder, a knife wound
on the left side of his torso, and a gunshot wound to his chest,
the latter of which was the cause of Seagle's death. The trial
court allowed the State to publish two autopsy photographs to the
jury by projecting them onto a screen in the courtroom, noting“with these small photographs, it certainly would be helpful to
enlarge [them].”
We hold that the trial court's ruling admitting the enlarged
photographs that were projected onto a screen was proper for the
purpose of illustrating the extent of Seagle's wounds. Thus, the
probative value of the photographs outweighs any potential unfair
prejudice due to the nature of the photographs. The photographs
were not used in a repetitive manner and it was not excessive to
project them onto a screen for the purpose of making them more
easily viewed. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the enlarged photographs that were
projected onto a screen.
[4] Defendant also argues that the short-form first-degree
murder indictment was constitutionally defective. We disagree.
Our Supreme Court has consistently held that short-form murder
indictments are constitutionally sound. State v. Hunt, 357 N.C.
257, 278, 582 S.E.2d 593, 607, cert. denied, 539 U.S. 985, 156 L.
Ed. 2d 702, petition denied, 539 U.S. 985, 156 L. Ed. 2d 702
(2003); see also State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 504-05, 528 S.E.2d
326, 341 (2000) (upholding short-form indictment for murder).
Accordingly, we overrule this assignment of error as it is without
merit.
NO ERROR.
Judges TYSON and GEER concur.
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***