1. Child Abuse and Neglect--neglect--findings of fact--failure to visit child one week
prior to filing of petition
The trial court erred in a child neglect case by its finding of fact 5 that states neither the
mother nor the putative father visited the minor child for approximately one week prior to the
date of the filing of the petition in this case on June 24, 2003, because: (1) the record does not
reveal any testimony indicating the mother failed to visit the minor child in the hospital during
the week prior to the petition; (2) the two social workers did not provide any testimony regarding
the mother's visitation of the minor in the hospital; (3) the paternal grandfather testified the
mother lived with him for two weeks after the child's birth and that he would take the mother to
visit the child every night until she moved out of his home; and (4) DSS did not offer any
testimony regarding the mother's hospital visitation or lack thereof during the last week the child
was in the hospital.
2. Child Abuse and Neglect--neglect--findings of fact--whereabouts of parents
unknown
The trial court did not err in a child neglect case by the portion of finding of fact 5 which
states the whereabouts of the mother were not known at the time of the release of the minor child
from the hospital and the portion of finding of fact 10 which states the mother left the paternal
grandfather's residence and at the time of the filing of her petition her whereabouts were
unknown and she had no housing or income known to DSS, because: (1) the paternal grandfather
testified that the mother had moved from his home, that he did not know her whereabouts, and
that he informed DSS that the mother had left his residence; (2) no evidence was offered tending
to indicate DSS knew of the mother's whereabouts after she left the grandfather's home; (3) a
social worker testified the mother did not have any employment at the time the petition was
filed; and (4) no evidence was entered regarding the mother's housing situation, and all of the
evidence indicated that DSS did not know where the mother was.
3. Child Abuse and Neglect--neglect--findings of fact--mother admitted smoking
marijuana before child birth
The trial court did not err in a child neglect case by the portion of finding of fact 7 which
states the mother acknowledged smoking marijuana the day before the birth of the minor child,
because even though the mother did not specifically admit to using marijuana the day prior to the
child's birth, the testimony that she refused to take a drug test the day before the child's birth and
the fact that she tested positive for marijuana the day of the child's birth is sufficient evidence
from which the trial court could infer the mother had recently used marijuana.
4. Child Abuse and Neglect--neglect--findings of fact--cease reunification order
entered for infant's older sister
The trial court did not err in a child neglect case by finding that a cease reunification
order had been entered for the infant's older sister, because a social worker testified the older
daughter had been adjudicated abused and neglected and that a cease reunification order had
been entered.
5. Child Abuse and Neglect--neglect--findings of fact_-mother diagnosed with
narcissistic personality disorder
The trial court did not err in a child neglect case by its finding of fact 9 stating that the
mother previously had been diagnosed as having narcissistic personality disorder, because: (1) a
social worker testified by reading the pertinent report that an 11 February 2003 psychological
evaluation indicated the mother has narcissistic personality disorder; and (2) although the mother
objected to this testimony, she neither stated a basis for this objection during the hearing nor
does she make any arguments on appeal as to why this testimony was inadmissible.
6. Child Abuse and Neglect--neglect--findings of fact_-no supervision of minor child
The trial court erred in a child neglect case by its finding of fact 12 stating that the minor
child received no supervision from the mother for around one week next preceding the date of
the filing of the petition in this case and that the minor child had been abandoned as of the date
of the filing of the petition, because the evidence presented indicated the mother visited her
daughter regularly in the hospital and DSS did not present any evidence to the contrary.
7. Child Abuse and Neglect--neglect--findings of fact_-mother unavailable to receive
child--older sibling abused and neglected
The trial court did not err in a child neglect case by its finding of fact stating that the
minor child's mother was unavailable to receive her at discharge from the hospital and that the
child's older sister had been subjected to abuse and neglect, because: (1) custody had been
placed with DSS prior to the child's release from the hospital, meaning the mother would have
been unavailable to receive her daughter at discharge; (2) DSS did not know of the mother's
whereabouts at the time the petition was filed; and (3) although the older sister's adjudication
order had not been offered into evidence, the social worker did testify that the older sister had
been adjudged abused and neglected.
8. Child Abuse and Neglect--neglect--findings of fact_-clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence
Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports the conclusion that the minor child was
neglected including that: (1) the mother tested positive for marijuana use on the day the child
was born; (2) another child had been adjudged abused and neglected; (3) the mother was
unemployed; and (4) the mother's whereabouts were unknown at the time the petition was filed.
9. Child Abuse and Neglect--disposition hearing-_admission of reports--rules of
evidence do not apply
The trial court did not err in a child neglect case by considering the DSS and guardian ad
litem reports in making its disposition even though the reports had not been admitted into
evidence, because: (1) N.C.G.S. § 7B-901 provides that the disposition hearing is an informal
proceeding in which the formal rules of evidence do not apply; (2) the disposition hearing was
continued to a later date after the trial court was informed that all parties had not received a copy
of the reports; and (3) all parties had an opportunity to review the reports before the trial court
considered the reports in making its disposition.
10. Child Abuse and Neglect--neglect_-reasonable efforts made by DSS--cessation of
reunification efforts
The trial court did not err in a child neglect case by determining that reasonable
reunification efforts had been made by DSS and by ordering DSS to cease reunification efforts,because: (1) although at the time of the disposition hearing the mother was employed, the
findings of fact also indicated the mother did not have stable housing, she had tested positive for
marijuana and benzodiazopines on one occasion after the adjudication hearing, and she had not
attended several of her substance abuse assessments since the adjudication hearing; and (2) the
record included findings that the mother was not making progress on her psychological problems
and that an order to cease reunification efforts had been entered regarding her other daughter.
11. Child Abuse and Neglect--neglect_-failure to use exact statutory language for
cessation of reunification efforts
The trial court did not err in a child neglect case by failing to include in the disposition
order the exact statutory language under N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(b) necessary to order a cessation of
reunification efforts, because: (1) the statutory requirements were satisfied in conclusion of law 5
of the disposition order when the trial court stated that return to the home of either of the parents
is contrary to the best interest of the child at this time and is contrary to the health, safety, and
welfare of the child; (2) all of the statutory language is included in either the findings of fact or
conclusions of law; and (3) the mother failed to cite any case law or other relevant authority
indicating it was error not to use the exact statutory language.
12. Child Abuse and Neglect--neglect_-custody with mother not in best interest of child
The trial court did not err in a child neglect case by determining that custody of the child
with the mother is contrary to the child's best interest and to her safety and health even though
the mother contends that custody should have been placed with her based on N.C.G.S. § 7B-900
stating that the initial approach should involve working with the juvenile and the juvenile's
family in their own home so that the appropriate community resources may be involved,
because: (1) N.C.G.S. § 7B-900 provides that the initial approach should involve working with
the juvenile and the juvenile's family in their home if possible; and (2) the disposition order
concluded that DSS had exercised reasonable efforts toward reunification, but that reunification
was not in the best interest of the minor child at this time.
J. David Abernethy for petitioner-appellee Catawba County
Department of Social Services.
Carolyn Crouch for Guardian ad Litem.
Hall & Hall Attorneys at Law, P.C., by Susan P. Hall, for
respondent-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
The respondent mother appeals from the adjudication and
disposition orders which concluded her infant daughter, MJG, was
neglected and ordered the cessation of reunification efforts. Themother contends several findings of fact in both orders were
unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The mother
also challenges the trial court's determinations that (1) custody
of MJG in her home was contrary to the child's best interest and to
the safety and health of the child, (2) reasonable efforts were
undertaken by the Department of Social Services (“DSS”), and (3)
DSS shall cease its reunification efforts. After careful review,
we affirm the orders below.
The record tends to show that MJG was born on 4 June 2003 and
weighed two pounds and five ounces (2 lbs. 5 ozs.) at birth.
Immediately after birth, the infant was admitted to the intensive
care unit at Carolinas Medical Center in Charlotte, North Carolina.
The mother was living with the infant's paternal grandfather at the
time of MJG's birth, and he took the mother to the hospital each
night to visit MJG. Prior to MJG's release from the hospital, the
mother left the grandfather's residence and the grandfather did not
know her whereabouts. Upon release from the hospital, MJG was
placed in the custody of DSS. The child was never in the mother's
custody.
The mother's other daughter had been adjudicated abused and
neglected prior to MJG's birth and was in the custody of DSS. The
mother had been ordered to have drug screenings as part of her case
plan, and she had several positive drug tests prior to her
pregnancy with MJG. During the pregnancy she had several negative
drug tests. However, the mother tested positive for marijuana on
the day MJG was born and the mother admitted using marijuana on 6
May 2003. She also refused to take a drug test the day before MJG
was born. On 24 June 2003, Catawba County DSS filed a juvenile petition
alleging MJG was neglected, in that MJG did not receive proper
care, supervision, or discipline from her parent. After a 26
August 2003 hearing, MJG was adjudged neglected. After disposition
was deferred, a disposition hearing was conducted on 18 November
2003 and the disposition order was signed on 3 December 2003. In
the disposition order, the trial court ordered DSS to cease its
efforts to return the minor child to her own home. The mother
appeals.
The mother challenges several findings of fact in the
adjudication and disposition orders. Allegations of abuse and
neglect must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-805 (2003). “In a non-jury [abuse and] neglect
adjudication, the trial court's findings of fact supported by clear
and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive, even where
some evidence supports contrary findings.” In re Helms, 127 N.C.
App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997). Our review of a trial
court's conclusions of law is limited to whether the conclusions
are supported by the findings of fact. See In re Montgomery, 311
N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984). “If the trial court's conclusions
of law are supported by findings of fact based on clear, cogent and
convincing evidence, and the conclusions of law support the order
or judgment of the trial court, then the decision from which appeal
was taken should be affirmed.” In re Everette, 133 N.C. App. 84,
85, 514 S.E.2d 523, 525 (1999).
[1] First, the mother challenges a portion of finding of fact
5 in the adjudication order which states, “[n]either the mother nor
the putative father visited the minor child for approximately oneweek prior to the date of the filing of the petition in this case
on June 24, 2003[.]”
Our review of the record does not reveal any testimony
indicating the mother failed to visit MJG in the hospital during
the week prior to the filing of the petition. The two social
workers did not provide any testimony regarding the mother's
visitation of MJG in the hospital. The paternal grandfather
testified the mother lived with him for two weeks after MJG's birth
and that he would take the mother to visit MJG every night until
she moved out of his home. DSS did not offer any testimony
regarding the mother's hospital visitation or lack thereof during
the last week MJG was in the hospital. Accordingly, this finding
of fact is not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
[2] The mother also challenges the portion of finding of fact
5 in the adjudication order which states, “the whereabouts of the
mother and the whereabouts of the putative father were not known at
the time of the release of [MJG] from Carolinas Medical Center.”
A social worker attempted to provide testimony regarding this
finding of fact. However, the trial court sustained an objection
to the testimony and ordered the testimony stricken from the
record. The grandfather testified that the mother had moved from
his home, that he did not know of her whereabouts, and that he
informed DSS that the mother had left his residence. No evidence
was offered tending to indicate DSS knew of the mother's
whereabouts after she left the grandfather's home. Accordingly,
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports the testimony that
her whereabouts were unknown at the time the petition was filed
because neither DSS nor the grandfather knew her location. Similarly, the mother challenges a portion of finding of fact
10 which states, “[s]he left that residence and at the time of the
filing of the petition, her whereabouts were unknown and she had no
housing or income known to the Department of Social Services.” As
previously stated, DSS did not know of the mother's whereabouts at
the time the petition was filed. A social worker also testified
the mother did not have any employment at the time the petition was
filed. No evidence was entered regarding her housing situation at
the time the petition was filed. Rather, all of the evidence
indicates DSS did not know where the mother was. Accordingly, we
conclude the findings that her whereabouts were unknown and that
she did not have any income at the time the petition was filed is
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Also, the
finding that she did not have any housing known to DSS at the time
the petition was filed is supported by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence.
[3] The mother next challenges the portion of finding of fact
7 in the adjudication order which states “[t]he mother acknowledged
smoking marijuana the day before the birth of [MJG] . . . .” The
social worker testified that the mother admitted smoking marijuana
with MJG's father after a May 2003 court hearing. The social
worker also testified the mother refused to take a drug test the
day before MJG was born. In regards to whether the mother had used
drugs the day prior to MJG's birth, the social worker specifically
testified “[the mother] did not state whether she had used.”
However, the social worker also testified that the mother tested
positive for marijuana the day MJG was born. Even though the
mother did not specifically admit to using marijuana the day prior
to MJG's birth, the testimony that she refused to take a drug testthe day before the infant's birth and tested positive for marijuana
the day of her birth is sufficient evidence from which the trial
court could infer the mother had recently used marijuana.
Accordingly, we conclude this finding of fact is supported by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
[4] The mother next argues the trial court erroneously found
that a cease reunification order had been entered for the infant's
older sister as there was no evidence entered supporting this
statement. Our review of the transcript indicates a social worker
testified the older daughter had been adjudicated abused and
neglected and that a cease reunification order had been entered.
Accordingly, this finding of fact is supported by competent
evidence.
[5] The mother next challenges finding of fact 9 in the
adjudication order which states “[t]he mother previously has been
diagnosed as having Narcissistic Personality Disorder.” A social
worker testified, by reading the report, that an 11 February 2003
psychological evaluation indicated the mother has narcissistic
personality disorder. Although the mother objected to this
testimony, she neither stated a basis for the objection during the
hearing nor does she make any arguments on appeal as to why this
testimony was inadmissible. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
Accordingly, this finding of fact is supported by clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence.
[6] The mother next challenges finding of fact 12 in the
adjudication order which states “[t]hat [MJG] received no
supervision from [the mother or the father] for around one week
next preceding the date of the filing of the petition in this case,and [MJG] had been abandoned as of the date of filing of the
petition.”
(See footnote 1)
The evidence indicates MJG was born on 4 June 2003 and was
immediately placed in the intensive care unit of the Carolinas
Medical Center. While MJG was in the hospital, the paternal
grandfather testified the mother lived with him for approximately
fourteen days, and that he took her to the hospital each night to
visit MJG. A few days before the mother left his home, she
attempted to jump out of a moving vehicle three times. Then, on
the day she left his home, the grandfather testified the mother
said: “Well, dad . . . . The hell with it. They can have [MJG
and the older sister] both. I'm leaving.”
This evidence indicates that prior to the filing of the
petition, the mother visited her infant daughter several times in
the hospital. The juvenile petition was filed on 24 June 2003, and
according to the petition, MJG was still in the hospital at the
time the petition was filed. No evidence was presented by DSS
regarding whether or not the mother visited her daughter in the
hospital after she left the grandfather's home. Rather, the
evidence only indicates the mother did not live with the
grandfather during the last week MJG was in the hospital. The
evidence presented indicates the mother visited her daughter
regularly in the hospital, and DSS did not present any evidence to
the contrary. Accordingly, clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
does not support this finding of fact. [7] Next, the mother challenges finding of fact 13 which
states “[t]hat [MJG], had her mother been available to receive her
at discharge from Carolinas Medical Center, would have lived in a
home where another child, [the older sister], had been subjected to
abuse and neglect.” The mother contends the statements that she
was unavailable to pick up her child and that another child had
been subjected to abuse and neglect were unsupported by competent
evidence.
In this case, a nonsecure custody order placing MJG in the
custody of DSS was entered on 23 June 2003, the day before the
petition was filed, and prior to MJG's release from the hospital.
As the record indicates custody had been placed with DSS prior to
MJG's release from the hospital, the mother would have been
unavailable to receive her daughter at discharge. Furthermore, DSS
did not know of the mother's whereabouts at the time the petition
was filed. Therefore, this finding of fact was supported by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence.
The mother also challenges the portion of finding of fact 13
in the adjudication order which indicates another child had been
abused and neglected. Although the older sister's adjudication
order had not been offered into evidence, the social worker did
testify that the older sister had been adjudged abused and
neglected. Accordingly, finding of fact 13 is supported by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence.
[8] Even though we have concluded several findings of fact
were unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, the
remaining findings of fact support the conclusion that MJG was
neglected. A neglected juvenile is: A juvenile who does not receive proper care,
supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's
parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or
who has been abandoned; or who is not provided
necessary medical care; or who is not provided
necessary remedial care; or who lives in an
environment injurious to the juvenile's
welfare; or who has been placed for care or
adoption in violation of law. In determining
whether a juvenile is a neglected juvenile, it
is relevant whether that juvenile lives in a
home where another juvenile has died as a
result of suspected abuse or neglect or lives
in a home where another juvenile has been
subjected to abuse or neglect by an adult who
regularly lives in the home.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2003).
The findings of fact that the mother tested positive for
marijuana use on the day MJG was born, that another child had been
adjudged abused and neglected, that the mother was unemployed, and
that her whereabouts were unknown at the time the petition was
filed support the conclusion that MJG was neglected.
[9] The mother next challenges several findings of fact in the
disposition order. In the disposition order, the trial court
adopted and incorporated by reference court reports prepared by the
social worker and guardian ad litem. Based upon these reports, the
trial court rendered findings of fact indicating:
1 *
the parents had a long history of
domestic violence and substance abuse,
2 *
the mother had lived in four different
homes in the five months since MJG's
birth,
3 *
that the mother had to pay a fine for
resisting an officer,
4 *
that the mother was employed,
5 *
that the mother had been hospitalized for
depression and threatened suicide,
6 *
that describe details about the older
daughter's abuse and neglect case,
7 *
that the mother had signed a
relinquishment for MJG's adoption but
timely revoked it, and
8 *
that the mother had failed to utilize the
services offered her by DSS.
The mother argues that DSS failed to move the reports upon which
these findings were based into evidence, and therefore, the trial
court erroneously relied upon the reports in making its findings of
fact. We disagree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-901 (2003) states:
The dispositional hearing may be informal
and the court may consider written reports or
other evidence concerning the needs of the
juvenile. The juvenile and the juvenile's
parent, guardian, or custodian shall have an
opportunity to present evidence, and they may
advise the court concerning the disposition
they believe to be in the best interests of
the juvenile. The court may consider any
evidence, including hearsay evidence as
defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court
finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary
to determine the needs of the juvenile and the
most appropriate disposition. The court may
exclude the public from the hearing unless the
juvenile moves that the hearing be open, which
motion shall be granted.
Id. In In re Ivey, 156 N.C. App. 398, 402, 576 S.E.2d 386, 389-90
(2003), this Court considered the argument that the trial court
erroneously rendered findings of fact in a permanency planning
hearing based upon reports that were not admitted into evidence.
In holding that no error was committed by the trial court, this
Court stated dispositional hearings are informal and that the trial
court may consider all reports submitted. This Court also
emphasized the parties had complied with the local rules requiring
DSS and the guardian ad litem to submit reports to all parties at
least two working days before the disposition or review hearing.
Thus, no error was committed in considering the reports that hadnot been admitted into evidence and these reports provide
sufficient evidence supporting the findings of fact in the
disposition order.
Similarly, in this case, DSS and the guardian ad litem
presented the reports to the trial court for consideration during
the disposition hearing, which under the terms of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-901 is an informal proceeding in which the formal rules of
evidence do not apply. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-901; In re
Montgomery, 77 N.C. App. 709, 715, 336 S.E.2d 136, 140 (1985)
(indicating the formal rules of evidence do not apply in a
dispositional hearing). Furthermore, the dispositional hearing was
continued to a later date after the trial court was informed all
parties had not received a copy of the reports. Therefore, all
parties had an opportunity to review the reports before the trial
court considered the reports in making its disposition. Based upon
this Court's holding in In re Ivey and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-901, we
conclude the trial court did not erroneously consider the DSS and
guardian ad litem reports in making its disposition.
[10] Next, the mother contends the trial court erroneously
determined that reasonable efforts had been made by DSS and in
ordering DSS to cease reunification efforts. Specifically, she
argues that in the three months between the adjudication and
disposition hearings, the mother had made progress. She also
argues the order did not contain the necessary statutory language
for cessation of reunification efforts.
Although at the time of the disposition hearing the mother was
employed, the findings of fact also indicate the mother did not
have stable housing, that she had tested positive for marijuana and
benzodiazopines on one occasion after the adjudication hearing, andthat she had not attended several of her substance abuse
assessments since the adjudication hearing. The record also
includes findings that the mother was not making progress on her
psychological problems and that an order to cease reunification
efforts had been entered regarding her other daughter. The older
daughter had been adjudicated abused and neglected on 17 December
2002. Based upon these findings of fact, we conclude the trial
court did not erroneously determine DSS had made reasonable efforts
towards reunification of the mother and child.
[11] The mother also argues that the disposition order failed
to include the exact statutory language necessary to order a
cessation of reunification efforts. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)
(2003) states in pertinent part that:
[T]he court may direct that reasonable efforts
to eliminate the need for placement of the
juvenile shall not be required or shall cease
if the court makes written findings of fact
that:
(1) Such efforts clearly would be futile or
would be inconsistent with the juvenile's
health, safety, and need for a safe,
permanent home within a reasonable period
of time[.]
Id. In finding of fact 10 of the disposition order, the trial
court stated:
Although reunification efforts have been made,
those valiant efforts have failed because the
mother has failed to utilize the offered
services. Reunification efforts with either
parent clearly would be futile and
inconsistent with the need of the minor child
for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable
period of time.
In conclusion of law 5 of the disposition order, the trial court
stated “[t]hat return to the home of either of the parents is
contrary to the best interest of the child at this time, and iscontrary to the health, safety and welfare of the child.” We
conclude that this finding of fact and conclusion of law satisfies
the statutory requirements. Indeed, all of the statutory language
is included in either the finding of fact or conclusion of law.
Although the mother contends it was error for the trial court not
to use the exact statutory language, she does not cite any case law
or other relevant authority indicating it was error not to use the
exact statutory language. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court
did not erroneously fail to use the exact statutory language.
[12] Finally, the mother argues the trial court erroneously
determined that custody of MJG with the mother is contrary to the
child's best interest and to her safety and health. The mother
argues that instead of custody being placed with DSS, custody
should have been placed with her because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-900
(2003) states “the initial approach should involve working with the
juvenile and the juvenile's family in their own home so that the
appropriate community resources may be involved[.]” However, N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-900 states in its entirety:
The purpose of dispositions in juvenile
actions is to design an appropriate plan to
meet the needs of the juvenile and to achieve
the objectives of the State in exercising
jurisdiction. If possible, the initial
approach should involve working with the
juvenile and the juvenile's family in their
own home so that the appropriate community
resources may be involved in the care,
supervision, and treatment according to the
needs of the juvenile. Thus, the court should
arrange for appropriate community-level
services to be provided to the juvenile and
the juvenile's family in order to strengthen
the home situation.
Id. (emphasis added). This statutory provision clearly states that
the initial approach should involve working with the juvenile andthe juvenile's family in their home if possible. In the
disposition order, the trial court concluded in pertinent part:
2. That the DSS has exercised reasonable
efforts toward reunification of the minor
child with her parents, but reunification
is not in the best interest of the minor
child at this time[.]
3. That the DSS has exercised reasonable
efforts to serve the needs of the minor
child.
4. That the DSS has exercised reasonable
efforts to prevent or eliminate the need
for continued placement out of the
parents' homes.
5. That return to the home of either of the
parents is contrary to the best interest
of the child at this time, and is
contrary to the health, safety and
welfare of the child.
6. That the best interest of the minor child
will be served by the entry of the
following order.
Based upon the trial court's conclusions of law and the findings of
fact discussed previously, we conclude the trial court did not err
in placing MJG in the custody of DSS.
In sum, even though we have determined several findings of
fact were not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,
several findings of fact, which are supported by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence, remain upon which the trial court could base
a finding of neglect. We also conclude the trial court properly
considered the DSS and guardian ad litem reports in making its
disposition. Finally, notwithstanding the mother's limited
progress, we affirm the disposition order.
Affirmed.
Judges CALABRIA and LEVINSON concur.
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