1. Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--failure to assert issue at trial
Although defendant contends he was denied his state constitutional right to a verdict by a
jury of twelve because fewer than all twelve jurors engaged in deliberations while having lunch,
defendant failed to present this argument to the trial court and therefore this argument is not
properly before the Court of Appeals. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1).
2. Jury--juror misconduct--motion for mistrial
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder, robbery with a
dangerous weapon, first-degree kidnapping, and second-degree arson case by denying
defendant's motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct, because: (1) the trial court
questioned the identified jurors individually regarding their lunch conversation; (2) the trial court
individually questioned each juror regarding what he or she had expressed or heard regarding the
jurors' opinions on the ultimate issues in the case; and (3) while the jurors' lunch conversation
did violate the judge's instructions by discussing the demeanor of the witnesses before the close
of all evidence, this misconduct did not substantially and irreparably prejudice defendant's case.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Teresa H. Pell, for the State.
Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Constance E.
Widenhouse, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-
appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
Where the trial court inquired into juror misconduct and
determined that no jurors had expressed their opinion on the
ultimate issues in the case, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial. After
careful review of the record, we find no error. Defendant, Harry Wood, was indicted by the Forsyth County
Grand Jury for the first-degree murder of Edward Grant, robbery
with a dangerous weapon, first-degree kidnapping of Mr. Grant,
first-degree arson, and first-degree kidnapping of Earther Wynn.
At the close of all evidence, the trial court dismissed the first-
degree kidnapping charge with regard to Ms. Wynn.
At trial, after Defendant presented his evidence and while the
State was presenting its rebuttal evidence, a local attorney, J.D.
Byers, informed the trial court that while he was having lunch at
Bon Appetit in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, he thought he
overheard some of the jurors discussing witnesses in the case. The
jury was brought into the courtroom, given a brief instruction, and
then returned to the jury room. Mr. Byers identified two or three
jurors he thought he heard discussing witnesses.
At Defendant's request, the trial court brought the identified
jurors into the courtroom individually and questioned them. All
jurors stated that they did not express or hear anyone express an
opinion as to guilt or innocence of Defendant. One juror stated
that during the lunch conversation jurors joked about facial
expressions and stuff like that, but nothing to do with the events
of the case or anything like that. Defendant moved for a
mistrial.
The trial court proceeded to individually question every juror
and alternate juror. The trial court asked each juror the
following questions:
[H]ave you expressed your opinion about the
guilt or innocence of the Defendant to other
Jurors?
[H]ave you heard any of the other Jurors
discuss their opinions about the guilt or
innocence of the Defendant?
[H]ave you formed any opinion about this case
based on anything you've overheard or talked
with other Jurors about?
[C]an you make your decision based solely upon
the law and the evidence presented at trial?
All jurors answered the first three questions in the negative, and
the last in the affirmative. Upon additional questioning by the
defense counsel, one juror stated that more than half of the jurors
had discussed questions they wanted answered, but no one had
expressed any opinions about the ultimate issues. After the trial
court questioned a juror, he or she was taken to a second jury
room. After questioning all the jurors, the trial court denied
Defendant's motion for a mistrial.
The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder,
second-degree arson, first-degree kidnapping, and robbery with a
dangerous weapon. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole on the first-degree murder charge; 100 months to 129
months imprisonment on the first-degree kidnapping charge; and a
consecutive sentence of fifteen to eighteen months imprisonment on
the second-degree arson charge. Defendant appealed.
____________________________________________
On appeal, Defendant argues that he was denied his state
constitutional right to a verdict by a jury of twelve and that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. We
disagree.
[1] Defendant first argues that he was denied his state
constitutional right to a verdict by a jury of twelve because fewerthan all twelve jurors engaged in deliberations while having
lunch. Defendant did not present this argument to the trial court
and therefore this argument is not properly before this Court on
appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1).
[2] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a mistrial without conducting an adequate
investigation to determine whether Defendant was prejudiced by the
jury misconduct. We disagree.
A mistrial is appropriate only when there are such serious
improprieties as would make it impossible to attain a fair and
impartial verdict under the law. State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C.
232, 243-44, 333 S.E.2d 245, 252 (1985); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1061
(2004). Whether to grant a motion for mistrial is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is so clearly erroneous as to amount to a
manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Ward, 338 N.C. 64, 92-93,
449 S.E.2d 709, 724 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1134, 131 L. Ed.
2d 1013 (1995).
It is well-settled law in this State that the
determination of the trial court on the
question of juror misconduct will be reversed
only where an abuse of discretion occurred.
The reason for the rule of discretion is
apparent. Misconduct is determined by the
facts and circumstances in each case. The
trial judge is in a better position to
investigate any allegations of misconduct,
question witnesses and observe their demeanor,
and make appropriate findings.
State v. Harris, 145 N.C. App. 570, 576, 551 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2001)
(citing State v. Drake, 31 N.C. App. 187, 190, 229 S.E.2d 51, 54
(1976)). Where juror misconduct is alleged . . . the trial court must
investigate the matter and make appropriate inquiry. State v.
Najewicz, 112 N.C. App. 280, 291, 436 S.E.2d 132, 139 (1993)
(emphasis omitted). Not every violation of a trial court's
instruction to jurors is such prejudicial misconduct as to require
a mistrial. Harris, 145 N.C. App. at 578, 551 S.E.2d at 504.
Here, the trial court questioned the identified jurors
individually regarding their lunch conversation. Additionally, the
trial court individually questioned each juror regarding what they
had expressed or heard regarding the jurors' opinions on the
ultimate issues in the case. The trial court made an appropriate
inquiry into the jury misconduct. Najewicz, 112 N.C. App. at 291,
436 S.E.2d at 139.
While the jurors' lunch conversation did violate the judge's
instructions by discussing the demeanor of witnesses before the
close of all evidence, this misconduct did not substantially and
irreparably prejudice Defendant's case. O'Berry v. Perry, 266 N.C.
77, 81, 145 S.E.2d 321, 324 (1965) (no abuse of discretion where
trial court refused to grant a mistrial after a juror, the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff's witness walked to lunch together and
discussed fishing); Harris, 145 N.C. App. at 578, 551 S.E.2d at 504
(no abuse of discretion where the trial court did not inquire into
misconduct where a juror had summarized and typed his thoughts on
the evidence while on a break in deliberation). Therefore, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial.
Defendant did not present arguments for his three remaining
assignments of error, therefore, they are deemed abandoned. N.C.
R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
No prejudicial error. Judges McGEE and TYSON concur.
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***