Divorce_-foreign judgment--alimony--continuing exclusive jurisdiction over support orders
The trial court did not err by registering and enforcing the parties' New Jersey judgment
of divorce and by denying plaintiff husband's request to modify or terminate the alimony
provisions contained therein pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-16.9, because: (1) under both North
Carolina and New Jersey's UIFSA statutory scheme, the issuing state retains continuing
exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order throughout the existence of the support
obligation regardless of whether either party continues to reside in the issuing state; (2) pursuant
to UIFSA, New Jersey is the issuing state of the spousal support order and retains continuing
exclusive jurisdiction over the judgment of divorce throughout the existence of the support
obligation; (3) although UIFSA provides that a state loses continuing exclusive jurisdiction over
a child support order when the obligor and obligee no longer reside in that state, there is no
parallel exception for spousal support orders; (4) defendant's registration of the parties'
judgment of divorce in North Carolina had no effect on New Jersey's status as the issuing state
with continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the spousal support order; (5) New Jersey is the only
state with jurisdiction to modify or terminate plaintiff's alimony obligation pursuant to the
parties' judgment of divorce; and (6) N.C.G.S. §§ 52C-2-205(f) and 52C-2-206(c) regarding
modification of spousal support orders issued in another state control over any conflict created
by N.C.G.S. § 50-16.9(c).
Prichett & Burch, P.L.L.C., by Lloyd C. Smith, Jr., Lars P.
Simonsen and Maria Misse, for plaintiff appellant.
Tharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Lynn P. Burleson and Jill
Schnabel Jackson, for defendant-appellee.
ELMORE, Judge.
James Hook (plaintiff) and Dana Schwenzfeier (defendant),
formerly Dana Hook, were married on 18 June 1965 in New Jersey.
The two divorced on 7 October 1996, and entered into a settlement
agreement, including alimony; that agreement was then incorporated
into a judgment of divorce entered by the appropriate court in NewJersey. Following their divorce, both plaintiff and defendant
moved out of New Jersey, plaintiff moving to North Carolina and
defendant to Massachusetts. Neither party had significant contacts
with New Jersey after their respective moves.
On 31 December 1999, plaintiff lost his job and sought to
terminate the alimony provisions of the New Jersey court's
judgment. Prior to the hearing on the motion, defendant filed a
motion seeking to enforce the alimony provision. On 20 August
2002, the New Jersey court, sua sponte, dismissed plaintiff's
motion to modify and defendant's motion to enforce the judgment of
divorce. The court determined that New Jersey no longer had
subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the parties because
neither was domiciled in New Jersey at that time. Neither party
appealed that determination.
After the New Jersey court's order dismissing the case,
plaintiff ceased making alimony payments to defendant. Defendant
then filed a notice of registration of a foreign support order with
the Tyrrell County Clerk's Office. A hearing on the matter was
scheduled due to the fact that defendant opposed the filing and
enforcement of the original New Jersey judgment, and in his written
response included a motion that under the judgment the alimony
should be modified or terminated. After the hearing, Judge Parker
entered an order registering the New Jersey judgment and ordering
plaintiff to pay the accrued arrears and monthly alimony payments
according to the judgment. The trial court also denied plaintiff's
motion to modify the judgment of divorce, determining that NorthCarolina lacked jurisdiction to do so. From this order, plaintiff
appeals.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in making findings
of fact and conclusions of law that, pursuant to the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), New Jersey retains
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify or terminate
plaintiff's alimony obligation and that North Carolina's
jurisdiction in this matter is limited to registration and
enforcement of the parties' judgment of divorce. We affirm the
trial court's order.
UIFSA has been enacted by all fifty states and is codified in
North Carolina as Chapter 52C of the North Carolina General
Statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-1-100 et seq. (2003); see also
N.J. Stat. § 2A:4-30.65 et seq. (2005). UIFSA establishes a
procedural mechanism through which an obligee (here, defendant) who
resides in another state may use the North Carolina courts to
enforce a support order entered by a court in another state (New
Jersey) against an obligor who resides in North Carolina
(plaintiff). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-3-301 (2003). UIFSA
procedures apply to both child support orders and spousal support
orders. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 52C-1-101(18) and (21) and 52C-2-
205(f) (2003).
Under UIFSA, a support order is first entered by the “issuing
tribunal” in the “issuing state.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-1-101(9)
and (10) (2003). If an obligee wishes to enforce a support order
against an obligor who resides in a different state, the obligeemay “register” the order in the state where the obligor resides.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 52C-6-601 and 52C-6-602 (2003). Unless the
responding state, North Carolina in this matter, has “continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction” over a registered foreign support order,
the jurisdiction of a responding state is limited to the
ministerial function of enforcing the registered order. See N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 52C-1-101(16) (2003) (defining responding state); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 52C-3-305(a) (2003) (official commentary characterizes
the listing of duties in subsection (a) as “ministerial.”); see
also Welsher v. Rager, 127 N.C. App. 521, 527, 491 S.E.2d 661, 664
(1997) (citing to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-2-205, the Court determined
that without 1) both parties' consent to a modification of a
support order or 2) the issuing state having lost continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction, North Carolina may not modify a support
order).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-2-205 and N.J. Stat. § 2A:4-30.72,
discussing continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over support orders,
provide that
[a] tribunal of this State issuing a support
order consistent with the law of this State
has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a
spousal support order throughout the existence
of the support obligation. A tribunal of this
State may not modify a spousal support order
issued by a tribunal of another state having
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that
order under the law of that state.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-2-205(f) (2003); N.J. Stat. § 2A:4-30.72(f)
(2005) (Subsection (f) in New Jersey is identical, save the second
sentence where New Jersey inserted a comma after “spousal support”and added “custody visitation, or non-child support provisions of
an” before “order.”). Under both North Carolina and New Jersey's
UIFSA statutory scheme, the issuing state retains “continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order throughout the
existence of the support obligation,” regardless of whether either
party continues to reside in the issuing state. See id. (emphasis
added). Pursuant to UIFSA, New Jersey is the “issuing state” of
the spousal support order and retains continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over the judgment of divorce throughout the existence
of the support obligation. Although UIFSA provides that a state
loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order
when the obligor and obligee no longer reside in that state, there
is no parallel exception for spousal support orders. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 52C-2-205 (a) and (f) (2003). Instead, UIFSA specifically
provides that the issuing state retains continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over a spousal support order throughout the existence
of the support obligation. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-2-205(f)
(2003).
We are persuaded that the statute's differing treatment
regarding continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of spousal support
orders and child support orders is purposeful, as evidenced by the
official commentary to section 52C-2-205.
Spousal support is treated differently; the
issuing tribunal retains continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over an order of spousal support
throughout the entire existence of the support
obligation. Sections 205(f) and 206(c) state
that the procedures of UIFSA are not available
to a responding tribunal to modify the
existing spousal support order of the issuingState. This marks a radical departure from
RURESA, which treated spousal and child
support orders identically. . . . The
prohibition of modification of spousal support
by a nonissuing State tribunal under UIFSA is
consistent with the principle that a tribunal
should apply local law to such cases to insure
efficent handling and to minimize choice of
law problems. Avoiding conflict of law
problems is almost impossible if spousal
support orders are subject to modification in
a second State.
* * *
A wavier of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
and subsequent modification of spousal support
by a tribunal of another State simply is not
authorized under the auspices of UIFSA.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-2-205 official commentary (2003).
Defendant's registration of the parties' judgment of divorce
in North Carolina had no effect on New Jersey's status as the
issuing state with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the
spousal support order. New Jersey is the only state, therefore,
with jurisdiction to modify or terminate plaintiff's alimony
obligation pursuant to the parties' judgment of divorce.
Plaintiff next argues that North Carolina has obtained
jurisdiction over the parties' judgment of divorce and that the
trial court erred by failing to modify or terminate his alimony
obligation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.9. We disagree.
Section 50-16.9 of the North Carolina General Statutes
provides:
When an order for alimony has been entered by
a court of another jurisdiction, a court of
this State may, upon gaining jurisdiction over
the person of both parties in a civil action
instituted for that purpose, and upon a
showing of changed circumstances, enter a neworder for alimony which modifies or supersedes
such order for alimony to the extent that it
could have been so modified in the
jurisdiction where granted.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.9(c) (2003). The language of section
50-16.9(c) is consistent with the provisions of UIFSA's predecessor
statute, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA),
which allowed courts of this State to modify support orders of
other states. When the North Carolina General Assembly enacted
UIFSA, which severely curtailed the authority of a responding state
to modify a foreign support order, it did not amend or repeal
section 50-16.9(c).
It is evident that sections 52C-2-205(f) and 52C-2-206(c) are
in conflict with section 50-16.9(c), that section allowing courts
of this State to accomplish exactly what the provisions of Chapter
52C prohibit. As such, we hold that sections 52C-2-205 and 52C-2-
206, regarding modification of spousal support orders issued in
another state, control over any conflict created by section 50-
16.9(c). We do not believe the General Assembly set out to make a
radical departure from prior law, by adopting UIFSA and repealing
URESA, simply to have its effect undone by then-existing section
50-16.9(c). See Sally B. Sharp, Step by Step: The Development of
the Distributive Consequences of Divorce in North Carolina, 76 N.C.
L. Rev. 2017, 2105-2106 (1998) (“[Section 50-16.9(c)] is in direct
conflict with the federally mandated Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act . . . . Thus, any attempt by any court in North
Carolina to modify a spousal support award from another state would
thus be unenforceable in this, or any other, state.”). While we are confident that this reconciliation is consistent
with the intent of the General Assembly, we are guided to the same
result by our own principles of statutory construction.
Where there is one statute dealing with a
subject in general and comprehensive terms,
and another dealing with a part of the same
subject in a more minute and definite way, the
two should be read together and harmonized
. . .; but, to the extent of any necessary
repugnancy between them, the special statute,
or the one dealing with the common subject
matter in a minute way, will prevail over the
general statute[.]
McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 631, 461 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1995)
(quoting Food Stores v. Board of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624,
628-29, 151 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1966)). Furthermore, when there are
conflicting provisions in statutes that cannot be reconciled, the
older statute must yield to the most recent provision because “the
later statute represents the latest expression of legislative will
and intent.” Adair v. Burial Assoc., 284 N.C. 534, 541, 201 S.E.2d
905, 910 (1974) (citations omitted).
UIFSA is a detailed, comprehensive statutory scheme adopted by
all fifty states to create uniformity in enforcement procedures.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-1-100 et seq (2003). UIFSA was enacted
to take effect in North Carolina on 1 January 1996 by the 1995
session of the General Assembly. 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 538, §
7(c) (adding Chapter 52C, while section 7(a) of the Session Law
repealed Chapter 52A). UIFSA specifically sets forth in great
detail the necessary jurisdictional requirements for modification
of a foreign support order. See id. In contrast, section
50-16.9(c) is part of a general statute authorizing modification ofalimony orders. Additionally, section 50-16.9 was enacted well
before UIFSA, making UIFSA the more current will of the
legislature. See 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1152 § 2. Therefore,
since UIFSA is the more specific and more recent statute, any
conflict between it and section 50-16.9(c) must be resolved in
accordance with the provisions of UIFSA.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court
registering and enforcing the parties' judgment of divorce and
denying plaintiff's request to modify or terminate the alimony
provisions contained therein.
Affirmed.
Judges McCULLOUGH and LEVINSON concur.
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