Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata_defensive collateral estoppel_mutuality of
parties_consideration of criminal results in civil action
Defensive collateral estoppel no longer requires mutuality of parties in North Carolina,
and the trial court properly considered plaintiff's criminal convictions for assault in granting
summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's civil claims arising from the same incident.
Cunningham & Crump, PLLC, by R. Flint Crump for plaintiff-
appellant.
Stiles Byrum & Horne, L.L.P., by Terry D. Horne and Virginia
Lee Bailey for defendant-appellee.
WYNN, Judge.
For the use of defensive collateral estoppel, North Carolina
does not require mutuality of parties. Where an issue in a civil
suit has already been fully litigated in a criminal trial, evidence
of that criminal conviction is admittable in the civil suit. For
the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision of the trial
court.
On 28 November 2001, Plaintiff Arthur Lee Mays filed a civil
action against Defendants David W. Clanton, The Town of
Taylorsville, and The Taylorsville Police Department alleging
battery, false imprisonment, negligent hiring, and negligentsupervision. On 26 December 2003, Mays voluntarily dismissed the
negligent hiring and supervision claims.
In his pleadings, Mays alleged that on 2 December 2000,
Clanton, a police officer for the Town of Taylorsville, was
directing traffic after a Christmas parade. Clanton instructed
Mays to move his vehicle onto a street that Mays did not want to
travel. Mays made a gesture to Clanton which he stated was one of
confusion. The two engaged in a physical altercation; ultimately,
Clanton moved the vehicle and arrested Mays.
On 14 March 2002, criminal proceedings against Mays resulted
in jury verdicts of assaulting a public officer with a deadly
weapon and simple assault for the events of 2 December 2000.
Thereafter, on 22 December 2003, Defendants filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment as to all issues presented in the civil action
against them on the basis of collateral estoppel. In response,
Mays filed a Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of his criminal
convictions arising from the events of 2 December 2000. From the
trial court's denial of his Motion in Limine and grant of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of collateral
estoppel, Mays appeals to this Court.
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On appeal, Mays contends that the trial court erred in
considering his prior convictions as a basis for granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendants on collateral estoppel grounds. We
disagree. Traditionally, under collateral estoppel “a final judgment on
the merits prevents relitigation of issues actually litigated and
necessary to the outcome of the prior action in a later suit
involving a different cause of action between the parties or their
privies.” Thomas M. McInnis & Ass., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421,
428, 349 S.E.2d 552, 557 (1986). However, our Supreme Court no
longer requires mutuality of parties when a party seeks to assert
collateral estoppel defensively. Id. at 434, 349 S.E.2d at 560;
see Johnson v. Smith, 97 N.C. App. 450, 453, 388 S.E.2d 582, 584
(1990). The party invoking collateral estoppel need not have been
a party to or in privity with a party in the first lawsuit “as long
as the party to be collaterally estopped had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action.” Thomas
M. McInnis & Ass., Inc., 318 N.C. at 432, 349 S.E.2d at 559.
“Defensive use of collateral estoppel 'means that a stranger to the
judgment, ordinarily the defendant in the second action, relies
upon a former judgment as conclusively establishing in his favor an
issue which he must prove as an element of his defense.'” Johnson,
97 N.C. App. at 453, 388 S.E.2d at 584 (citation omitted).
Mays relies on the traditional rule that
evidence of a conviction and of a judgment
therein, or of an acquittal, rendered in a
criminal prosecution, is not admissible in
evidence in a purely civil action to establish
the truth of the facts on which the verdict of
guilty or of acquittal was rendered, or when
there is a verdict of acquittal to constitute
a bar to a subsequent civil action based on
the same facts.
Durham Bank & Trust Co. v. Pollard, 256 N.C. 77, 79, 123 S.E.2d
104, 106 (1961). This rule was founded on the fact that “[w]hile
the same facts may be involved in two cases, one civil and the
other criminal, the parties are necessarily different, for, whereas
one action is prosecuted by an individual, the other is maintained
by the state.” Id. at 79-80, 123 S.E.2d at 106.
Since Durham Bank & Trust Co. was decided, our Supreme Court
eliminated the need for mutuality of parties in the use of
defensive collateral estoppel. Thomas M. McInnis & Ass., Inc., 318
N.C. at 434, 349 S.E.2d at 560. Because the Court in Durham Bank
& Trust Co. based its decision of not allowing criminal convictions
used for collateral estoppel in a civil case on the lack of
mutuality between parties, this analysis is no longer accurate.
Indeed, following our Supreme Court's elimination of the
requirement for mutuality of parties to establish defensive
collateral estoppel, this Court has upheld collateral estoppel of
an issue in a civil suit when that issue was previously established
as an element in a criminal conviction. Burton v. City of Durham,
118 N.C. App. 676, 680, 457 S.E.2d 329, 332 (1995) (plaintiff's
conviction in district court is conclusive as evidence that
plaintiff was not arrested for his verbal protests in a subsequent
First Amendment claim); Hill v. Winn-Dixie Charlotte, Inc., 100
N.C. App. 518, 397 S.E.2d 347, 349 (1990) (plaintiff's conviction
in district court is conclusive as evidence of probable cause in a
subsequent civil case for malicious prosecution unless plaintiff
can produce evidence that the conviction was procured by fraud orunfair means). As determined by this Court, evidence of a prior
criminal conviction is admittable in a civil suit to support a
defensive use of collateral estoppel. Burton, 118 N.C. App. at
680, 457 S.E.2d at 332.
In light of this Court's holdings in Burton and Hill, we must
conclude that the trial court properly considered Mays's 14 March
2002 criminal convictions in granting summary judgment.
Affirmed.
Judges HUDSON and STEELMAN concur.
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