Juveniles--disposition and restitution--delegation of authority
The trial court did not impermissibly delegate its authority when determining the
dispositional alternatives for a delinquent juvenile by ordering that the juvenile pay restitution,
but left the amount to be determined, and ordered participation in a residential treatment
program, but left the specifics of the day-to-day program to be directed by the Juvenile Court
Counselor or Mental Health Agency.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Director Victims and Citizens
Services William M. Polk, for the State.
James N. Freeman, Jr., for juvenile-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
Under section 7B-2506 of the North Carolina General Statutes
“the court, and the court alone, must determine which dispositional
alternatives to utilize with each delinquent juvenile.” In re
Hartsock, 158 N.C. App. 287, 292, 580 S.E.2d 395, 399 (2003). In
this matter, the juvenile contends that the trial court
impermissibly delegated its authority by allowing others to
determine the amount of restitution and the specifics of a
residential treatment program. Because the trial court ordered
restitution and participation in the residential treatment program,
albeit without specifics, we affirm the order of the trial court.
This matter arose from an incident involving an eleven-year-old student, M.A.B., who struck another student on the head with
his fist, causing swelling on the side and back of the student's
head. Following M.A.B.'s admission in court to the substance of
the allegations, the trial court adjudicated M.A.B. delinquent on
the count of misdemeanor assault inflicting serious injury in an
adjudication/disposition order dated 1 March 2004. The trial court
ordered M.A.B. to: (1) pay restitution “in an amount to be
determined,” for the student's medical bills; (2) be placed on
juvenile probation for twelve months under the supervision of a
Juvenile Court Counselor; (3) be evaluated for counseling and
receive a psychological evaluation and comply with their
recommendations for further treatment; (4) write a letter of
apology to the other student; and (5) “cooperate and participate in
a residential treatment program as directed by court counselor or
mental health agency.” M.A.B. appealed from that order.
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On appeal, M.A.B. argues that the trial court impermissibly
delegated its authority by ordering M.A.B. to “pay restitution in
an undetermined amount to be decided by the Juvenile Court
Counselor” and “cooperate and participate in a residential
treatment program as directed by the Court Counselor or Mental
Health Agency.” We disagree.
As this matter was a Level I, Community Disposition under
section 7B-2508 of the North Carolina General Statutes, the trial
court could consider various alternatives for punishment listed in
section 7B-2506(1) through (13), and (16) of the North CarolinaGeneral Statutes. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2508(c) (2004). Section
7B-2506 provides in pertinent part:
(3) Order the juvenile to cooperate with . .
. a residential or nonresidential treatment
program. Participation in the programs shall
not exceed 12 months.
(4) Require restitution, full or partial, up
to five hundred dollars ($500.00), payable
within a 12-month period to any person who has
suffered loss or damage as a result of the
offense committed by the juvenile. The court
may determine the amount, terms, and
conditions of the restitution.. . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2506(3), (4) (2004) (emphasis added).
M.A.B. cites In re Hartsock, 158 N.C. App. 287, 580 S.E.2d
395, to support his argument that the trial court improperly
delegated its authority. In Hartsock, the “court ordered juvenile
to 'cooperate with placement in a residential treatment facility
[i]f deemed necessary by MAJORS counselor or Juvenile Court
Counselor.'” Id. at 291, 580 S.E.2d at 398. This Court held that
“[t]he statute does not contemplate the court vesting its
discretion in another person or entity, therefore, the court, and
the court alone, must determine which dispositional alternatives to
utilize with each delinquent juvenile.” Id. at 292, 580 S.E.2d at
399. This Court went on to note that “a judge could order certain
dispositional alternatives apply upon the happening of a condition,
since the court, and not another person or entity, would be
exercising its discretion.” Id.
Here, unlike Hartsock, the adjudication/disposition order did
not impermissibly delegate authority. Instead, the trial court inthis matter ordered M.A.B. to pay restitution, but left the amount,
which is subject to the statutory limitation of $500.00, to be
determined until medical bills were provided to the court. Thus,
the trial court did not delegate whether restitution would be paid,
but only left the amount undetermined. This interpretation
comports with the statute which only provides that the “court may
determine the amount . . . of the restitution.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-2506(4) (emphasis added). The statute does not make it
mandatory for the trial court to determine the amount of
restitution.
Moreover, the trial court's order for participation in a
residential treatment program differs from the order in Hartsock.
In Hartsock, the decision of whether the juvenile would be placed
in a residential treatment facility was left to the determination
of the MAJORS or Juvenile Court Counselor. 158 N.C. App. at 291,
580 S.E.2d at 398. Here, the trial court ordered M.A.B. to
“cooperate and participate in a residential treatment program as
directed by court counselor or mental health agency.” (emphasis
added). The determination of whether M.A.B. would participate in
a residential treatment program was made by the trial court, but
the specifics of the day-to-day program were to be directed by the
Juvenile Court Counselor or Mental Health Agency. Thus, the trial
court, and not another person or entity, exercised its discretion.
Id. at 292, 580 S.E.2d at 399.
As the trial court did not impermissibly delegate its
authority, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Judges TYSON and ELMORE concur.
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