Appeal by defendant from a judgment entered 27 May 2004 by
Judge Russell J. Lanier, Jr. in Lenoir County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 March 2005.
White & Allen, P.A., by Matthew S. Sullivan, Thomas J. White,
III, and Gregory E. Floyd, for plaintiff-appellee.
George L. Simpson, III, for defendant-appellant.
BRYANT, Judge.
Ashley Nicole Williams and her mother, Debbie C. Williams,
(plaintiffs) filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking a
determination of the amount of underinsured motorist coverage (UIM)
available to them under an automobile liability policy issued by
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (defendant) to David and Mary
Ann Canady. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The
trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
determining the insurance policy provided UIM coverage with limits
of $1,000,000.00 per person and $1,000,000.00 per accident. For
the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the trial court's ruling.
Facts
This matter was presented to the trial court upon stipulated
facts. On 17 July 2001, Ashley Nicole Williams (Ashley) was
injured in an automobile accident while riding as a passenger in a
1992 Dodge automobile owned by David Canady and operated by his
son, Jeremy Canady. Jeremy's negligence was the sole proximate
cause of the accident and Ashley's injuries. At the time of the
accident Ashley was a minor and her mother, acting as her guardian,
incurred expenses for her daughter's medical treatment until Ashley
reached the age of majority.
On the date of the accident, the Canady vehicle was insured
under an automobile policy issued by Nationwide with bodily injury
coverage of $50,000.00 per person and $100,000.00 per accident.
The parties stipulated that plaintiffs are insureds for purposes
of the Canady policy's UIM coverage. The dispute in this matter
concerns the amount of UIM coverage available under the Canady
policy based upon the following stipulated facts:
6. . . . The Canady policy was issued to Mr.
and Mrs. Canady initially in 1984, and, except
for periods of time when the policy was
cancelled due to the Canadys' failure to pay
the premium, it remained in effect through
July 17, 2001, either through new, reinstated
or renewal policies. The Canady policy was
last renewed prior to the July 17, 2001
accident on June 12, 2001 for the policy
period from June 12, 2001 to December 12,
2001. Neither Mr. Canady nor Mrs. Canady were
offered by Nationwide or its authorized agent
an opportunity to select or to reject UIM
limits greater than their liability limits at
any time prior to July 17, 2001. The option to
select or reject UIM limits that are greater
than the policy's liability limits was not
available to insureds in North Carolina at anytime prior to the effective date of the 1991
amendments to the UIM statute. Neither Mr.
Canady nor Mrs. Canady signed a North Carolina
Rate Bureau UM/UIM selection/rejection form
for the Canady policy at any time prior to
July 17, 2001.
Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the Superior Court of
Lenoir County on 1 March 2004, seeking a declaratory judgment of
the amount of UIM coverage available to them under the Canady
insurance policy. On 14 May 2004, plaintiffs and defendant filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. These motions were heard by
the Honorable Russell J. Lanier, Jr. on 17 May 2004. On 27 May
2004, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment, determining the applicable UIM limits under the Canady
insurance policy to be $1,000,000.00 per person and $1,000,000.00
per accident. Defendant appeals.
_________________________
In its sole assignment of error, defendant contends the trial
court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and
denying its motion for the same. Under Rule 56(c) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2003). Because the parties have
stipulated to the applicable facts, we consider only whether the
trial court properly found plaintiffs were entitled to judgment asa matter of law. Any error made in interpreting a statute is an
error of law . . . .
In re Appeal of North Carolina Sav. & Loan
League, 302 N.C. 458, 464, 276 S.E.2d 404, 409 (1981).
Section 20-279.21(b)(4) of the North Carolina General Statutes
governs UIM coverage. The version of this statute in effect in
1984, when the Canady policy was first issued, provided that UIM
limits were not to exceed the policy limits for automobile bodily
injury liability as specified in the owner's policy. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1983). The General Assembly amended the
statute in 1991 to provide that the amount of UIM coverage was not
to be less than the financial responsibility amounts for bodily
injury liability as set forth in G.S. 20-279.5 nor greater than one
million dollars ($1,000,000)
as selected by the policy owner.
1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 646, § 2 (emphasis added). The 1991 amendment
also added the following language to the statute: The coverage
required under this subdivision shall not be applicable where any
insured named in the policy rejects the coverage. An insured named
in the policy may select different coverage limits as provided in
this subdivision.
Id. The General Assembly subsequently amended
this statute in 1992, inserting the following language: If the
named insured does not reject underinsured motorist coverage and
does not select different coverage limits, the amount of
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the highest limit
of bodily injury liability coverage for any one vehicle in the
policy. 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 837, § 9. Defendant relies on
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Fortin,
350 N.C. 264, 513 S.E.2d 782 (1999), in an attempt to show the
statutory limits of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(4) apply. In
Fortin, the insured had initially rejected underinsured motorist
(UIM) coverage and the policy was later renewed with the continuing
rejection of UIM coverage.
Fortin, at 266, 513 S.E.2d at 783.
However, the forms provided to the insured at renewal merely
contemplated a renewal of a previously selected coverage and did
not offer the insured a fresh choice to reject UIM coverage or
select different coverage limits as required by recent amendments
to N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4).
Fortin, at 270-71, 513 S.E.2d at
785. The failure of the forms to provide for a new choice to
reject or select different UIM coverage was interpreted by our
Supreme Court to result in an invalid rejection of UIM coverage.
Id. Therefore, because there was neither a valid rejection of UIM
coverage nor a selection of different UIM coverage limits, the
statutory coverage limits established in N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4)
applied.
Fortin, at 271-72, 513 S.E.2d at 786. However, a lack of
a fresh choice concerning the selection of UIM coverage in a
renewal form, as occurred in
Fortin, is not equivalent to the
situation at hand where there has been a total failure to provide
the insured with an opportunity to select UIM coverage.
Underinsured coverage is mandatory unless rejected by the
insured in accordance with the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
20-279.21.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Smith, 117 N.C. App. 593, 598,
452 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1995). The statutory limitations for UIMcoverage established in N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) take effect if
the named insured does not reject UIM coverage or does not select
UIM coverage limits different than the bodily injury liability
coverage contained in the policy. N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4)
(2001). Here, however, the insured was not given the opportunity
to reject or select different coverage limits. If N.C.G.S. §
20-279.21(b)(4) were to apply in this situation, insurers would be
permitted to establish default UIM coverage simply by failing to
provide the proper rejection/selection forms to their clients.
This would be contrary to the requirements set forth in the
statute: Such owner's policy of liability insurance: (4) Shall .
. . provide underinsured motorist coverage . . .
as selected by the
policy owner.
Id. (emphasis added). The statute clearly
establishes that the insured must be given the initial opportunity
to reject or select different policy limits.
Maryland Cas., at
598, 452 S.E.2d at 321;
see also, Fortin, at 268, 513 S.E.2d at 784
([A]n insurer is required to offer its insureds the opportunity to
select UIM coverage limits . . . and to obtain a valid rejection or
selection of different UIM coverage limits . . . .).
While N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(4) does not address the
applicable default policy limits where the insured is not given the
opportunity to select or reject the UIM policy limits, this Court
has held [a]ny ambiguity in the Financial Responsibility Act
(Act), which includes section 20-279.21(b)(4), must be liberally
construed to effectuate the Act's remedial purpose -- protecting
innocent victims of automobile accidents from financiallyirresponsible motorists.
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Caviness, 124 N.C. App. 760, 763, 478 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1996)
(citing
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341,
352, 152 S.E.2d 436, 444 (1967)). In
Caviness, this Court held the
statute as written prior to the 1992 amendments was ambiguous as to
the amount of UIM coverage available to an insured who failed to
select or reject UIM coverage, and, in order to protect innocent
victims, the insured was entitled to the highest available limit of
UIM coverage of $1,000,000.
Caviness, at 763-65, 478 S.E.2d at
667-68.
A total failure on the part of the insurer to provide an
opportunity to reject UIM coverage or select different UIM policy
limits violates the requirement that these choices be made by the
policy owner. Such a failure should not invoke the minimum UIM
coverage limits established in N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) and
shield the insurer from additional liability. So doing would
violate the purpose of the statute to protect the insured and allow
them to choose their policy benefits. Accordingly, we find no
error committed by the trial court and affirm its order granting
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
Affirmed.
Judges MCGEE and STEELMAN concur.
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