ANNIE P. MONTGOMERY, Employee, Plaintiff, v. TOASTMASTER, INC.,
Employer, SELF-INSURED, (CORPORATE CLAIMS MANAGEMENT, Serving
Agent), Defendant
2. Workers' Compensation_make-work after injury_part-time, irregular
To prove that a disabled employee is employable, an employer must show that the
tendered employment accurately reflects the employee's ability to compete with others in the job
market. The Industrial Commission did not err here by concluding that plaintiff was entitled to
ongoing temporary total disability where the jobs given to plaintiff were not full-time, regular
positions, with similar positions available on the open market.
3. Workers' Compensation_evidence and credibility_not explained
Although a workers' compensation defendant argued that the Industrial Commission did
not consider all of the evidence, the Commission does not have to explain its findings by
distinguishing the evidence it finds credible.
The Sumwalt Law Firm, by Mark T. Sumwalt and Vernon Sumwalt,
for plaintiff-appellee.
Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by Jonathan C. Anders and
Meredith T. Black, for defendant-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
In general, to prove that a disabled employee is employable,
an employer must show that tendered employment accurately reflects
the employee's ability to compete with others in the job market.
Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 438, 342 S.E.2d 798, 806
(1986). In this case, the employer contends that the employee's
light-duty work was suitable employment. Because the record
shows competent evidence supporting the Commission's findings of
fact that in turn support the conclusions of law that the tendered
employment positions were make-work, we affirm the opinion and
award.
Employee, Annie P. Montgomery (sixty-five years old), worked
for Employer, Toastmaster, Inc., for thirty-three years in the
assembly department. Her work on the assembly line for seventeen
years
required gripping and twisting screwdrivers repetitively with
both hands; and, her work with plastic molding for fifteen years
required gripping pliers with both hands to insert crystals and
place other components into clocks. Ms. Montgomery
estimated that
she did this approximately three thousand times a day when
inserting crystals and between 1,200 to 3,000 times a day when
handling the other components. After a period of time, she
experienced symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome in both hands.
As stipulated to by the parties, Ms. Montgomery
sustained a
compensable injury by accident on 2 October 1998. On 21 January1999, at the recommendation of her physician, Dr. Ward Oakley, Ms.
Montgomery stopped working in the assembly department. Dr. Oakley
performed surgery on her
left wrist in January 1999 and on her
right wrist in
March 1999
. He
released her
to return to work on 1
May 1999, with restrictions to avoid strenuous repetitive use of
her hands until 1 June 1999.
While Ms. Montgomery
was out of work from 21 January 1999
through 3 May 1999, Toastmaster paid Ms. Montgomery
temporary
disability benefits
. During that time,
Ms. Montgomery
and
Toastmaster entered into a Form 21 agreement approved by the North
Carolina Industrial Commission.
On 5 May 1999, Toastmaster
provided Ms. Montgomery
with light-duty work in the subassembly
department which
included, inter alia, tearing down parts of clocks
for recycling and incorporating the parts into other clocks. All
the subassembly tasks required, at some point, continuous,
repetitive, or consistent use of the hands. Ms. Montgomery
testified that on certain business days,
she did not have anything
to do so she was sent home.
In June 1999, following Dr. Oakley's advice that she could
resume normal activities, Ms. Montgomery
returned to her previous
job in the plastic molding department. However, evidence shows
tha
t Ms. Montgomery
's carpal tunnel symptoms returned
in less than
an hour of performing her job duties in the plastic moldingdepartment. As a result,
Dr. Oakley determined that she could not
perform her previous molding job and placed her on permanent
restriction, which meant she should avoid strenuous or repetitive
use of her hands. Upon returning to work, Toastmaster again placed
her in the subassembly department.
Following a two week plant inventory shutdown in July 1999,
Ms. Montgomery
retired at the age of sixty-two. Ms. Montgomery
testified that she wanted to continue to work because that was the
only income [she] had, you know. But by [her] hands getting
messed up like they did, [she] couldn't see where [she] could
continue. Since July 1999, Ms. Montgomery
has not sought other
work.
On 21 February 2003, Deputy Commissioner Lorrie L. Dollar
denied Ms. Montgomery
's claim for change of condition and ordered
Toastmaster to pay permanent partial disability compensation to Ms.
Montgomery
for fifty weeks.
In an opinion and award entered 10
June 2004, the full Commission reversed Deputy Commissioner Dollar
and ordered Toastmaster to pay temporary total disability beginning
21 January 1999, and continuing until further order and medical
expenses. Toastmaster appealed.
________________________________________
On appeal, Toastmaster argues that (1) the full Commission's
findings of fact regarding the nature of Ms. Montgomery
'semployment were not supported by competent evidence; (2) the full
Commission erred in concluding that Ms. Montgomery
's employment was
not suitable employment; and (3) the full Commission failed to
consider all competent evidence.
The standard of review for this Court in reviewing an appeal
from the full Commission is limited to determining whether any
competent evidence supports the Commission's findings of fact and
whether the findings of fact support the Commission's conclusions
of law. Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530
S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). Our review 'goes no further than to
determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to
support the finding.' Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509
S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (citation omitted). The full Commission's
findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by
competent evidence[,] even if there is evidence to support a
contrary finding, Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 6, 282
S.E.2d 458, 463 (1981), and may be set aside on appeal only when
there is a complete lack of competent evidence to support them[.]
Young v. Hickory Bus. Furniture, 353 N.C. 227, 230, 538 S.E.2d 912,
914 (2000). Further, all evidence must be taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is entitled to the
benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from theevidence. Deese, 352 N.C. at 115, 530 S.E.2d at 553 (citation
omitted).
[1] First, Toastmaster argues that the full Commission's
findings of fact regarding the nature of Ms. Montgomery
's
employment were not supported by any competent evidence. We
disagree.
Toastmaster assigns error to the following findings of fact:
6. The first subassembly job attempted by
plaintiff involved separating parts. This was
not a normal job any employee did on a
full-time basis. Plaintiff herself was sent
home when there was not separating work to be
done. The separating positions were not
regular work positions available in the job
market but rather were part-time jobs given to
light-duty employees from other departments.
While plaintiff was there, there were seven to
eight employees in subassembly, and all were
under work restrictions of some type.
***
11. When plaintiff returned with her
increased restrictions, she was put back into
the light duty subassembly area, where she
worked until 4 July 1999 separating parts,
punching dials, and applying labels. During
this period, plaintiff had to search for
things to do. This modified position
plaintiff occupied was not a regular full-time
position available in the competitive job
market.
12. Defendant-employer was shut down from 4
July 1999 until 12 July 2002 (sic) for
vacation and inventory. As of 12 July 1999,
the plaintiff stopped work after 33 years
working for defendant-employer. The plaintiffretired because what they had her doing was
not a job. The plaintiff wanted to keep
working, but her physical limitations and pain
prevented it.
13. Plaintiff has not worked or earned any
wages since her employment with
defendant-employer ended. Plaintiff has not
sought other work due to her physical
restrictions and vocational limitations.
Our examination of the record on appeal reveals that there is
competent evidence to support finding of fact six. Ms. Montgomery
testified that her first subassembly job involved separating parts
and that Toastmaster sent her home on 5 May 1999, because they had
no work for her to do. Toastmaster also sent her home early five
days in June. Ms. Montgomery further testified that [t]here
wasn't enough of parts to separate all day[,] and separating parts
was not a permanent, full-time job at Toastmaster, but rather tasks
employees performed as needed. Fannie Dockery, foreman at
Toastmaster, testified that separating parts and applying labels
was not a full-time job. Ms. Dockery also testified that there
were seven or eight employees in subassembly, several of those with
repetitive motion restrictions.
Further, the record shows competent evidence to support
finding of fact eleven. Ms. Montgomery testified that when she
returned to work in May 1999, with her light duty restrictions, she
separated parts, punched holes out of dials, and put labels onclocks. Ms. Montgomery also testified that during this time period
there were times when she had nothing to do and her supervisor
would tell her Well, I've got to find you something to do. She
testified that the combination of her three tasks was not a
regular, full-time job. Ms. Dockery also testified that nobody
performed the tasks given to Ms. Montgomery on a full-time basis.
Additionally, the record shows competent evidence to support
finding of fact twelve. Dana Leviner, HR generalist for
Toastmaster, testified that in July 1999 the plant closed for two
weeks for inventory. Ms. Montgomery
testified that she wanted to
continue to work because that was the only income [she] had, you
know. But by [her] hands getting messed up like they did, [she]
couldn't see where [she] could continue.
Moreover, the record shows competent evidence to support
finding of fact thirteen. Ms. Montgomery testified that she has
not worked since her employment with Toastmaster and has not sought
other employment due to the limitations of her hand and limited
education.
Toastmaster argues that even though Ms. Montgomery's testimony
supports findings of fact six, eleven, twelve, and thirteen, her
testimony is not credible and there is other evidence that
contradicts Ms. Montgomery's testimony. But the full Commission's
findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported bycompetent evidence[,] even if there is evidence to support a
contrary finding. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 6, 282 S.E.2d at 463.
Further, determining credibility of witnesses is the responsibility
of the full Commission, not this Court. Adams, 349 N.C. at 681,
509 S.E.2d at 414. This Court does not re-weigh the evidence. Id.
Therefore, the full Commission's findings of fact are binding on
appeal.
[2] Next, Toastmaster argues that the full Commission erred in
concluding that Ms. Montgomery
's employment was not suitable
employment and that she is entitled to ongoing disability benefits.
We disagree.
The record shows, and it is not disputed by the parties, that
Ms. Montgomery met her burden of proving that she is disabled,
i.e., unable to earn wages due to her disability. As a result, the
burden shifted to Toastmaster to show that Ms. Montgomery was
employable which it sought to do by showing that Ms. Montgomery had
been performing on her tendered employment. See Dalton v. Anvil
Knitwear, 119 N.C. App. 275, 284, 458 S.E.2d 251, 257, disc. review
denied, 341 N.C. 647, 462 S.E.2d 507 (1995). However, the fact
that an employee is capable of performing employment tendered by
the employer is not, as a matter of law, an indication of
plaintiff's ability to earn wages. Saums v. Raleigh Cmty. Hosp.,
346 N.C. 760, 764, 487 S.E.2d 746, 750 (1997). The tenderedemployment must accurately reflect the employee's ability to
compete with others in the job market in order for the employment
to be indicative of an employee's earning capacity. Peoples, 316
N.C. at 438, 342 S.E.2d at 806. Thus, if other employers would
not hire the employee with the employee's limitations at a
comparable wage level . . . [or] if the proffered employment is so
modified because of the employee's limitations that it is not
ordinarily available in the competitive job market[,] the job is
make work and is not competitive. Id.
The full Commission concluded that the jobs given to Ms.
Montgomery in May and June 1999 were not suitable jobs and
Toastmaster did not meet its burden of producing evidence that
suitable jobs are available to plaintiff and that the plaintiff is
capable of attaining one given the plaintiff's age, education,
physical limitations, vocational skills, and experience. This
conclusion is supported by the full Commission's findings of fact
that the jobs of separating parts and punching holes on clock dials
given to Ms. Montgomery in May and June 1999, were not full-time
jobs at Toastmaster; the position given to Ms. Montgomery was not
a regular, full-time position offered at Toastmaster; and
Toastmaster did not demonstrate that a similar job was available on
the open market. These findings of fact support the full
Commission's conclusions of law that the jobs given to Ms.Montgomery were not suitable and Toastmaster failed to show that
suitable jobs are available to Ms. Montgomery on the open market.
Therefore, the full Commission did not err in concluding that Ms.
Montgomery is entitled to ongoing temporary total disability
compensation.
[3] Finally, Toastmaster argues that the full Commission
failed to consider all competent evidence. Specifically,
Toastmaster contends that the full Commission did not indicate that
it gave proper consideration to the testimony of four witnesses.
However, determining credibility of witnesses is the responsibility
of the full Commission, not this Court. Adams, 349 N.C. at 681,
509 S.E.2d at 414. This Court does not re-weigh the evidence. Id.
Furthermore, the Commission does not have to explain its findings
of fact by attempting to distinguish which evidence or witnesses it
finds credible. Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553.
Accordingly, we must hold that this argument is without merit.
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and JACKSON concur.
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