Juveniles_committed youthful offender_consecutive sentences_total exceeding twenty years
N.C.G.S. § 148-49.14 (now repealed) does not prohibit the imposition of separate
consecutive sentences for a committed youthful offender which do not exceed twenty years
respectively. The trial court here correctly denied a motion for appropriate relief that challenged
consecutive sentences for multiple offenses as exceeding twenty years in total.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
General Thomas H. Moore, for the State.
Reita P. Pendry for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
Johnnie A. Ware (“defendant”) appeals a denial of a motion for
appropriate relief from two sentences entered 26 March 1996
pursuant to a plea agreement as to charges of robbery with a
dangerous weapon, safecracking, breaking and entering, larceny,
second degree kidnapping, and assault with a deadly weapon.
On 19 March 1994, defendant, seventeen at that time, was
involved in a series of criminal acts for which he was indicted on
23 May 1994, including robbery with a dangerous weapon,
safecracking, felonious breaking and entering, two counts of first
degree kidnapping, one count of second degree kidnapping, and
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting seriousinjury. Defendant pled guilty to the charges of robbery with a
dangerous weapon, safecracking, felonious breaking and entering,
second degree kidnapping, and assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury in exchange for consolidation of the
robbery, safecracking, breaking and entering, and larceny charges
for a term of twenty years as a committed youthful offender,
consolidation of the second degree kidnapping and assault charges
for a term of fifteen years as a committed youthful offender, and
dismissal of the additional charges. The trial court accepted the
plea and sentenced defendant, as specified in the plea agreement,
to two consolidated terms of twenty years and fifteen years
respectively, and further indicated that defendant should serve
both as a committed youthful offender pursuant to Chapter 148,
Article 3B.
On 15 November 2001, defendant moved for appropriate relief,
contending that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-49.14 (repealed 1993) (repeal
effective 1 October 1994) required that a sentence under that act
should “not . . . exceed the limit otherwise prescribed by law for
the offense of which the person is convicted or 20 years, whichever
is less[,]” and that his sentences exceeded that amount. The trial
court denied defendant's motion. Defendant filed a petition for
writ of certiorari in this Court, which was allowed on 26 March
2003.
Defendant contends in his sole assignment of error that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for appropriate relief as
the consecutive sentences imposed under the plea bargain agreementviolated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-49.14, governing sentences of
committed youthful offenders at the time of defendant's
convictions. Defendant contends the language of the statute
prohibits the imposition of sentences under section 148-49.14,
which exceed twenty years in their totality. It appears this is a
question of first impression for our courts. We therefore begin
with an examination of the statute.
“Statutory interpretation properly begins with an examination
of the plain words of the statute. The legislative purpose of a
statute is first ascertained by examining the statute's plain
language.” Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141,
144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992) (citation omitted). “'When the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is not room
for judicial construction and the courts must give the statute its
plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate,
or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.'”
State v. Carr, 145 N.C. App. 335, 343, 549 S.E.2d 897, 902 (2001)
(citations omitted).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-49.14 provided for sentencing of
individuals below the age of twenty-one determined to be committed
youthful offenders. The statute stated:
As an alternative to a sentence of
imprisonment as is otherwise provided by law,
when a person under 21 years of age is
convicted of an offense punishable by
imprisonment and the court does not suspend
the imposition or execution of sentence and
place him on probation, the court may sentence
such person to the custody of the Secretary of
Correction for treatment and supervision as acommitted youthful offender. . . . At the
time of commitment the court shall fix a
maximum term not to exceed the limit otherwise
prescribed by law for the offense of which the
person is convicted or 20 years, whichever is
less. . . . If the court shall find that a
person under 21 years of age should not obtain
the benefit of release under G.S. 148-49.15,
it shall make such “no benefit” finding on the
record.
Id. Thus the critical portion of the statute contested by
defendant is the requirement that the court must fix a maximum term
for the offense of which the person is convicted which does not
exceed twenty years. Defendant appears to argue that the term
offense should be read to encompass all crimes for which defendant
is indicted and convicted as a whole, and contends that federal
jurisprudence on the Federal Youth Corrections Act is persuasive on
this point. See Price v. United States, 384 F.2d 650, 652 (10th
Cir. 1967) (stating that when a defendant is sentenced as a youth
offender, cumulative or consecutive sentences on several counts
would not fit the design and purpose of the Federal Youth
Corrections Act).
A review of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-49, Article 3B, Facilities
and Programs for Youthful Offenders, the Article containing section
148-49.14 reveals that no definition of the term “offense” was
provided in that Article. However, our Supreme Court has held that
“[a] defendant may be convicted of and sentenced for each specific
criminal act which he commits.” State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780,
786, 309 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1983). “[W]here there are several counts
and each count is for a distinct offense, a general verdict ofguilty will authorize the imposition of a judgment on each count.”
State v. Austin, 241 N.C. 548, 549, 85 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1955). We
find that the plain language of the statute is “clear and
unambiguous,” as it refers to an offense in the singular, that is
a specific criminal act, thus permitting the trial court to
sentence a defendant to a maximum of twenty years for each specific
criminal act of which a defendant is convicted. See Carr, 145 N.C.
App. at 343, 549 S.E.2d at 902. We further note that section 148-
49.14 did not preclude the imposition of consecutive sentences and
defendant cites no precedent to the contrary.
Defendant contends, however, that such a reading of the plain
language violates the intent of the statute. The purposes and
intent of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-49, Article 3B were stated in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 148-49.10 (repealed 1993):
The purposes of this Article are to
improve the chances of correction,
rehabilitation, and successful return to the
community of youthful offenders sentenced to
imprisonment by preventing, as far as
practicable, their association during their
terms of imprisonment with older and more
experienced criminals, and by closer
coordination of the activities of sentencing,
training in custody, parole, and final
discharge. It is the intent of this Article
to provide the courts with an additional
sentencing possibility to be used in the
court's discretion for correctional punishment
and treatment in cases, where in the opinion
of the court, a youthful offender requires a
period of imprisonment, but no longer than
necessary for the Parole Commission to
determine that the offender is suitable for a
return to freedom and is ready for a period of
supervised freedom as a step toward
unconditional discharge and restoration of the
rights to citizenship.
Id. Defendant contends that the imposition of multiple sentences,
the total of which would exceed twenty years, is irreconcilable
with the stated purpose of the Article.
As discussed in State v. Niccum, 293 N.C. 276, 238 S.E.2d 141
(1977), our Supreme Court stated that the purposes of the Article
governing committed youthful offenders were
to improve the chances of rehabilitating
youthful offenders: (1) by segregating them,
as far as practicable, from older and more
experienced criminals; and (2) by providing
the court with “an additional sentencing
possibility” to be used for correctional
punishment and treatment in cases where, in
its opinion, a youthful offender required
imprisonment only for the time necessary for
the Board of Paroles to determine his
suitability for a return to supervised
freedom.
Niccum, 293 N.C. at 280, 238 S.E.2d at 144. As Niccum noted, the
“Board of Paroles was authorized to release a committed youthful
offender under supervision at any time after reasonable notice to
the Commissioner.” Id. at 281, 238 S.E.2d at 145. Thus, the Act's
alternative sentencing method provided increased flexibility to
permit a case-by-case determination of the progress towards
correction, rehabilitation, and successful return to the community
of youthful offenders. Such a purpose is not irreconcilable with
the imposition of multiple sentences under section 148-49.14.
Rather it reflects the discretionary nature of the statute;
recognizing the gravity of the offense by permitting a sentence of
up to twenty years for each offense, while still providing the
possibility of early parole for youthful offenders who madesuccessful progress and were determined suitable for a return to
supervised freedom.
We finally note that although defendant contends federal case
law concerning the Federal Youth Corrections Act should be
persuasive to this Court, see State v. Mitchell, 24 N.C. App. 484,
211 S.E.2d 645 (1975) (comparing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-49, Article
3A (repealed 1977) with the Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1950),
a review of the sentencing requirements of the federal statute, 18
U.S.C. §§ 5005-5023 (repealed 1984) with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-49,
Article 3B, as modified and amended in 1977, reveals substantial
differences in the substance of those statutes. We therefore
decline to consider federal case law with regards to this matter.
As we conclude that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-49.14 does not
prohibit the imposition of separate consecutive sentences which do
not exceed twenty years respectively, we find the trial court
properly denied defendant's motion for appropriate relief.
Affirmed.
Judges McCULLOUGH and LEVINSON concur.
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