1. Workers' Compensation--suspension of benefits--incarceration of plaintiff
The Industrial Commission did not err in a workers' compensation case by authorizing
defendant to suspend payment of plaintiff's workers' compensation disability payments as a
result of plaintiff's incarceration, because: (1) the denial of benefits is reasonable where the state
purposefully deprives that person of the right to earn wages caused by the imprisonment and not
by the injury; (2) the issue presented in this case is identical to that presented in Parker v. Union
Camp Corp., 108 N.C. App. 85 (1992), and thus the Court of Appeals is bound by that decision;
(3) contrary to plaintiff's assertion, Parker was not overruled by the case of Harris v. Thompson
Contractors, Inc., 148 N.C. App. 472 (2002), aff'd, 356 N.C. 664 (2003), but Harris merely
distinguished Parker since plaintiff did not suffer a work-related injury while on work release;
and (3) neither Parker nor Harris states that the outcome of the case would have been different
had there been any dependents, and that decision is best left to the General Assembly.
2. Workers' Compensation_-incarceration of plaintiff--credit to employer for
payments made during incarceration
The Industrial Commission did not err in a workers' compensation case by permitting
defendant to take an immediate credit for payments made during plaintiff's incarceration by
reducing his ongoing payments by $100.00 per week allegedly in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
97-42, because: (1) where an award of compensation is for an indefinite period of time, it is not
possible to shorten the period during which compensation must be paid and therefore the
Commission may order the employer to reduce the amount of the employee's payments in order
to allow the employer to recoup the amount of the credit; and (2) in the instant case the
Commission awarded plaintiff temporary total
disability which has no specific ending time, and
there is nothing in the record to suggest that plaintiff will or will not ultimately receive a
permanent partial disability award.
Scudder & Hedrick, by Samuel A. Scudder, for plaintiff-
appellant.
Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Bruce A.
Hamilton and William A. Bulfer, for defendants-appellants.
STEELMAN, Judge.
The facts of this matter are not in dispute. Plaintiff, Frank
Easton, was injured after falling from a tractor while working for
J.D. Denson Mowing Company. Pursuant to an opinion and award filed
16 October 2000, plaintiff was awarded temporary total disability
benefits for the compensable work-related injury he sustained.
This Court affirmed that award in an unpublished opinion, Easton
v. J.D. Denson Mowing Co., 148 N.C. App. 405, 560 S.E.2d 885
(2002)(unpublished). Plaintiff was awarded $365.78 per week in
disability payments beginning on 3 September 1997, continuing until
plaintiff was able to return to work or until otherwise ordered by
the Industrial Commission. While receiving these disability
payments, plaintiff was incarcerated for a probation violation from
22 January 2003 until 8 September 2003. Plaintiff's counsel
informed defendants of plaintiff's possible incarceration on 4
April 2003, and confirmed the incarceration on 3 June 2003. On 24
July 2003, defendants filed a Form 24 seeking authorization to
suspend defendant's disability payments until plaintiff's release
from jail, which was granted on 28 August 2003. Plaintiff appealed
and the Deputy Commissioner affirmed the suspension of benefits and
allowed defendants a credit for the amounts previously paid while
plaintiff was incarcerated. Plaintiff appealed to the Full
Commission, which affirmed the Deputy Commissioner's ruling by an
Opinion and Award entered 30 August 2004. Plaintiff appeals.
[1] In plaintiff's first argument, he contends the Industrial
Commission erred in authorizing defendant to suspend payment ofplaintiff's workers' compensation disability payments as a result
of his incarceration. We disagree.
This Court definitively addressed this issue in Parker v.
Union Camp Corp., 108 N.C. App. 85, 422 S.E.2d 585 (1992). In
Parker, the plaintiff suffered a compensable work-related injury
and was receiving workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 86, 422
S.E.2d at 585. While receiving benefits, the plaintiff was
convicted and sentenced to prison. This Court held the plaintiff
was not entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits while in
prison. Id. at 88, 422 S.E.2d at 587. This Court reasoned that
the denial of benefits is reasonable where the state “purposefully
deprives that person of the right to earn wages.” Id. at 87, 422
S.E.2d at 586. The rationale behind this decision was that “while
he was in prison Mr. Parker did not have the right to earn wages;
his incapacity to earn was caused by his imprisonment, not by his
injury.” Id. at 88, 422 S.E.2d at 586.
Plaintiff first asserts that Parker is based upon an erroneous
interpretation of the law and asks this Court to overrule Parker.
This we cannot and will not do. We are bound by opinions of prior
panels of this Court deciding the same issue. In the Matter of
Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37
(1989). The issue presented in this case is identical to that
presented in Parker, thus we are bound by that decision.
Plaintiff next contends Parker has been overruled by the case
of Harris v. Thompson Contractors, Inc., 148 N.C. App. 472, 558
S.E.2d 894 (2002), aff'd, 356 N.C. 664, 576 S.E.2d 323 (2003). This is incorrect. In Harris, the plaintiff was serving a sentence
in the Department of Corrections. After he was incarcerated,
Harris was allowed to work for defendant-employer under a work
release program pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-33.1. This Court
held Harris was entitled to receive compensation, stating:
Parker is distinguishable from the instant
case. In Parker, the claimant was injured on
the job before his incarceration and was
already receiving benefits. Parker at 86, 422
S.E.2d at 585. Here, plaintiff was already
incarcerated at the time of his injury and was
involved in the work release program when his
work related injury occurred.
Id. at 479, 558 S.E.2d at 899. Thus, Harris did not overrule
Parker, nor could it. Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. at 379 S.E.2d at 37.
Rather, Harris clearly distinguished Parker, and is not applicable
to the instant case since plaintiff did not suffer a work-related
injury while on work release.
Plaintiff next asserts that the combination of dicta in Parker
and the decision in Harris mandates that we reverse the Industrial
Commission in this matter.
In Parker, the majority noted that its ruling may work a
hardship to a plaintiff's dependents by suspending compensation
benefits during periods of incarceration and suggested that the
General Assembly may wish to examine this issue. Parker, 108 N.C.
App. 88, 422 S.E.2d at 587. Plaintiff asserts that this language,
coupled with the holding in Harris - that plaintiff's compensation
could be paid to the Department of Corrections for disbursement in
accordance with the work release program, requires reversal because
of the adverse impact upon plaintiff's dependents in this case. The language in Parker discussing a plaintiff's dependents was
dicta, not necessary to the resolution of the case. See State v.
Jackson, 353 N.C. 495, 500, 546 S.E.2d 570, 573 (2001) (noting
statements made in an opinion which are not determinative of the
issue before the reviewing court are dicta and not binding). This
Court did not state that the outcome of the case would have been
different had there been any dependents. Rather, the opinion
suggested that the General Assembly may want to consider changing
the law to prevent dependents from being harmed by a plaintiff's
incarceration. The legislature has not amended the relevant
statutes since this Court rendered its decision in Parker.
Finally, there is no indication in Harris that dependents were
in any way implicated. The award entered by the Industrial
Commission, and affirmed by this Court, simply directed that the
compensation be paid to the Department of Corrections for
disposition in accordance with the work release program. Harris,
148 N.C. App. at 479, 558 S.E.2d at 899. Each of plaintiff's
arguments, along with any other assertions made under this
argument, are without merit.
[2] In plaintiff's second argument, he contends that if
defendant was entitled to suspend his workers' compensation
benefits while he was incarcerated, the Industrial Commission erred
in permitting defendant to take an immediate credit for payments
made during plaintiff's incarceration by reducing his ongoing
payments by $100.00 per week, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-
42. We disagree. It is within the Commission's discretion to award an employer
who makes payments that are not due and payable a credit for those
payments pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-42. Thomas v. B.F.
Goodrich, 144 N.C. App. 312, 319, 550 S.E.2d 193, 197, disc. review
denied, 354 N.C. 228, 555 S.E.2d 276 (2001). We note that
plaintiff does not contest the Commission's authority to award a
credit, but rather contests the manner in which the Commission
assessed the credit.
When the Commission grants a credit to an employer for
payments made under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-42, it must be made by
shortening the period during which payments are due. Id. at 318,
550 S.E.2d at 197. In dicta, however, this Court stated that
“[w]hen . . . an employee receives an award of permanent disability
to be paid during his lifetime, it is not possible to 'shorten[]
the period during which compensation must be paid.'” Id. Thus,
in order to give an employer a credit, this Court reasoned that the
Commission could order the employer to reduce the amount of the
employee's weekly payments in order to recoup the amount of the
credit. Id. This Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would
contravene the legislature's intent of encouraging employer's to
make voluntary payments while the employee's claim was being
litigated. Id.
We find the reasoning in Thomas to be persuasive. The fact
the plaintiff was permanently disabled was not key to this Court's
reasoning in Thomas. Rather, the fundamental principle enunciated
was that where an award of compensation is for an indefinite periodof time, it is not possible to shorten the period during which
compensation must be paid; therefore, the Commission may order the
employer to reduce the amount of the employee's payments in order
to allow the employer to recoup the amount of the credit. Id.
This is such a case. Here, the Commission awarded plaintiff total
temporary disability, which has no specific ending time. In fact,
plaintiff has already received total temporary disability for eight
years, with little likelihood of plaintiff ever returning to work.
If plaintiff never returns to work, his benefits will end at his
death, and there will be no opportunity to shorten the period of
disability. If plaintiff returns to work, his entitlement to any
temporary partial disability or permanent partial benefits will
immediately terminate, and there will be no opportunity to shorten
the period of disability. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-30 to -31
(2004). Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that
plaintiff will or will not ultimately receive a permanent partial
disability award. We believe this result would contravene the
intent of the legislature.
Accordingly, we conclude the Commission did not err in
permitting defendant to take an immediate credit for payments made
during plaintiff's incarceration and permitting defendant to deduct
$100.00 per week from its ongoing payments.
AFFIRMED.
Judges MCGEE and JACKSON concur.
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