Child Support, Custody, and Visitation--support--foreign order--full faith and credit
The trial court did not err by finding that the 1991 Tennessee child support order was
controlling in this case instead of a 1989 Washington state child support order, that defendant had
paid all child support due under the Tennessee order, and that defendant owed no outstanding
arrearages, because: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(e)(2) provides that a child support order may be
modified by a sister state if the rendering state has lost continued, exclusive jurisdiction over the
child support order if neither the child nor any of the parties continue to reside in the state or if
each of the parties consented to the assumption of jurisdiction by another state; (2) although in
1986 the Washington trial court entered the original child support order, in 1988 Tennessee
became the state with continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the parties since defendant and both
children resided in Tennessee and both parties entered into an Agreed Order whereby they
consented to Tennessee's jurisdiction over the child support order; (3) although, plaintiff moved
back to Washington with the two children in 1988, defendant never again resided in Washington
nor did he consent to Washington assuming jurisdiction, and thus, any action by Washington in
1989 was invalid and not entitled to full faith and credit as Washington had no authority to act;
and (4) plaintiff never attempted to have the 1991 Tennessee child support order modified after
defendant left Tennessee and moved to North Carolina.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Gerald K. Robbins, for plaintiff-appellant.
Pitts, Hay & Hugenschmidt, P.A., by James J. Hugenschmidt, for
defendant-appellee.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Plaintiff, Brenda Uhrig, appeals the trial court's order
dismissing her attempted registration of a 1989 Washington state
child support order. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.
Plaintiff and defendant, Douglas Madaras, were married and had
two children. In 1986, plaintiff and defendant were granted anabsolute divorce in Washington. Defendant was awarded custody and
plaintiff was ordered to pay $25.00 per month in child support.
Shortly after receiving custody, defendant and the minor children
moved to Tennessee and plaintiff moved to California. By the end
of 1986 neither plaintiff, defendant, nor the children were living
in Washington.
In October 1987, while living in California, plaintiff filed
a petition in Tennessee seeking custody of the children and child
support. After filing this petition, plaintiff moved to North
Carolina. On 27 June 1988, the parties entered into an Agreed
Order in Tennessee. Plaintiff was granted custody of the children
and defendant was ordered to pay $50.00 per month in child support.
At the time the 1988 Agreed Order was entered, defendant and the
children had been living in Tennessee for more than six months.
In 1989, plaintiff and the children moved back to Washington.
Plaintiff filed a motion in the original divorce action in
Washington seeking to modify the terms of the Agreed Order entered
in Tennessee. Defendant was served with a copy of the motion, but
did not respond or appear. On 26 October 1989, the Washington
court issued an order increasing defendant's child support
obligation to $872.00 per month.
In 1990, plaintiff filed a petition in Tennessee to enforce
the 1989 Washington order. On 14 September 1990, a Tennessee court
determined defendant was in arrears under the 1989 Washington order
in the amount of $9,141.00. Tennessee entered another order on 26
November 1990 finding arrearages in the amount of $10,082.96. On17 April 1991, upon its own motion, the Tennessee court set aside
its orders of 6 September 1990 and 8 November 1990. In that order,
the Tennessee court found defendant was not in arrears and ordered
him to pay $44.00 per week in child support. This was the last
order entered in this case. No appeal was taken from this order by
either party and it became a final order. Sometime after the 1991
Tennessee order was entered, defendant moved to North Carolina.
Defendant continued to pay child support payments as directed
by the 1991 Tennessee order. On 22 October 2003, plaintiff filed
a Notice of Registration of Foreign Support Order in Buncombe
County District Court, seeking enforcement of the 1989 Washington
order. In response to the Notice of Registration, defendant
asserted the 1991 Tennessee order superceded the 1989 Washington
order and he had made all payments required by the 1991 Tennessee
order. In addition, defendant asserted a number of affirmative
defenses.
The matter came on for hearing in the Buncombe County District
Court. On 23 September 2004, the trial court found that the 1989
Washington order was not the controlling order, and therefore, was
not entitled to enforcement. The trial court ruled the 1991
Tennessee order was controlling, that defendant had paid all
support due under that order, and dismissed plaintiff's action.
Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in ruling that the
1991 Tennessee order superceded the 1989 Washington order, and asa result, defendant did not owe any arrearages for child support.
We disagree.
We first address whether this matter is governed by the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) or the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). Plaintiff contends
that URESA applies because the support orders were entered prior to
the enactment of UIFSA on 1 January 1996, and that both the 1989
Washington order and the 1991 Tennessee order are valid and
enforceable. See Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N.C. App. 56, 62, 523
S.E.2d 710, 715 (1999) (noting that under URESA, a subsequent order
does not necessarily nullify a prior order). We disagree.
UIFSA governs the proceedings concerning the enforceability of
any foreign support order that is registered in North Carolina
after 1 January 1996. Welsher v. Rager, 127 N.C. App. 521, 527,
491 S.E.2d 661, 664 (1997) (holding UIFSA applied to a 1985 New
York support order registered in North Carolina in 1996). A
support order becomes registered in North Carolina upon its filing.
Id. at 525, 491 S.E.2d at 663 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-6-603).
Plaintiff registered the 1989 Washington support order in North
Carolina in 2001, well after the effective date of UIFSA.
Therefore, UIFSA applies. Where UIFSA applies, there can only be
one controlling support order at any given time. Id.
Next, we must determine which order was controlling, the 1989
Washington order or the 1991 Tennessee Order. The federal Full
Faith and Credit Child Support Order Act (FFCCSOA), as amended in
1996, created a framework for dealing with multiple foreign supportorders to determine which order controls, as well as provide that
order with full faith and credit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2005);
Twaddell, 136 N.C. App. at 64, 523 S.E.2d at 716. The FFCCSOA is
binding on all states and supersedes any inconsistent provisions of
state law. Kelly v. Otte, 123 N.C. App. 585, 598, 474 S.E.2d 131,
134 (1996). The FFCCSOA is virtually identical to UIFSA, both in
terms of structure and intent. Welsher, 127 N.C. App. at 528, 491
S.E.2d at 665. A child support order may be modified by a sister
state only if the rendering state has lost continued, exclusive
jurisdiction over the child support order. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(e).
Such jurisdiction is lost in two situations: (1) if neither the
child nor any of the parties continue to reside in the state; or
(2) if each of the parties consented to the assumption of
jurisdiction by another state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(e)(2).
Both of these situations are present in this case. In 1986,
the Washington trial court entered the original child support order
requiring plaintiff to pay defendant $25.00 per month. By 1988,
neither party nor the children were living in Washington. As a
result, Washington lost jurisdiction over the matter. In 1988,
Tennessee became the state with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
over the parties: defendant and both children resided in
Tennessee, and both parties entered into an Agreed Order, whereby
they consented to Tennessee's jurisdiction over the child support
order. Although, plaintiff moved back to Washington with the two
children in 1988, defendant never again resided in Washington, nor
did he consent to Washington assuming jurisdiction. Accordingly,any action by Washington in 1989 was invalid and not entitled to
full faith and credit as Washington had no authority to act.
Further, plaintiff never attempted to have the 1991 Tennessee child
support order modified after defendant left Tennessee and moved to
North Carolina. Therefore, the last valid and enforceable order
was the 1991 Tennessee order.
The trial court did not err in finding that the 1991 Tennessee
child support order was controlling in this case, that defendant
had paid all child support due under that order, and that defendant
owed no outstanding arrearages. For the reasons discussed herein,
we affirm the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER concur.
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