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All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the
print version appearing in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative.
IN THE MATTER OF: D.M.W., a minor child
NO. COA05-70
Filed: 18 October 2005
1. Termination of Parental Rights-_grounds--neglect
The trial court erred in a termination of parental rights case by concluding that respondent
mother neglected the minor child at the time of the hearing, because: (1) respondent completed
substance abuse treatment, domestic violence counseling, and parenting classes required by her
case plan, although not through DSS's recommended sources, and respondent is not bound by a
single source provider for recommended services while seeking to overcome the issues that led to
the minor child's removal; and (2) the case plan required respondent to obtain legal employment
and stable housing, she obtained employment while in prison working seven days a week in the
kitchen while also taking steps to help her obtain employment upon her release such as attempting
to obtain her GED, and she testified that she would live with her mother upon her release.
2. Termination of Parental Rights-_grounds--willfully failed to pay reasonable portion
of cost of care for six months preceding filing of petition
The trial court erred in a termination of parental rights case by concluding that respondent
mother willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for a period of six months
preceding the filing of the petition although she was physically and financially able to do so,
because: (1) respondent testified that she had just got her job with the Department of Correction
at the time of the hearing; and (2) no evidence was presented that respondent was employed or
had the ability to pay support during the six month period preceding the filing of the petition.
Judge HUNTER dissenting.
Appeal by respondent mother from order entered 26 August 2004
by Judge Avril U. Sisk in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 24 August 2005.
Mecklenburg County Attorney's Office, by J. Edward Yeager,
Jr., for petitioner-appellee Mecklenburg County Department of
Social Services.
Matt McKay, for petitioner-appellee Guardian ad Litem.
Richard Croutharmel, for respondent-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
Denise M. (respondent) appeals from order terminating her
parental rights to her minor child, D.M.W. We reverse.
I. Background
D.M.W. was born to respondent in September 1999. On or about
2 June 2003, respondent left D.M.W. with her maternal grandmother
while respondent served time in jail. D.M.W.'s maternal
grandmother later left D.M.W. with her aunt, respondent's sister.
Respondent did not retrieve D.M.W. on her expected release date.
The Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services (DSS)
became involved in July 2003. Respondent's sister contacted DSS
because she could no longer care for D.M.W. DSS searched for
respondent, but was unable to locate her. DSS filed a juvenile
petition on 9 July 2003 alleging D.M.W. was neglected and
dependant. The court ordered non-secure custody of D.M.W. with DSS
pending the adjudication hearing.
On 11 August 2003, DSS learned that respondent was
incarcerated. DSS and respondent subsequently agreed to a case
plan to address the following concerns: (1) substance abuse; (2)
domestic violence; (3) parenting skills; (4) housing; and (5)
employment. The trial court conducted the adjudication and
dispositional hearings on 13 August 2003. Respondent was present
with her attorney and stipulated to the facts alleged in the
petition. The court adjudicated D.M.W. neglected and dependent as
to respondent. The court adopted the 12 August 2003 case plan
prepared by DSS.
Respondent was released from jail on or about 22 August 2003
and first met with a DSS social worker on 25 August 2003. On 23
September 2003, the Families in Recovery Stay Together (FIRST)program screened respondent for substance abuse, mental health, and
domestic violence problems. FIRST recommended respondent undergo
substance abuse treatment through the CASCADE program and
participate in domestic violence counseling through the Women's
Commission. Respondent agreed to undergo substance abuse
treatment, but refused to participate in domestic violence
counseling.
Respondent initiated treatment at the CASCADE program but
failed to complete it. She never began the domestic violence
counseling through the Women's Commission. DSS made a referral for
respondent to attend parenting classes. Respondent agreed, but
never attended the parenting classes through DSS's recommended
source. She was incarcerated at the time of the hearing to
terminate her parental rights. Respondent has been incarcerated at
least six times during the time in which DSS had custody of D.M.W.
and never visited with D.M.W. due to her frequent incarcerations.
Since respondent has been incarcerated, she has worked toward
completing the requirements of her case plan. She completed: (1)
a substance abuse treatment program; (2) three parenting classes;
and (3) a domestic violence treatment program. Respondent expected
to be released from prison fourteen days following the hearing to
terminate her parental rights.
The court conducted a review hearing of its 13 August 2003
order on 15 January 2004 and ordered reunification efforts with
respondent to cease and for DSS to pursue termination ofrespondent's parental rights. DSS filed a petition to terminate
respondent's parental rights on 24 February 2004.
As grounds for termination, the petition alleged respondent:
(1) had neglected D.M.W.; and (2) willfully left D.M.W. in the
custody of DSS for a continuous period of more than six months
preceding the filing of the petition without paying a reasonable
portion of the cost of care for D.M.W. although physically and
financially able to do so. DSS alleged it was in the best interest
of D.M.W. that respondent's parental rights be terminated. On 25
August 2004, the trial court entered an order finding facts to
terminate respondent's parental rights on both grounds and
concluded it was in D.M.W.'s best interest to terminate
respondent's parental rights. Respondent appeals.
II. Issues
The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by:
(1) concluding that grounds existed to terminate respondent's
parental rights based on neglect; (2) concluding that grounds
existed to terminate respondent's parental rights based on
willfully leaving D.M.W. in foster care for more than six
continuous months without paying a reasonable portion of D.M.W.'s
cost of care; (3) concluding that it was in D.M.W.'s best interest
to terminate respondent's parental rights; and (4) abusing its
discretion and violating respondent's substantial rights by
terminating her parental rights.
III. Standard of Review
A termination of parental rights proceeding involves two
separate analytical phases: an adjudication stage and a
dispositional stage. In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543
S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). A different standard of review applies to
each phase.
At the adjudication stage, the party petitioning for the
termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
that grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights exist.
In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997). The
standard for appellate review is whether the trial court's findings
of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and
whether those findings of fact support its conclusions of law. In
re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), disc.
rev. denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001) (citation omitted).
Clear, cogent, and convincing describes an evidentiary standard
stricter than a preponderance of the evidence, but less stringent
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C. State Bar v.
Sheffield, 73 N.C. App. 349, 354, 326 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1985).
If the petitioner meets its burden of proving at least one
ground for termination of parental rights exists under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a), then the trial court proceeds to the
dispositional phase and determines whether termination of parental
rights is in the best interest of the child. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1110(a) (2003). We review the trial court's best interests
decision under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Nesbitt, 147
N.C. App. 349, 352, 555 S.E.2d 659, 662 (2001).
IV. Conclusions of Law
A. Neglect
[1] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) (2003) provides nine separate
enumerated grounds upon which a court may terminate parental
rights. A finding of any one of those grounds will authorize a
court to terminate parental rights. In re Pierce, 67 N.C. App.
257, 261, 312 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1984). Respondent argues that DSS
presented insufficient evidence to support the trial court's
findings of fact to support its conclusion that grounds existed to
terminate her parental rights based on neglect. We agree.
A trial court may terminate parental rights upon a finding
that the parent has abused or neglected the juvenile. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2003). A neglected juvenile is defined as
follows:
A juvenile who does not receive proper care,
supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's
parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or
who has been abandoned; or who is not provided
necessary medical care; or who is not provided
necessary remedial care; or who lives in an
environment injurious to the juvenile's
welfare.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2003).
It is well established that [a] finding of neglect sufficient
to terminate parental rights must be based on evidence showing
neglect at the time of the termination proceeding. In re Young,
346 N.C. at 248, 485 S.E.2d at 615 (citation omitted). If the
child is removed from the parent before the termination hearing, as
in this case, then [t]he trial court must also consider any
evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of priorneglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect. In re
Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984).
[P]arental rights may nonetheless be terminated if there is a
showing of a past adjudication of neglect and the trial court finds
by clear and convincing evidence a probability of repetition of
neglect if the juvenile were returned to [his] parents. In re
Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000).
DSS did not present sufficient evidence at the time of the
termination hearing to serve as a basis to terminate respondent's
parental rights. DSS argued respondent failed to complete portions
of her case plan. Pursuant to the case plan, respondent was to
complete a substance abuse assessment with the FIRST program,
follow all recommendations made by the FIRST program, and refrain
from using any substances. With regard to the domestic violence
concerns under the case plan, respondent was to complete an
assessment for domestic violence counseling through the FIRST
program and follow all recommendations. The case plan also
required respondent to complete parenting classes through the
Family Center and follow all recommendations made by professionals.
Respondent was also to obtain and maintain employment sufficient to
provide for D.M.W. and stable housing.
Respondent completed substance abuse treatment, domestic
violence counseling, and parenting classes required by her case
plan, although not through DSS's recommended sources. She
completed a substance abuse and domestic violence assessment
through the FIRST program on 23 September 2003. FIRST recommendedsubstance abuse treatment through the CASCADE program and domestic
violence counseling through the Women's Commission. Respondent
never began domestic violence counseling through the Women's
Commission. However, while in custody of the Mecklenburg County
Sheriff, she completed a two week domestic violence class.
Respondent also began a week long parenting class while in the
custody of the Mecklenburg County Sheriff, but was only able to
finish three classes because she was transferred to the Department
of Correction. Respondent began substance abuse treatment through
the CASCADE program, attended approximately six sessions, but was
unable to complete the program because she was subsequently
incarcerated. While in custody of the Department of Correction,
she completed intensive chemical dependency treatment through a two
month Drug Awareness Resistance Treatment Program (DART).
Respondent did not complete substance abuse treatment,
domestic violence counseling, and parenting classes recommended by
DSS, but sought and completed alternative treatment and counseling
programs. Respondent is not bound by a single source provider for
recommended services while seeking to overcome the issues that led
to D.M.W.'s removal.
The case plan also required respondent to obtain legal
employment and stable housing. She obtained employment while in
prison working seven days a week in the kitchen. There was no
evidence presented at the hearing concerning the wage respondent
earned while working in prison. Respondent also completed a
cognitive behavior intervention program and completed some of therequired courses to obtain her GED. At the time of the termination
hearing, respondent anticipated completing her GED prior to release
from custody of the Department of Correction. Respondent has taken
steps while incarcerated to help her obtain employment upon her
release. No finding of fact shows respondent did not have stable
housing. Respondent testified that she will live with her mother
upon her release.
The 12 August 2003 case plan addresses five areas of concern:
(1) substance abuse; (2) domestic violence; (3) parenting skills;
(4) employment; and (5) housing. Upon our review of the evidence
presented at the termination hearing, we find that DSS did not meet
its statutory burden of proving by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that respondent, at the time of the termination hearing,
had not taken substantial steps and made reasonable progress to
resolve these issues. The trial court erred in concluding as a
matter of law that respondent neglected D.M.W. See In re Young,
346 N.C. at 248, 485 S.E.2d at 615.
B. Failure to Pay a Reasonable Portion of the Cost of Care
[2] Respondent next argues that the trial court erred in
concluding as a matter of law that D.M.W. has been placed in the
custody of DSS for a continuous period of more than six months
preceding the filing of the petition and respondent willfully
failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for D.M.W.
although physically and financially able to do so pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3). We agree. [C]ost of care refers to the amount it costs the Department
of Social Services to care for the child, namely, foster care.
Specific findings of fact as to the reasonable needs of the child
are not required. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 113, 316 S.E.2d
246, 254 (1984) (quotation omitted).
A parent's ability to pay is the controlling
characteristic of what is a reasonable portion
of cost of foster care for the child which the
parent must pay. A parent is required to pay
that portion of the cost of foster care for
the child that is fair, just and equitable
based upon the parent's ability or means to
pay. What is within a parent's ability to pay
or what is within the means of a parent to pay
is a difficult standard which requires great
flexibility in its application.
In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 604, 281 S.E.2d 47, 55 (1981) (quotation
omitted). [N]onpayment constitutes a failure to pay a reasonable
portion 'if and only if respondent [is] able to pay some amount
greater than zero.' In re Clark, 151 N.C. App. 286, 289, 565
S.E.2d 245, 247 (2002) (quoting In re Bradley, 57 N.C. App. 475,
479, 291 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1982)).
The trial court found respondent has paid nothing toward the
cost of caring for D.M.W. despite having employment with the
Department of Correction while in prison. At the termination
hearing, respondent testified that she had just got the job with
the Department of Correction. No evidence was presented that
respondent was employed or had the ability to pay support during
the six month period preceding the filing of the petition. The
trial court made no findings regarding respondent's ability or
means to pay. In re Clark, 151 N.C. App. at 289, 565 S.E.2d at
247. Without such findings to support the conclusions of law, thetrial court erred in terminating respondent's parental rights on
this ground.
IV. Conclusion
DSS failed to provide clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
to support the trial court's conclusion that respondent neglected
D.M.W. at the time of the hearing and willfully failed to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost of care for a period of six months
preceding the filing of the petition although she was physically
and financially able to do so. In light of our decision, we do not
address respondent's remaining assignments of error. The trial
court's order is reversed.
Reversed.
Judge STEELMAN concurs.
Judge HUNTER dissents.
HUNTER, Judge, dissenting.
Because I conclude there was clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence in the record to support the trial court's termination of
respondent's parental rights, I respectfully dissent from the
majority.
Respondent's case plan with DSS indicated respondent had an
extensive substance abuse history, including various criminal drug
charges, and limited parenting skills. Respondent was also a
victim of domestic violence and had not provided a stable living
environment for her family. The case plan contained the following
objectives: (1) Successful treatment for respondent's substance
abuse issues; (2) appropriate treatment for respondent's domesticviolence issues; (3) effective demonstration by respondent of
appropriate parenting skills; and (4) maintenance of a stable,
appropriate home. To meet these objectives, respondent agreed to
(1) complete a substance abuse assessment through FIRST, follow all
recommendations, submit to random drug screens, and refrain from
drug use; (2) complete a domestic violence assessment through FIRST
and follow any recommended counseling; (3) successfully complete a
parenting skills class through the Family Center and follow all
recommendations; and (4) obtain and maintain appropriate employment
and appropriate and stable housing, with all household bills to be
paid monthly.
Ms. Hoop-Lightner, a social worker, testified respondent
failed to complete her substance abuse treatment with the CASCADE
program and had not provided proof of completing any other type of
substance abuse treatment program. Respondent did not comply with
domestic violence counseling, nor did she provide proof to DSS of
alternate treatment. Respondent did not attend parenting classes
at the Family Center, and she did not inform DSS of any other
parenting classes she attended. Respondent failed to maintain
contact with DSS, although Ms. Hoop-Lightner provided respondent
with her contact information. Between periods of incarceration,
respondent failed to visit her child. At the time of the hearing,
respondent was incarcerated, and had no plans for employment upon
release and no housing other than her mother's residence. DSS
originally became involved with the family after respondent'smother left the minor child with his maternal aunt while respondent
was incarcerated.
The trial court concluded that respondent had neglected her
child and that termination of respondent's parental rights was in
the best interests of the child. The trial court's findings and
conclusions are fully supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The evidence showed respondent failed to successfully fulfill even
one of the requirements of her case plan with DSS. The majority
nevertheless asserts that [r]espondent completed the substance
abuse treatment, domestic violence counseling, and parenting
classes required by her case plan, although not through DSS's
recommended sources. This assertion is unsupported by the
evidence of record.
Respondent testified she attended only three parenting classes
while in the custody of the Mecklenburg County Sheriff. Ms.
Hooper-Lightner testified respondent never attended parenting
classes at the Family Center, as required by her case plan, and
that respondent failed to inform DSS of her involvement with the
three parenting classes she attended while incarcerated. DSS
therefore had no opportunity to assess whether respondent's
attendance of the three parenting classes had enabled her to
develop appropriate parenting skills, which was the ultimate
objective of the case plan. Respondent submitted no evidence
regarding the parenting program she attended. See In re D.M., ___
N.C. App. ___, ___, 615 S.E.2d 669, 671 (2005) (holding that clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence existed to support termination ofthe respondent-father's parental rights, where the respondent-
father failed to complete domestic violence counseling with NOVA as
required by his case plan with DSS, and there was no evidence in
the record regarding the substance of the alternative private
treatment the respondent-father received). As such, the majority's
assertion that respondent completed the parenting classes required
by her case plan is unsupported by the record.
Next, respondent testified she completed a two-week domestic
violence class while in the custody of the Mecklenburg County
Sheriff. According to respondent, the classes met every other
day. Thus, respondent attended, at most, seven classes. Ms.
Hooper-Lightner testified respondent never provided her with any
proof she was engaged in any type of domestic violence treatment.
Again, respondent failed to offer any evidence regarding the
substance of these classes or their effectiveness towards
resolution of her domestic violence issues. See id. The
majority's conclusion that respondent completed the domestic
violence counseling required by her case plan is therefore
unsupported by the record.
Finally, respondent testified she completed the DART substance
abuse treatment program while incarcerated. Respondent offered no
evidence that the DART program was substantially similar to the
CASCADE program required by her case plan. Respondent testified
that, upon her release from incarceration, she had no employment
and no independent housing. Contrary to the majority's assertion,the trial court specifically found that respondent never provided
proof of having obtained appropriate housing or legal employment.
The majority states that [r]espondent is not bound by a
single source provider for recommended services while seeking to
overcome the issues that led to D.M.W.'s removal. Respondent is
surely responsible, however, for informing DSS of her alternate
compliance with the case plan to which she agreed, or for providing
the trial court with evidence regarding the substance of the
treatment she received. Without information regarding the length
and type of treatment respondent received, the trial court and DSS
had no ability to assess whether, in fact, respondent substantially
complied with her case plan, and, more importantly, whether she met
the ultimate objectives the case plan was designed to achieve. The
case plan was designed to ensure that respondent could provide
proper care and supervision of her son and to avoid the probability
of future neglect. To that end, respondent needed to successfully
treat her substance abuse and domestic violence issues, demonstrate
appropriate parenting skills, and maintain a stable, appropriate
home. Respondent provided little evidence that she has achieved
any of these objectives. As found by the trial court, respondent's
completion of some treatment classes while incarcerated does not
demonstrate a long-term commitment to resolution of the issues
which led to placement of the child into foster care. Notably,
the evidence tended to show, and the trial court found, that what
little progress respondent made towards achieving the objectives
articulated in her case plan occurred while she was incarcerated. While respondent was not incarcerated, she made absolutely no
progress toward resolution of any of the issues on her case plan.
During those times she also failed to maintain contact with [DSS]
or to visit with the child. There was, therefore, little evidence
of changed conditions on the part of respondent, and clear and
convincing evidence of the probability of future neglect by
respondent.
Because I conclude the trial court properly found grounds for
terminating respondent's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(1), I need not address the remaining ground found by the
court. See In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 132-33
(1982). I further conclude the trial court did not err in
determining that termination of respondent's parental rights was in
the best interests of the child, and did not abuse its discretion
in terminating respondent's parental rights. DSS presented
evidence that respondent's son was thriving in foster care, that he
had bonded with his foster family and referred to his foster mother
as Mom, and that the family was interested in adopting him. The
trial court did not err in terminating respondent's parental
rights. I therefore respectfully dissent.
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