STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMUEL AARON BLYTHER
NO. COA05-549
The trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to dismiss an habitual felon
indictment even though defendant contends it violated the equal protection clause under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment clause under the Eighth
Amendment based on the fact that the District Attorney in Moore County has exercised his
discretion in deciding to prosecute all persons eligible for habitual felon status which is allegedly
different from the way similarly situated persons are treated in other North Carolina counties,
because: (1) there may be selectivity in prosecutions and the exercise of this prosecutorial
prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there is a showing that the selection
was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification; (2) defendant failed to provide evidence to substantiate intentional discrimination
but instead relies solely on statistics regarding the number of convictions in Moore County and
Randolph County; and (3) without substantial evidence of intentional discrimination and absent a
showing by defendant that the prosecutorial system was motivated by a discriminatory purpose
and had a discriminatory effect, the District Attorney has not abused his prosecutorial discretion
in deciding to seek indictments against all eligible individuals.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying a
motion to dismiss an habitual felon indictment in violation of the
equal protection clause (Fourteenth Amendment) and cruel and
unusual punishment clause (Eighth Amendment) under the U.S.
Constitution.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1 any person who has been
convicted of or pled guilty to three felony offenses in any federal
court or state court in the United States or combination thereof is
declared to be an habitual felon. N.C.G.S. § 14-7.1 (2003). In
order for a selective prosecution claim to prevail, defendant must
show the prosecutorial system was motivated by a discriminatorypurpose and had a discriminatory effect.
State v. Garner, 340 N.C.
573, 588, 459 S.E.2d 718, 725 (1995);
State v. Spicer, 299 N.C.
309, 312, 261 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1980);
State v. Wilson, 311 N.C.
117, 123, 316 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1984). To demonstrate such
intentional discrimination, the defendant must allege 'that the
selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'
Id.
at 123-24, 316 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,
456, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446, 453 (1962)). In deciding who will and who
will not be prosecuted, district attorneys must weigh many factors
such as the likelihood of successful prosecution, the social value
of obtaining a conviction as against the time and expense to the
State, and his own sense of justice in the particular case.
See
State v. Dammons, 159 N.C. App. 284, 583 S.E.2d 606,
rev. denied,
357 N.C. 579, 589 S.E.2d 133 (2003),
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 951,
158 L. Ed. 2d 382 (2004);
see also State v. Cates, 154 N.C. App.
737, 740, 573 S.E.2d 208, 210 (2002) (concluding that it was within
the prosecutor's discretion to select among the defendant's prior
convictions for purposes of proving his habitual felon status and
calculating his prior record level),
disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C.
682, 577 S.E.2d 897 (2003). The proper exercise of a prosecutor's
broad discretion in his consideration of factors which relate to
the administration of criminal justice aids tremendously inachieving the goal of fair and effective administration of the
criminal justice system.
Spicer, 299 N.C. at 311-12, 261 S.E.2d at
895.
In the present case, defendant was prosecuted in Moore County
and asserts he has been selectively prosecuted as an habitual
felon. To support his claim, defendant states that there have been
substantially more convictions of habitual felon indictments in
Moore County than there have been in Randolph County over a nine-
year period. Defendant argues that because the District Attorney
of Moore County has a policy of prosecuting all persons potentially
eligible for habitual felon status, such persons are treated
differently in Moore County from the way similarly situated persons
are treated in other North Carolina counties, counties where an
habitual felon prosecution may or may not occur. Defendant argues
he belongs to a protected class of individuals that can be
precisely described and that a fundamental right is involved.
It is well established that there may be selectivity in
prosecutions and that the exercise of this prosecutorial
prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there
is a showing that the selection was deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary
classification.
State v. Wilson, 139 N.C. App. 544, 550, 533
S.E.2d 865, 870 (citations omitted). Here, defendant pled guiltyto attaining the status of an habitual felon.
See State v. Parks,
146 N.C. App. 568, 572, 553 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2001) (North Carolina
appellate courts have repeatedly upheld the use of [the Habitual
Felon Act and Structured Sentencing Act] together, as long as
different prior convictions justify each.),
disc. rev. denied, 355
N.C. 220, 560 S.E.2d 355,
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 832, 154 L. Ed. 2d
49 (2002). Further, the District Attorney for Moore County has
exercised his discretion in deciding to prosecute all persons
eligible for habitual felon status. The defendant fails to provide
evidence to substantiate intentional discrimination and relies
solely on statistics regarding the number of convictions in the two
counties. Without substantial evidence of intentional
discrimination, and further, absent a showing by defendant that the
prosecutorial system was motivated by a discriminatory purpose and
had a discriminatory effect, the District Attorney of Moore County
has not abused his prosecutorial discretion in deciding to seek
indictments against all eligible individuals.
See Parks, 146 N.C.
App. at 570-71, 553 S.E.2d at 695. This assignment of error is
overruled.
No error.
Judges HUDSON and CALABRIA concur.
Footnote: 1 By orders dated 30 June and 1 July 2005, this Court granted
defendant's motion for consolidation of COA05-548 and COA05-549
for hearing only. Therefore, two separate opinions are issued.
See State v. Gibson, 175 N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (COA05-
548)(2005).
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