LARRY B. HANEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v
.
From Watauga County
No. 02 CVS 0746
GREENE CONSTRUCTION, INC., A
Corporation, WATAUGA READY-MIX
CORPORATION, A Corporation,
MECO ELECTRIC, INC., A Corporation
and WINKLER HEATING & PLUMBING,
INC., A Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Lewis & Daggett, P.A., by Michael J. Lewis, Michael P.
Williams and Rushanna McNair-Wright for plaintiff-appellant.
Pinto, Coates, Kyre & Brown, PLLC, by Richard L. Pinto and
Deborah J. Bowers, for defendant-appellee.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the ruling of the trial court granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment which dismissed plaintiff's
action. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.
Defendants, Greene Construction, Inc. and Watauga Ready-Mix
Corporation are the same legal entity, Watauga Ready-Mix
Corporation having changed its corporate name to Greene
Construction, Inc. following the events giving rise to plaintiff's
complaint. They are hereinafter referred to as defendant. Defendant was the general contractor on a construction project for
Watauga Medical Center (Watauga), where an existing building was
being converted into a kidney dialysis center. Plaintiff was an
employee of Watauga. Part of the construction project was the
addition of a concrete pad which was to serve as a loading dock.
After the project commenced, Watauga decided to add a mechanical
lift to the loading dock. On 11 February 2000, plaintiff and two
truck drivers went to the loading dock to determine exactly where
the mechanical lift should be located.
The concrete pad of the loading dock was sixteen inches above
the asphalt parking area on the east side and twenty inches above
the asphalt parking area on the west side. There were three cinder
blocks on the asphalt next to the concrete pad on the west side.
The cinder blocks were stacked in a triangular formation, with two
blocks on the bottom and one on the top, parallel to the concrete
pad. When plaintiff approached the loading dock, he saw the three
cinder blocks on the west side of the concrete pad.
The three men stepped onto the concrete pad from the east
side. After examining the pad and discussing the placement of the
mechanical lift, the three men stepped off of the concrete pad on
the west side, using the cinder blocks as steps. The two truck
drivers preceded the plaintiff and descended without incident.
When plaintiff attempted to descend in the same manner, he fell,
resulting in personal injury. Plaintiff testified that the cinder
blocks shifted, resulting in his fall. Plaintiff filed thisaction, asserting that his injuries were proximately caused by the
negligence of defendant.
In his only assignment of error, plaintiff contends that the
trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment. We disagree.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2004). On
appeal from summary judgment, the record is reviewed in the light
most favorable to the non-movant. See Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C.
375, 378, 218 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1975). Summary judgment is rarely
appropriate in a negligence action. DiOrio v. Penny, 331 N.C.726,
729, 417 S.E.2d 457, 459 (1992).
The party moving for summary judgment bears
the burden of establishing that there is no
triable issue of material fact. This burden
may be met by proving that an essential
element of the opposing party's claim is
nonexistent, or by showing through discovery
that the opposing party cannot produce
evidence to support an essential element of
his claim or cannot surmount an affirmative
defense which would bar the claim. Once the
moving party satisfies these tests, the burden
shifts to the nonmoving party to produce a
forecast of evidence demonstrating that the
[nonmoving party] will be able to make out at
least a prima facie case at trial.
DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 355 N.C. 672, 681-682, 565 S.E.2d
140, 146 (2002)(internal citations omitted). Plaintiff's brief presents two issues for our consideration.
First, was summary judgment properly granted as to the negligence
of defendant; and second, was summary judgment properly entered on
the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Plaintiff asserts that defendant was negligent in failing to
warn him, or protect him from the danger posed by the three stacked
cinder blocks.
There is no duty to protect or warn, however,
against dangers either known or so obvious
and apparent that they reasonably may be
expected to be discovered. Moreover, a
landowner is not required to warn of hazards
of which the lawful visitor has equal or
superior knowledge.
Bolick v. Bon Worth, Inc., 150 N.C. App. 428, 430, 562 S.E.2d 602,
604 (2002)(internal citations omitted).
In Bolick, plaintiff was a customer in defendant's store, and
was directed to the back of the store in order to use the bathroom.
Plaintiff went up several steps to enter the bathroom, but fell
upon exiting the bathroom. She averred that the reason she fell
was that there was no landing at the top of the steps in front of
the bathroom. This Court affirmed the trial court's granting of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that even if
the steps leading up to and out of the bathroom created a hazardous
condition, plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged hazardous
condition. Id. at 431, 562 S.E.2d 602, 604.
We hold that even assuming the three cinder blocks constituted
a hazardous condition, plaintiff had knowledge of it. The cinder
blocks were an open and obvious danger of which plaintiff had equalknowledge prior to his injury, and defendant had no duty to warn
plaintiff of the condition.
Because we hold no duty, we do not reach plaintiff's argument
on contributory negligence.
AFFIRMED.
Judges TYSON and BRYANT concurs.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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