NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v
.
Lee County
No. 01 CVS 0879
JOHN A. WILLIAMS, GEORGE
RIDDLE and wife, INEZ
RIDDLE, JERONE C. HERRING,
Trustee, JIMMY L. LOVE,
Trustee, and BRANCH
BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants
Attorney General, Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Spurgeon Fields, III for plaintiff-appellee.
Stam, Fordham & Danchi, P.A., by Henry C. Fordham, Jr. for
defendants-appellants.
STEELMAN, Judge.
In October of 1990 and January of 1991 defendants purchased
two abutting tracts of land totaling approximately 250 acres in Lee
County. Defendants subsequently took some preliminary steps
towards subdividing the property. In March of 1997 defendants were
made aware that the Department of Transportation intended to
condemn a large portion of their property for a proposed bypass.
On 9 February 1999 the Department of Transportation recorded its
notice of adoption of transportation corridor official map,pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-44.50 (2003), and subsequently
initiated this action against defendants pursuant to Chapter 136 of
the North Carolina General Statutes.
Defendants filed a motion for hearing pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 136-108 (2003) to determine issues other than damages,
including whether defendants' property represented a single tract
or an accomplished subdivision. On 12 August 2003 the trial court
entered its order concluding defendants could not present their
property to the jury as an accomplished subdivision. From this
order defendants appeal.
In defendants' only argument, encompassing numerous
assignments of error, they contend the trial court erred in denying
their request that the takings map show a completed subdivision.
This appeal is interlocutory. DOT v. Rowe, 351 N.C. 172, 521
S.E.2d 707 (1999). The dispositive issue, which we address sua
sponte, is whether defendant's appeal must be dismissed as an
improper interlocutory appeal. We hold that it must.
In general, a party may not seek immediate
appeal of an interlocutory order. A party may
appeal an interlocutory order under two
circumstances. First, the trial court may
certify that there is no just reason to delay
the appeal after it enters a final judgment as
to fewer than all of the claims or parties in
an action. Second, a party may appeal an
interlocutory order that affects some
substantial right claimed by the appellant and
will work an injury to him if not corrected
before an appeal from the final judgment.
Rowe, 351 N.C. at 174-75, 521 S.E.2d at 709. Defendants argue that
the ruling of the trial court concluding the property in question
was not a completed subdivision affects a substantial right. InRowe, the North Carolina Department of Transportation condemned a
portion of the defendants' land, leaving defendants with four
remaining parcels of land divided by condemned right-of-ways. One
of the issues presented was whether the land remaining to
defendants after the condemnation was one unified tract or four
separate tracts. The Rowe Court held:
defendants here are the undisputed owners of
the land DOT is seeking to condemn. Defendants
contest only the unification of the four
remaining tracts, not what parcel of land is
being taken or to whom that land belongs.
Thus, we hold that the trial court's
interlocutory order does not affect any
substantial right of these defendants. To the
extent that Nuckles [271 N.C. 1, 155 S.E.2d
772 (1967)] has been expanded to other issues
arising from condemnation hearings, we now
limit that holding to questions of title and
area taken.
Rowe, 351 N.C. at 176, 521 S.E.2d at 709. In the instant case,
like in Rowe, it is undisputed that defendants own the property in
question. They contest only the trial court's ruling that there
was no completed subdivision, not what parcel of land is being
taken or to whom that land belongs. The issue of whether there is
a completed subdivision of the land concerns the nature of the
property taken, not the area. Inasmuch as the parties'
substantial rights are unaffected by the trial court's order, the
instant appeal is improper and must be dismissed. DOT v.
Stagecoach Vill., __ N.C. App. __, __, 601 S.E.2d 279, 281 (2004).
DISMISSED.
Judges TYSON and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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