STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Randolph County
No. 02 CRS 55636
REGINA DENISE GREEN
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Patricia A. Duffy, for the State.
Amos Granger Tyndall, for defendant-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
On 1 September 2002, Trooper Grady Robert Catherwood (“Trooper
Catherwood”) of the North Carolina Highway Patrol parked his patrol
vehicle in a parking lot located on U.S. 220 Business near Level
Cross in Randolph County. Trooper Catherwood observed an older
model Honda automobile traveling northbound on U.S. 220 Business.
He ran a license check of the vehicle and determined that the tags
on the vehicle did not correspond to the vehicle, but because
traffic was heavy, he decided not to pursue the vehicle.
A few minutes later, the same vehicle approached from the
opposite direction, heading southbound on U.S. 220 Business. There
was no traffic at this time, so Trooper Catherwood decided to
follow the Honda automobile. As Trooper Catherwood prepared toactivate his blue lights, the automobile turned into a gasoline
station and stopped at the pumps. Trooper Catherwood walked to the
driver's side of the vehicle and spoke to the driver, whom he
identified as Regina Denise Green (“defendant”). He noted that
defendant's speech was slurred, that her eyes were red and glassy,
that her clothing was “mussed,” and that there was a moderate to
strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath and person. Defendant
told him that she did not have a driver's license and admitted that
she had been drinking. Trooper Catherwood also noticed a passenger
in the back seat with a half-full 40 ounce bottle of malt liquor
between his feet.
Trooper Catherwood arrested defendant. While en route to the
Randolph County Jail, defendant repeatedly asked the trooper
questions. Before the trooper could finish answering the question,
defendant would interrupt and ask the same question again or
another question. After arriving at the jail, defendant refused to
submit to a chemical analysis of breath or to any psychophysical
evaluations, e.g., balance or agility tests. Defendant told the
officer that she had been convicted of driving while impaired six
times since 1996 and that “she was not going to get railroaded this
time.” Defendant gave a statement in which she indicated she had
not eaten for two or three days, that she had not slept for four
days, and that she drank a “one dollar shot” of Canadian Mist and
one beer either forty-five minutes or two hours before she was
stopped. In Trooper Catherwood's opinion, defendant had consumed
a sufficient quantity of an impairing substance to appreciablyimpair her mental and physical capabilities. Defendant was found
guilty of habitual impaired driving and was sentenced to an active
term of imprisonment of a minimum of 18 months and a maximum of 22
months. Defendant appeals.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by
denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be
drawn from the evidence. State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313
S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984). "The test for sufficiency of the evidence
is the same whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial or
both. . . . [T]he court must consider whether a reasonable
inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the [evidence]."
State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 596, 573 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002)
(citation omitted).
In the case at bar, the evidence shows (1) defendant was
operating the vehicle without a license; (2) while the trooper was
following defendant's vehicle, defendant pulled her vehicle into a
gas station; (3) defendant had a moderate to strong odor of alcohol
on her breath and person; (4) defendant was taking Paxil,
Trazodone, and Remeron for anxiety; (5) defendant's clothing was
“mussed;” (6) defendant's speech was slurred and her eyes were
bloodshot and glassy; (7) the trooper observed an open container of
an alcoholic beverage in defendant's vehicle; (8) defendant refused
to submit to the Intoxilyzer; (9) defendant was upset and cryingafter refusing to submit to the Intoxilyzer; (10) defendant refused
to submit to psychophysical evaluations; (11) defendant had not
eaten in two or three days and had not slept in four; (12)
defendant constantly interrupted the trooper and repeated the same
questions before he could finish his answers; and (13) in the
trooper's opinion, based upon his observations of defendant and
experience as a law enforcement officer, defendant was impaired by
an intoxicating substance. We conclude the trial court did not err
in determining the foregoing evidence is sufficient to support a
reasonable inference that defendant committed the offense of
driving while impaired. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was
properly denied.
No error.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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