An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA03-1717

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 18 January 2005

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

         v.                        Davidson County
                                No. 93 CRS 16908
RAYMOND BROWN ROBBINS, JR.

    On a writ of certiorari from judgment entered 14 January 1997 by Judge Julius P. Rousseau in Davidson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 January 2005.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kimberly D. Potter, for the State.

    Daniel Shatz, for defendant-appellant.

    CALABRIA, Judge.

    According to the State's evidence, on 17 October 1993, Thomas Hawley (“Hawley”) retrieved his mail from his post office box. As Hawley stood at a table sorting his mail, Raymond Brown Robbins (“defendant”) entered the post office, struck Hawley on the back of head with a dark object, and demanded Hawley's billfold. Defendant then left the post office and departed in a green automobile having a piece of plastic taped over the driver's side passenger window. Law enforcement officers subsequently stopped a vehicle satisfying that description, and defendant was the driver of that vehicle. Defendant did not present any evidence at trial.
    On 14 January 1997, defendant was found guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon and sentenced to an active term of 40 yearsunder the Fair Sentencing Act. His petition for a writ of certiorari was allowed by this Court on 12 March 2003.
I.    Alleged Flaws in Indictment
    Defendant argues the indictment is insufficient because it fails to identify the weapon with sufficient specificity in that is only refers to “a blunt object.” We disagree. An indictment charging a defendant with a crime that has use of a deadly or dangerous weapon as one of its elements is sufficient if it (1) names the weapon and (2) either expressly states that the weapon is a deadly or dangerous weapon or alleges such facts demonstrating the deadly or dangerous character of the weapon. State v. Palmer, 293 N.C. 633, 640-41, 239 S.E.2d 406, 411 (1977). In the case sub judice the indictment identified the weapon, “a blunt object,” and expressly stated that the weapon is dangerous. Moreover, the victim testified the weapon was used to strike him on the head resulting in disorientation, an open would require ten stitches to close, and a convalescence period of three to four days out of work due to problems resulting from the use of the weapon. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
II.    Denial of Motion to Dismiss
    Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence. State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984). Contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence are to be disregarded and left for resolution by a jury. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). The trial court determines whether there is substantial evidence to establish each element of the offense charged and to identify the defendant as the perpetrator. State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1982).
    Defendant specifically argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that a dangerous weapon was used by defendant. A dangerous or deadly weapon is generally defined as “any article, instrument or substance which is likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 301, 283 S.E.2d 719, 725 (1981). The determination of whether an object or weapon may be characterized as deadly or dangerous is dependent upon the circumstances and manner of its use and is ordinarily one for the jury to make. State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 64-65, 243 S.E.2d 367, 373 (1978). “No item, no matter how small or commonplace, can be safely disregarded for its capacity to cause serious bodily injury or death when it is wielded with the requisite evil intent and force.” Sturdivant, 304 N.C. at 301, 283 S.E.2d at 726 (footnote 2).
    Although Hawley could not positively identify the object, he testified that he did see it and that it could have been a blackjack, tire tool, or gun. Defendant struck Hawley in the head with the object with such force that Hawley “saw stars and heard bells” and fell forward against the table. For about five to tenseconds after the blow Hawley felt woozy and disoriented. The blow to Hawley's head opened a laceration requiring ten stitches. Hawley suffered headaches for days afterward that required him to miss work, and the blow left an injury on Hawley's head that did not completely heal for approximately one year. Based upon the foregoing evidence, we conclude a jury could reasonably find that defendant employed a dangerous weapon likely to cause death or serious bodily harm. We hold the court properly denied the motion to dismiss.
    No error.
    Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and LEVINSON concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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