Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss the felonious possession of stolen goods
charge due to insufficient evidence.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we view “the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit
of all reasonable inferences.”
State v. Morgan, _ N.C. _, _, 604
S.E.2d 886, 904 (2004) (citing
State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 430,
340 S.E.2d 673, 693,
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166,107 S. Ct. 241 (1986)). If we find that “substantial evidence
exists to support each essential element of the crime charged and
that defendant was the perpetrator, it is proper for the trial
court to [have denied] the motion.”
Id.
(citing
State v. Malloy,
309 N.C. 176, 178, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983)). Substantial
evidence “is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
State v. Brown, 310
N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984) (citing
State v. Smith,
300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980)). “It is immaterial
whether the substantial evidence is circumstantial or direct, or
both.”
State v. Diaz, 317 N.C. 545, 546, 346 S.E.2d 488, 490
(1986) (quotation omitted).
To survive Defendant's motions to dismiss the charge of
felonious possession of stolen goods
worth more than $1000, the
State needed to proffer substantial evidence that: (1) Defendant
possessed the property, (2) the property was valued at more than
$1000, (3) the property had been stolen, (4) Defendant knew or had
reasonable grounds to believe that the property was stolen, and (5)
Defendant acted with a dishonest purpose. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§
14-71.1, 14-72 (2003);
State v. Martin, 97 N.C. App. 19, 25, 387
S.E.2d 211, 214 (1990) (same).
Here, Defendant concedes that “[t]here was substantial
evidence of the first three elements of the offense[]” and argues
only that there was insufficient evidence to support the last two
elements. We therefore restrict our analysis to those two
elements. Regarding the fourth element of the felonious possession
offense, the State needed to present substantial evidence that
Defendant had actual knowledge that the property was stolen or,
using a “reasonable man standard,” that Defendant had reasonable
grounds to believe the property was stolen.
State v. Parker, 316
N.C. 295, 304, 341 S.E.2d 555, 560 (1986). Moreover,
In
State v. Haywood, 297 N.C. 686, 256 S.E.2d 715
(1979), we stated that a defendant-seller's
knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe that
property was stolen can be implied from his
willingness to sell the property at a mere fraction
of its actual value. Such knowledge or reasonable
belief can also be implied where a defendant-buyer
buys property at a fraction of its actual cost.
Id.
Here, there was evidence that Defendant was a seasoned scrap
metal trader with five years of experience trading many different
metals; the metals here were unusual in both their geometric shape
and their having identification markings burned into them;
Defendant bought the metals in a fast-food restaurant parking lot
from a man without identification or a wallet; and Defendant paid
$1400 for the materials and quickly resold them for almost $9000.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
there was sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude
that
Defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the
metal was stolen.
(See footnote 1)
Regarding the fifth element of the felonious possession
offense, the State needed to present substantial evidence that
Defendant acted with a dishonest purpose. “Dishonest purpose is
equivalent to felonious intent” and “can be proven by direct or
circumstantial evidence.”
State v. Withers, 111 N.C. App. 340,
348, 432 S.E.2d 692, 698
(citing
Parker, 316 N.C. 295, 341 S.E.2d
555 and
State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 208 S.E.2d 506 (1974)),
disc.
review denied, 335 N.C. 180, 438 S.E.2d 207 (1993). Indeed,
[i]ntent is “seldom provable by direct evidence. It
must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from
which it may be inferred.”
State v. Hines, 54 N.C.
App. 529, 533, 284 S.E. 2d 164, 167 (1981).
(Citations omitted.) In determining the absence or
presence of intent, the jury may consider “the acts
and conduct of the defendant and the general
circumstances existing at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense charged.”
Id
State v. Bennett, 84 N.C. App. 689, 691, 353 S.E.2d 690, 691-92
(1987).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
there was sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude
that
Defendant acted with a dishonest purpose: Defendant bought
the metals, which, as discussed above, a reasonable jury could
conclude Defendant knew or should have known were stolen, in a
fast-food restaurant parking lot from a man without any
identification, and Defendant paid only $1400 for the materials and
then quickly resold them for almost $9000. In sum, because the State proffered sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant knew or had reasonable
grounds to believe that the metal was stolen and that Defendant
acted with a dishonest purpose, the trial court did not err in
denying Defendant's motions to dismiss.
Defendant next contents that the trial court erred in giving
the jury instruction on the doctrine of recent possession for the
charge of felonious possession of stolen property. He argues that
the trial court's instruction improperly allowed the jury to infer
his guilt as to the felonious possession of stolen goods charge
even if he was not found to be the thief of the stolen goods.
The doctrine of recent possession permits an inference or
presumption the person in possession of recently stolen property is
the thief.
State v. Joyner, 301 N.C. 18, 28, 269 S.E.2d 125, 132
(1980);
see also, e.g., State v. Osborne, 149 N.C. App. 235, 238,
562 S.E.2d 528, 531 (The doctrine of recent possession “allows the
jury to infer that the possessor of certain stolen property is
guilty of larceny.” (quotation omitted)),
aff'd, 356 N.C. 424, 571
S.E.2d 584 (2002). The recent possession inference or presumption
is allowed only where the State shows beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) the property described in the indictment was stolen; (2) the
stolen goods were found in defendant's custody and subject to his
control and disposition to the exclusion of others though not
necessarily found in defendant's hands or on his person so long as
he had the power and intent to control the goods; and (3) the
possession was recently after a larceny, mere possession of stolenproperty being insufficient to raise a presumption of guilt.
State
v. Maines, 301 N.C. 669, 674, 273 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1981).
Here, notably, while the trial court referred to the doctrine
of recent possession, it nowhere instructed that the doctrine
raised an inference, not even to mention a presumption, that
Defendant was guilty of any of the crimes charged against him. The
trial court merely stated that “you may consider them together with
all other facts and circumstances in deciding whether or not the
defendant is guilty of felonious larceny or possession of stolen
goods.” We find no error in the trial court's instruction that a
person's recent possession of stolen goods is merely relevant in
deciding whether a person was guilty of possession of stolen goods.
Finally, Defendant contends that the order in which the trial
court gave the jury instructions confused the jury and left a
mistaken impression that the doctrine of recent possession replaced
the substantive elements of felonious possession of stolen goods.
“We presume 'that jurors . . . attend closely the particular
language of the trial court's instructions in a criminal case and
strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions
given them.'”
State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 618, 430 S.E.2d
188, 208 (1993) (quoting
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324
n.9, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 360 n.9 (1985)). Moreover, “[i]t is
axiomatic in this state that the trial court's jury charge must be
construed contextually as a whole and that isolated errors are not
necessarily prejudicial.”
State v. Newkirk, 73 N.C. App. 83, 88,
325 S.E.2d 518, 521-22 (citing
State v. Bailey, 280 N.C. 264, 185S.E.2d 683,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948, 34 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1972)),
disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 608, 332 S.E.2d 81 (1985);
see also,
e.g., State v. Humphrey, 13 N.C. App. 138, 142, 184 S.E.2d 902, 904
(1971) (jury instructions “must be considered as a whole, . . .
with the presumption that the jury did not overlook any portion of
it and if, when so construed, it presents the law fairly and
correctly, there is no ground for reversal[]” (citation omitted)).
As in
Jennings, in this case, we presume that the jury paid
attention to the trial court's instruction on the five requisite
elements for felonious possession of stolen goods. The trial court
instructed the jury it must find all five elements beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to convict Defendant of felonious
possession of stolen goods. The fact that the instruction on the
doctrine of recent possession was prefaced by the trial court's
stating “Now let me go back, ladies and gentlemen, and insert this
in when we're talking about possession of the property[,]” in the
context of the whole instruction, would not render the jury
instructions improper, nor would the fact that the instruction on
the doctrine of recent possession came after the jury instruction
on felonious possession of stolen goods.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error and affirm
Defendant's conviction.
No error.
Judges HUDSON and STEELMAN concur
.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Footnote: 1