An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA04-243

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 1 February 2005

JUDY PEARSON MOODY,
        Plaintiff

v .                         Wake County
                            No. 02 CVD 4254
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY
        Defendant.

    Appeal by plaintiff from orders entered 23 June and 27 October 2003 by Judge James R. Fullwood in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January 2005.

    E. Gregory Stott, for plaintiff-appellant.

    Larcade & Heiskell, PLLC, by Christopher N. Heiskell, for defendant-appellee.

    MARTIN, Chief Judge.

    Plaintiff appeals from an order compelling her to arbitrate disputed medical payments under the terms of her automobile insurance policy. Defendant has moved to dismiss the appeal.
    There is no provision for an immediate appeal from an order compelling arbitration. Laws v. Horizon Housing, Inc., 137 N.C. App. 770, 771, 529 S.E.2d 695, 696 (2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1- 567.18 (2002) (§§ 1-567.1 to 1-567.20 was repealed effective 1 January 2004 and was replaced with §§ 1-569.1 et seq., the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, for agreements entered after that date; § 1-567.18 applies unless all parties agree to the contrary. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-569.3 (2003)). If an order jeopardizes anappellant's substantial right, this Court may accept an interlocutory appeal, but “it is the appellant's burden to present appropriate grounds” for us to do so. Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994). Furthermore, “[i]t is not the duty of this Court to construct arguments for or find support for appellant's right to appeal from an interlocutory order.” Id. at 380, 444 S.E.2d at 254.
    Plaintiff argues that avoiding arbitration is itself a substantial right. She contends that her appeal is not interlocutory and that she will suffer immediate and irreparable harm because she could be barred from asserting her unfair trade practices claim. She has, however, failed to present appropriate grounds or to provide relevant case law to support her contentions. Additionally, the trial court's order did not bar the unfair trade practices claim, rather it only stayed proceedings pending the resolution of the medical payments claim through the binding arbitration required by the insurance policy. Therefore, plaintiff's claims not governed by arbitration are not threatened by the trial court's order. Because this appeal is interlocutory and plaintiff has not met her burden of showing that a substantial right is jeopardized, defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal will be allowed.
    Dismissed.
    Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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