STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Beaufort County
No. 02 CRS 52607
GOLETTE HOLLOWAY,
Defendant.
On 26 August 2002, defendant Golette Holloway, who was born in
1948, was indicted for taking indecent liberties with a child in
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1 (2003). Defendant contends
on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress his statement to the police, and (2) the trial court
improperly curtailed defense counsel's cross-examination of various
witnesses. We affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to
suppress and find no error with respect to the trial court's cross-
examination rulings.
The State's evidence tended to show the following.
On 21 June
2002, DM, a 15-year-old girl, was babysitting her cousin's two
children. DM was watching television when she heard a knock on the
door. Defendant was at the door. DM had seen defendant before,but she did not know his name. Defendant entered the trailer, told
DM she was "one cute chick," asked about her boyfriend, and told
her that her boyfriend "must be the luckiest guy in the world."
Defendant asked DM for a kiss, but she refused.
DM babysat for her cousin's children again on 23 June 2002.
While she was there, the door was unlocked and defendant "just came
in." Defendant told DM that "when he saw [her] walking down the
street Saturday that he nearly melted." He said she had nice hips,
asked if her boyfriend was treating her right, and added that if he
was not, defendant would "take over." When defendant asked DM for
a hug, DM gave him a one-armed hug in which she "barely even
touched him." Defendant then asked for a kiss, but DM refused.
Defendant proceeded to kiss her anyway on the lips. DM pushed
defendant away, but as she turned around, defendant grabbed her
"butt." As DM walked away, defendant followed her. He put his
arms around her shoulder and told her that when she turned 16, they
were "going to work something out." Defendant then left.
Two days later, DM wrote a letter about what had happened.
Her mom found the letter and called the police. Lt. Jerry Cobb of
the Belhaven Police Department interviewed DM about what happened.
Subsequently, Lt. Cobb also interviewed defendant and defendant
gave the following statement:
On June 21st at approximately 9:30 p.m. I was
walking past the front door of Jerry Spencer's
residence and noticed [DM] in the living room.
I knocked on the door and she opened it and I
walked in. I told her I didn't know she was
babysitting. I didn't remember what her reply
were [sic], but I said a few more things to
her and left. I do remember asking her whowas her boyfriend, and she said he was from
Bath. On Saturday night, I stopped by to say
hello and run my mouth again. This time I
told her to show me some love, which she came
over and hugged me. Then I kissed her on the
cheek, as best I can remember. I don't
remember all that well because I had been
drinking on both those nights. I may have
said she had some pretty hips, but I don't
remember feeling of them when she walked away.
Defendant moved to suppress this statement, arguing that the
statement was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
The trial court denied the motion.
Defendant was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a
child and sentenced to a term of 15 to 18 months imprisonment.
Defendant's sentence was suspended and he was placed on supervised
probation for 36 months.
Defendant timely appealed.
We first consider whether the trial court
erred in denying
defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant contends
that because
Lt. Cobb failed to comply with departmental procedures for noting
the date and time he advised defendant of his Miranda rights, Lt.
Cobb's testimony that he informed defendant of his Miranda rights
prior to taking defendant's statement is uncorroborated and
insufficient to establish that Lt. Cobb properly advised defendant
of his Miranda rights.
"The scope of review on appeal of the denial of a defendant's
motion to suppress is strictly limited to determining whether the
trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence,
in which case they are binding on appeal, and in turn, whether
those findings support the trial court's conclusions of law."
State v. Corpening, 109 N.C. App. 586, 587-88, 427 S.E.2d 892, 893(1993). The trial court determined below that defendant went to
the Belhaven Police Department of his own accord, that Lt. Cobb
advised defendant of his Miranda rights, and that defendant freely
and voluntarily waived those rights.
The trial court based its findings on Lt. Cobb's testimony
that defendant approached him while he was on foot patrol and
asked, "You wanted to see me?" Lt. Cobb told him that he would
need to talk to him eventually, and defendant said he would come to
the police department. Later that day, Lt. Cobb received a call to
inform him that defendant was waiting at the police department to
speak with him. Lt. Cobb testified that defendant was not under
arrest, there was no warrant for his arrest, and defendant was not
handcuffed. Lt. Cobb testified that he advised defendant of his
Miranda rights at 9:07 p.m., and defendant executed the form
indicating he wished to waive his rights. Defendant then gave Lt.
Cobb a statement.
We need not reach the question whether defendant was in
custody when he gave his statement because we hold that the trial
court's conclusion that defendant voluntarily waived his rights was
supported by proper findings of fact, which were in turn supported
by competent evidence.
Lt. Cobb's testimony was sufficient to
support the trial court's findings; there is no requirement that it
be corroborated by documentary evidence. See State v. Vehaun, 34
N.C. App. 700, 704, 239 S.E.2d 705, 709 (1977) (holding that the
testimony of a single witness is legally sufficient to support a
verdict), disc. review denied, 294 N.C. 445, 241 S.E.2d 846 (1978)
.
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant's statements were properly
admitted as evidence at trial.
The assignment of error is
overruled.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by improperly
curtailing his cross-examination of the State's witnesses.
During
cross-examination, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's
objections to the following questions:
Q: Well, Mr. Holloway would have no way of
knowing that you [the victim] were there at
the house, would he?
. . . .
Q: [To Lt. Cobb] But my question is what
time. Specifically what time was his
statement taken?
. . . .
Q: Did you [Lt. Cobb] also know that Mr.
Holloway was a Viet Nam veteran?
. . . .
Q. Of your own personal knowledge, do you
know . . . if Mr. Holloway has ever served in
the Armed Forces?
. . . .
Q: But did anything happen between that time
and the time that you [Lt. Cobb] actually got
a warrant for Mr. Holloway's arrest?
. . . .
Q: Did anything happen that would have any
bearing on this case, this incident, between
the time you [Lt. Cobb] spoke to Ms. Martin,
her husband, and her daughter and the time you
got the arrest warrant for Mr. Holloway other
than you speaking with Mr. Holloway?
. . . .
Q: What was the impetus that forced you [Lt.
Cobb] or allowed you to go and get the arrest
warrant? What was the determining factor?
You said you went and got the arrest warrant
the day after you spoke with Mr. Holloway.
Defendant contends that the above examples illustrate that the
trial court repeatedly curtailed his cross-examination and thereby
violated his right to confront witnesses against him. We are not
persuaded.
Pursuant to our Rules of Evidence, "[a] witness may be
cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case,
including credibility."
N.C. Gen. Stat. §
8C-1, Rule 611(b)
(2003). The trial court, however, "shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2)
avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment."
N.C. Gen. Stat. §
8C-1, Rule
611(a) (2003). "'Because the manner of the presentation of
evidence is a matter resting primarily within the discretion of the
trial judge, his control of the case will not be disturbed absent
a manifest abuse of discretion.'" State v. Demos, 148 N.C. App.
343, 351, 559 S.E.2d 17, 22 (quoting
State v. Harris, 315 N.C. 556,
562, 340 S.E.2d 383, 387 (1986)), cert. denied, 355 N.C. 495, 564
S.E.2d 47 (2002).
We find no abuse of discretion. The first question cited by
defendant was rephrased and answered by the witness. The third and
fourth questions, regarding defendant's military service, were notrelevant to any issue in the case. In regard to the fifth, sixth,
and seventh questions cited by defendant, defendant failed to make
an offer of proof. Our Supreme Court has stated:
"It is well established that an exception
to the exclusion of evidence cannot be
sustained where the record fails to show what
the witness' testimony would have been had he
been permitted to testify. [I]n order for a
party to preserve for appellate review the
exclusion of evidence, the significance of the
excluded evidence must be made to appear in
the record and a specific offer of proof is
required unless the significance of the
evidence is obvious from the record."
State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 462, 533 S.E.2d 168, 231-32 (2000)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(quoting State v.
Johnson, 340 N.C. 32, 49, 455 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1995)), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 931, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305, 121 S. Ct. 1379 (2001).
Because defendant failed to make an offer of proof as to the
evidence that would have been elicited had the cross-examination
been allowed and the likely responses are not apparent from the
record, we cannot review defendant's objection to the trial court's
ruling on these questions. Finally, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in sustaining the objection to the second question
because it had already been answered. Lt. Cobb testified that he
read defendant his Miranda rights at 9:07 p.m. and that he took
defendant's statement immediately afterward. Accordingly, we find
no abuse of discretion and the assignment of error is overruled.
No error
.
Judges WYNN and TYSON
concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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