IN THE MATTER OF:
M.I.V
D.C.B., III Wake County
No. 03 J 91
J.T.B.
Duncan B. McCormick for respondent-appellant.
Corinne G. Russell, Deputy County Attorney, and Juanita B.
Hart, Assistant County Attorney, for petitioner-appellee Wake
County Human Services.
Richard Croutharmel, as guardian ad litem, for respondent-
appellee.
ELMORE, Judge.
Respondent mother, Tania Valentin (respondent), appeals the
judgment of the district court terminating her parental rights to
three of her four children. After a careful review of the record
we affirm the order terminating respondent's parental rights.
Respondent is the mother of four children by two separate men.
Two of her sons, M.I.V. (Mike) and D.C.B. III (Dan), and a
daughter, J.T.B. (Jen), are the subject of this action. On 11 June
2001, Mike, Dan, and Jen were removed from the care of respondent
and placed into foster care. Judge Michael R. Morgan's orderfinding that the children were neglected and dependant gave
respondent a listing of directives she should comply with if she
sought reunification with her children. She was able to show
enough progress toward meeting these directives that Mike was
returned to the home in September 2002. However, it is undisputed
that respondent did not, and still has not, met all the directives
outlined in the order. Less than a month later, petitioner Wake
County Health and Human Services received a complaint that Mike was
being improperly supervised and upon investigation determined that
he had marks on his head and neck consistent with choking.
Accordingly, Wake County Health and Human Services petitioned
the district court to terminate respondent's parental rights. The
district court found evidence to support three grounds for
termination and subsequently determined that termination was in the
best interests of the children.
(See footnote 1)
As such, respondent's rights were
terminated via the court's 31 July 2003 judgment. Respondent
appeals the decision of the court on the basis that clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence was not offered to support termination and
argues that termination of parental rights was contrary to the
children's best interest. We disagree.
A proceeding for termination of parental rights is conducted
in two phases. During the adjudication phase, the petitioner must
prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one or more ofthe statutory grounds for termination exists. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1109 (2003). The standard of appellate review is whether the
evidence supports the court's findings and the findings, in turn,
support the conclusions of law. In re Yocum, 158 N.C. App. 198,
203, 580 S.E.2d 399, 403, aff'd per curiam, 357 N.C. 568, 597
S.E.2d 674 (2003); In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d
838, 840 (2000), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9
(2001).
If the petitioner proves that one or more grounds for
termination exist, the trial court moves to the disposition phase.
At this time, the trial court determines whether termination is in
the best interests of the child. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2003);
In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908
(2001). The standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion.
In re Yocum, 158 N.C. App. at 206, 580 S.E.2d at 403; In re Brim,
139 N.C. App. 733, 744, 535 S.E.2d 367, 373-74 (2000).
When reviewing the record on appeal, a trial court's findings
of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent
evidence, even if there was conflicting evidence before the court.
In re Williamson, 91 N.C. App. 668, 674, 373 S.E.2d 317, 320
(1988). Additionally, findings of fact which were not assigned as
error in the record on appeal are conclusive on appeal. Dreyer v.
Smith, 163 N.C. App. 155, 156-57, 592 S.E.2d 594, 595 (2004).
Therefore, in this case, with some findings of fact binding on our
review, we will determine if clear and convincing evidence exists
to support those findings that are disputed and then determine ifthose findings support at least one ground for termination of
parental rights.
The order found that respondent had neglected her children and
also determined that if the children were returned to the home they
would be subject to repetition of neglect. Based on the evidence
presented at trial, those determinations made at prior proceedings,
and the likelihood of future neglect, we agree with petitioner that
clear and convincing evidence of neglect at the time of the
proceeding and the probability of such in the future was presented.
See In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984)
(When determining neglect, “[t]he trial court must also consider
any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of
prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of
neglect.”)(citations omitted); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1111(a)(1) and
7B-101(15) (2003).
The evidence and findings supporting respondent's inability to
parent her children, properly care for them, and properly care for
herself are extensive and most are not challenged on appeal.
Through multiple witnesses' testimony including social workers on
respondent's case, it is clear that respondent spanked, yelled,
cursed, slapped, threatened, and disregarded her children on a
consistent basis. The screaming and yelling was described as loud
enough to shake the walls and delivered right in their face.
Social workers testified that the supervised visits following
petitioner's award of custody were nightmare visits. Following the return of Mike to respondent's home, she
admitted having a party at the house involving alcohol, but denied
Mike's presence in the home. She did, however, admit that she did
not know the last name of the babysitter she left Mike with for the
evening. Respondent also admitted spanking Mike, which was in
violation of the return agreement.
Leading up to the second removal of Mike from respondent's
home was the social worker's discovery of several marks on his neck
and head consistent with choking. Although the trial court heard
extensive testimony on the marks, including the fact that similar
marks were noticed days earlier by a school official, the testimony
on what caused the marks was inconsistent. The court determined
that although the source of the bruises and marks could not be
identified, their existence demonstrated the mother's inability to
keep her child safe. It is true, as respondent points out, that
the mere existence of marks is not evidence of neglect, but in this
case there were copious other findings that supported a concern for
the child's safety.
The trial court also heard evidence that despite making
strides in therapy, respondent failed to follow instructions,
missed meetings, and was quick to revert to improper aggressive
styles of parenting when challenged. Respondent's psychological
review noted that she was ill prepared for parenting and that
without extensive therapy she would likely not change her current
abusive ways. The report also noted that her interpersonaldifficulties would likely keep her from maintaining any stable
employment.
That respondent was unable to hold a consistent job was
unchallenged in the record. Also unchallenged is the fact that she
had tested positive for marijuana while pregnant; could not turn
positive gains in therapy into positive parenting at home;
demonstrated her frustration at extensive counseling; and could not
demonstrate an ability to maintain any budget without State
assistance.
We determine that the record is replete with clear and
convincing evidence supporting each of the trial court's findings.
We also agree that evidence and findings support the conclusion
that Mike, Dan, and Jen were neglected and if returned faced the
probability of neglect in the future. Since it is only necessary
that petitioner prove one ground for termination, we will not
address the evidence supporting the other two grounds. Thus, we
review next whether the trial court abused its discretion in
finding that it was in the best interests of the children to
terminate respondent's parental rights.
Unchallenged on appeal are the court's findings that the
children appear happy and are doing well in foster care. In
denying a petition for termination of respondent's parental rights
regarding her fourth child, the court found that he appeared clean,
healthy, and happy with his mother. Yet, also unchallenged, is the
finding that the other children did not look forward to visits with
their mother and expressed fear of her. Based on all the unchallenged findings, and also looking at
the evidence supporting the other findings, we do not believe the
trial court abused its discretion in determining that the best
interests of the children could only be met by severing the
relationship between their parents and terminating their parental
rights.
As such, we affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating
respondent's parental rights to Mike, Dan, and Jen. We do not
address respondent's other assignments of error because they are
without merit.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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