EUGENE MILLS,
Employee,
Plaintiff
v
.
N.C. Industrial Commission
I.C. No. 163034
SPRINT MID-ATLANTIC,
Employer,
SELF-INSURED (GALLAGHER
BASSETT SERVICES, INC.),
Third-Party Administrator,
Defendants
McGougan, Wright, Worley, Harper & Bullard, L.L.P., by Paul J.
Ekster and Dennis T. Worley, for plaintiff-appellant.
Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by Cameron D. Simmons and
Meredith T. Black, for defendant-appellees.
ELMORE, Judge.
Eugene Mills (plaintiff) appeals from an opinion and award
denying his claim for benefits arising out of an injury occurring
on his commute from home to work at Sprint Mid-Atlantic
(defendant), a communications company. We affirm the opinion and
award entered by the Full Commission.
Plaintiff works as a cable splicer for defendant. His job
includes setting up new service lines as well as repairing and
maintaining existing lines. Plaintiff's normal work day beginswhen he arrives at defendant's plant. He travels both to the plant
before work and home from the plant after work in his own personal
vehicle. He is not compensated for his travel going to and coming
from work. During the day, defendant provides plaintiff with a
company van to travel out to locations that require plaintiff's
attention.
On 16 September 1999, plaintiff was injured on his way to
defendant's plant. Hurricane Floyd created treacherous driving
conditions and caused severe damage on that day. Plaintiff, after
leaving his house and attempting to travel his normal route to
work, had to go an alternate route because of a fallen tree
blocking the road. On the alternate route, plaintiff attempted to
cross a small bridge that had, unbeknownst to him, been washed out
by the storm. Plaintiff crashed, suffering serious injuries.
Plaintiff was out of work for nearly three months, but has since
recovered having a zero percent permanent partial disability
rating.
The opinion and award of the deputy commissioner denied
plaintiff's claim, finding that:
15. Plaintiff's employment did not include
transportation as part of his employment
contract. Plaintiff was not on the premises
of defendant-employer at the time the accident
occurred. Plaintiff was not on a special
errand on the date the accident occurred.
Plaintiff had not teamed with a fellow
employee to go out to survey the damage.
Plaintiff was simply driving to work.
Plaintiff was not assisting in any way
defendant-employer at the time his accident
occurred.
It was based in part on this finding that the deputy commissioner
concluded plaintiff's claim was not compensable. The Full
Commission's opinion and award, in pertinent part, found that:
13. Plaintiff's employment did not include
transportation as part of his employment
contract.
14. Plaintiff was not on the premises of
defendant at the time the accident occurred.
15. Plaintiff was not on a special errand for
his employer on the date the accident
occurred.
16. On the date the accident occurred,
plaintiff had not teamed up with a fellow
employee to go out to survey the damage.
17. The Full Commission finds based upon the
greater weight of the competent evidence that
plaintiff was injured while driving from his
home to work on a day he was regularly
scheduled to work. Plaintiff was not
assisting defendant in any way at the time his
accident occurred, and was not acting in the
course or scope of his employment.
18. Plaintiff failed to prove by the greater
weight of the evidence that he sustained an
injury by accident out of and in the course of
his employment with defendant on September 16,
1999.
Based on those findings the Full Commission also concluded that an
injury sustained “while going to or coming from work does not arise
out of and in the course of employment.” The Commission further
concluded that plaintiff's injury did not fall into any known
exception to that rule, thus determining his claim was not
compensable.
Our review of the Commission's findings that are excepted to
by plaintiff is limited to determining whether there was competentevidence in the record to support them. See Lanning v. Fieldcrest-
Cannon, Inc., 352 N.C. 98, 106, 530 S.E.2d 54, 60 (2000). We must
also determine whether the Commission's findings support its
conclusions, a matter that is fully reviewable. See id.
Plaintiff excepted to findings 15, 17, and 18, but we find
competent evidence in the record to support each of them. Evidence
before the Commission established that plaintiff was in route from
his home to defendant's plant to begin his work. There was no
indication that plaintiff was on a special errand for defendant.
There was also no evidence that plaintiff was specially called in
by defendant, nor was there evidence that he was surveying downed
lines for defendant while on the way in from home. Plaintiff was
just attempting to get to work to start what would have been a very
busy day. Based on the evidence in the record, we hold that the
Commission's findings were supported by competent evidence and will
address its conclusions.
Plaintiff argues in his brief that the “going and coming” rule
is “in need of a further exception, or its complete abolishment.”
He characterizes the “line” drawn by this rule and its exceptions
as “unfair and arbitrary.” Further, he argues that “the hazards of
the Plaintiff's route became the hazards of the employment, and his
claim should be held compensable.”
Our courts have generally held that if an employee is injured
while he is on his way to work, or on his way home from work, the
injury does not arise out of and in the course of his employment.
See Royster v. Culp, Inc., 343 N.C. 279, 281, 470 S.E.2d 30, 31(1996); Humphrey v. Laundry, 251 N.C. 47, 49, 110 S.E.2d 467, 468-
69 (1959); Stanley v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 161 N.C. App. 722,
725, 589 S.E.2d 176, 178 (2003); Deseth v. LensCrafters, Inc., 160
N.C. App. 180, 185, 585 S.E.2d 264, 268 (2003). Yet this rule is
by no means absolute.
Exceptions to this rule have been recognized
when: (1) an employee is going to or coming
from work but is on the employer's premises
when the accident occurs (premises exception).
. .; (2) the employee is acting in the course
of his employment and in the performance of
some duty, errand, or mission thereto (special
errands exception) . . . ; (3) an employee has
no definite time and place of employment,
requiring her to make a journey to perform a
service on behalf of the employer (traveling
salesman exception) . . . ; or (4) an employer
contractually provides transportation or
allowances to cover the cost of transportation
(contractual duty exception) . . . .
Stanley, 161 N.C. App. at 725, 589 S.E.2d at 178 (internal
citations omitted).
The Commission concluded that plaintiff's injury does not fall
into any established exception to the “coming and going” rule. We
agree. Plaintiff was not on his employer's property but a public
road near his home; he was not a traveling salesman; he was also
not receiving any compensation or allowance for his travel.
Notably, plaintiff was not on a special errand for defendant, but
was just coming in to work before meeting with his team and then
going back out into the community in one of defendant's vehicles.
He changed his route, as the evidence shows, not to inspect lines
on the way into work, but because a tree was blocking his normal
route. Under these circumstances, the hazard of a washed out bridge
is not one associated with the employer, as plaintiff suggests, but
rather one faced by any driver on the road. See id. at 726, 589
S.E.2d at 179 (affirming Commission's denial of claim where an
accident related to Hurricane Floyd occurred on employee's trip
home from work); see also Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 459-
60, 162 S.E.2d 47, 54-55 (1968) (noting that an automobile accident
in an employer's parking lot is a hazard the employer created but
one occurring on the road generally is not).
Accordingly, we affirm the opinion and award of the Full
Commission denying plaintiff's claim due to the fact that his
injury did not arise from or in the course of employment.
Affirmed.
Judges McCULLOUGH and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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