STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Forsyth County
Nos. 03CRS016100, 002328
CLINTON BERNARD REVEL
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
General Edwin Lee Gavin II, for the State.
Mercedes O. Chut for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
A jury found Clinton Bernard Revel (“defendant”) guilty of
possession of a handgun by a convicted felon but not guilty of
robbery with a dangerous weapon. Upon defendant's guilty plea to
habitual felon status, the trial court sentenced him to an active
prison term of 114 to 146 months. Defendant gave timely notice of
appeal in open court.
The prosecution's evidence tended to show that on the
afternoon of 6 March 2003, Hansel Allison (“Allison”) drove his
burgundy Toyota Camry to Bethabara Point Apartments to pick up
defendant. The two men then proceeded to Viking Drive to meet
their mutual friend, Isaac Barr (“Barr”). After picking up Barr,Allison allowed defendant to drive the car. The three men “just
r[ode] around” Winston-Salem, ending up on the south side of town.
After stopping briefly at Salem Garden, defendant proceeded to the
Boston Grocery convenience store at the intersection of Fourteenth
Street and Cherry Street. Defendant parked and exited the car, and
was joined outside by Allison and Barr. Allison saw defendant
point a gun at a man in front of the store, and saw the man
“throwing stuff out of his pockets.” The three men then ran back
to the car. The group left Boston Grocery with defendant driving
Allison's car, Allison seated in the back seat, and Barr sitting in
the front passenger's seat beside defendant. As he was driving,
defendant handed the gun to Allison, who looked at it briefly
before handing it back to defendant. Allison did not own a gun,
had never seen a gun in the car before, and had not seen defendant
with the gun prior to the incident at Boston Grocery. Defendant
drove to a gas station, backed the car into the parking lot and
parked. Allison, who pled guilty to common law robbery based on
the incident, was sitting in the back seat on the passenger's side
when the police arrived.
At approximately 8:00 p.m. on 6 March 2003, Verlie John Fields
(“Fields”) went to the Boston Grocery convenience store at the
corner of 14th Street and Cherry Street in Winston-Salem, North
Carolina. When he walked outside to talk to his girlfriend on his
cellular phone, he noticed a burgundy car pull into the store's
parking lot. Defendant exited the vehicle from the driver's door
and was joined by two associates who exited the car from thepassenger's side. As defendant walked around the front of the car,
Fields saw him pull a handgun from beneath his shirt. As Fields
tried to “duck and run at the same time,” defendant pointed the gun
at him, told him not to run and to “throw all your stuff on the
ground[.]” After telling his girlfriend that he was being robbed,
Fields dropped the phone and emptied his pockets onto the ground.
After asking Fields if the $2.00 on the ground was all that Fields
was carrying, defendant lifted the stocking cap that had been
covering his face and bent down to pick up the money. At this
point, Fields was able to see defendant's face. Defendant asked
Fields if he had any drugs. When Fields indicated he had no drugs,
defendant walked back to the car while keeping the gun aimed at
Fields. Joined by his two associates, defendant got back into the
driver's seat and drove away from the store. Fields ran into the
store, reported the robbery, and pointed out the burgundy car to
the store's manager, Claude Goodwin, Jr., who followed the suspects
in his own car while communicating with police by cellular phone.
Winston-Salem Police Officer T.L. McMasters (“McMasters”) was
on patrol in District Three on 6 March 2003, when he was advised to
be on the lookout for a “possible suspect vehicle in an armed
robbery.” He turned left from Cotton Street onto Broad Street and
drove northward until he “noticed a vehicle matching the
description backed in [at] the In and Out.” McMasters pulled into
the In and Out parking lot and stopped his car, at which point he
observed three black males in the suspect vehicle “sitting slouched
down in [the] seats.” He approached the vehicle and askeddefendant, who was in the driver's seat, to step outside and speak
with him. Defendant identified himself and told McMasters that no
weapons were in the vehicle. As McMasters was speaking with
defendant, Officers John Coppley (“Coppley”) and J. P. Timberlake
(“Timberlake”) arrived at the scene. Timberlake, who was
“considerably taller” than the other officers, peered through the
car's windshield and spotted the butt of an unloaded Taurus .357
magnum revolver lying under the driver's seat, “right up under the
lip of the front seat on the floor” in front of the seat
adjustments. Police examined the gun for latent fingerprints and
found none.
Winston Salem Police Officer Matthew Mulgrew (“Mulgrew”)
responded to Boston Grocery and spoke with Fields, who gave an
account of the robbery consistent with his trial testimony. While
he was with Fields, Mulgrew received a report that officers had
located possible suspects at a gas station at the corner of First
and Broad Streets. Mulgrew drove Fields to the In and Out gas
station at the corner of First and Broad, where they found “several
police cars out with a burgundy vehicle . . . with several subjects
standing out in the parking lot.” Fields “positively identified
[defendant] as the one that pointed the gun at him and stole his
money.” Fields also identified defendant in court as the man who
robbed him at gunpoint at the Boston Grocery.
Defendant gave a statement to police denying involvement in
the robbery or possession of the handgun, claiming that the gunfound in the car belonged to Allison. Defendant further stated, “I
can't take a gun charge because I'm looking at Fed[eral] time.”
Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a hangun
by a felon, absent substantial evidence that he was in constructive
possession of the handgun found in Allison's car. In reviewing the
denial of a criminal defendant's motion to dismiss, we must
determine whether the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror
to find defendant guilty of the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62,
296 S.E.2d 649 (1982).
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1(a) (2003) it is unlawful for
“any person who has been convicted of a felony to purchase, own,
possess, or have in his custody, care, or control any handgun or
other firearm with a barrel length of less than 18 inches or an
overall length of less than 26 inches[.]” State v. Bowens, 140
N.C. App. 217, 222, 535 S.E.2d 870, 873 (2000). Possession of an
object may be actual or constructive. A defendant has actual
possession of an object on his person if he is aware of its
presence and has the power and intent to control its disposition or
use. See State v. Crawford, 104 N.C. App. 591, 600, 410 S.E.2d
499, 504 (1991). In the case before us, the State adduced the
testimony of two eyewitnesses who saw defendant in actual
possession of a handgun both during the robbery of Fields at the
Boston Grocery and in Allison's car immediately thereafter. Therecovery of the handgun beneath defendant's car seat corroborated
the witnesses' claims. Moreover, defendant stipulated at trial to
his prior felony conviction. Accordingly, the trial court properly
denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charge under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-415.1. See State v. Glasco, 160 N.C. App. 150, 156-57,
585 S.E.2d 257, 262, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 580, 589 S.E.2d
356 (2003).
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in denying
his pre-trial motion to sever his two charges for trial pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-927 (2003). In requesting a severance,
defendant argued to the trial court that he would be prejudiced in
his trial for robbery with a dangerous weapon if the jury learned
of his prior felony conviction, an essential element of the charge
of possession of a handgun as a convicted felon. Inasmuch as the
jury acquitted defendant of the robbery charge, we find his
concerns of prejudice unfounded. State v. Bracey, 303 N.C. 112,
118, 277 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1981) (citing State v. Irick, 291 N.C.
480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977)). We further note that defendant failed
to renew his motion for severance at trial. This Court has held
that a defendant's “failure to renew a motion to sever as required
by G.S. 15A-927(a)(2) waives any right to severance and that on
appeal the Court is limited to reviewing whether the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering joinder at the time of the trial
court's decision to join.” State v. McDonald, 163 N.C. App. 458,
463-64, 593 S.E.2d 793, 797 (citing State v. Agubata, 92 N.C. App.651, 660-61, 375 S.E.2d 702, 708 (1989)), disc. review denied, 358
N.C. 548, 599 S.E.2d 910 (2004).
The joinder of criminal charges for trial requires only that
there be “some sort of 'transactional connection' between” them.
State v. Bracey, 303 N.C. at 117, 277 S.E.2d at 394 (quoting State
v. Powell, 297 N.C. 419, 255 S.E.2d 154 (1979)). Here, defendant's
use of the handgun during the alleged robbery was sufficient to
establish the requisite connection between the two cases.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
electing to consolidate the charges.
The record on appeal contains additional assignments of error
not addressed by defendant in his brief to this Court. Pursuant to
N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6), we deem them abandoned.
No error.
Judges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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