An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA04-815


Filed: 19 April 2005


v .                         Gaston County
                            No. 02 CVS 705

    Appeal by plaintiff from orders entered 4 August 2003 and 17 November 2003 and judgment entered 29 September 2003 by Judge Nathaniel J. Poovey in Gaston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 February 2005.

    Plaintiff-appellant Tony Grier, pro se.

    Arthurs & Foltz, by Douglas P. Arthurs, for defendant- appellee.

    HUDSON, Judge.

    On 22 February 2002, plaintiff Tony Grier filed a complaint against defendant Earl Tindol Ford, Inc., alleging negligence, breach of agreement, misrepresentation, and conversion in connection with the trade-in of plaintiff's used car. Plaintiff and defendant both moved to compel and for sanctions. On 4 August 2003, the court entered orders denying plaintiff's motion, and granting defendant's motion. Only plaintiff's negligence and conversion claims were tried. The court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict on the negligence claim. The jury found that defendant converted plaintiff's car and awarded him fifty dollarsin damages. Because the jury's award was less than defendant's pre-trial offer of judgment, the court ordered plaintiff to pay defendant the difference between defendant's post-offer costs and arbitration fee, and the jury award. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, which motion the court denied on 17 November 2003. Plaintiff appeals. As discussed below, we affirm.
    Plaintiff's statement of facts is somewhat unclear. Plaintiff owned a Mazda 626 which he had towed to defendant's car dealership as a trade-in for a new vehicle. The Mazda was stored at the home of a tow truck driver where it was disassembled by the tow truck driver in an effort to start it without a key. Subsequently, another person used the Mazda as a trade-in without plaintiff's consent.
    Plaintiff first argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to compel and for sanctions. Plaintiff contends that defendant “gave evasive and incomplete answer [sic] during discovery.” Because plaintiff fails to make any more specific allegations of abuse of discretion by the court, fails to take exception to any part of the deposition excerpts included in the record, and fails to challenge any of the findings contained in the order, we overrule this assignment of error as without merit.
    Plaintiff next argues that the court erred in granting defendant's motion to compel and for sanctions. Plaintiff's entire second argument is the following:
        Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, everyone has a privilege against self-incrimination. The plaintiff was [sic] for exercising his constitutional right.
Because plaintiff's argument is not intelligible to us, we deem this assignment of error abandoned.
    Plaintiff also assigns error to the court's granting defendant's motion for directed verdict. While plaintiff cites two cases regarding the standard of review on appeal of a grant of directed verdict, he makes no argument regarding their application to his case. We deem this assignment abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b).
    Plaintiff next argues that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on negligence. Because plaintiff fails to present an argument applying the case cited to the facts here, we deem this assignment of error abandoned as well. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b).
    Plaintiff also argues that the court erred in granting defendant attorney fees. The court did not award attorney fees to either party in its 29 September 2003 judgment. The court did tax the costs incurred by defendant after the date of its offer of judgment (11 April 2003) against plaintiff pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-11, Rule 68. However, because plaintiff failed to include the offer of judgment in the record before this Court, he may not use it as the basis of an assignment of error. N.C. R. App. P. 9.
    Finally, plaintiff assigns as error “Motion for a new trial when it abused discretion on the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's newly discovered evidence and, an uncontested affidavit.” Because plaintiff fails to make a coherent argument orcite any authority regarding this issue, this assignment of error is deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b).
    Judges WYNN and STEELMAN concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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