IN THE MATTER OF: Johnston County
BABY BOY M. No. 01 J 00209
DOB: 08-13-98
Sofie W. Hosford for respondent-appellant.
Legal Aid of North Carolina, by Denise A. Lockett, for
petitioner-appellee.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Respondent Louis Orlando Turner, Jr. appeals from an order
terminating his parental rights to the minor child Baby Boy M.
The materials before this Court reflect that the minor child
was born on 13 August 1998 in Wake County, North Carolina.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-701 (2003), the minor child's
mother relinquished her parental rights to the licensed child
placement agency, Another Choice for Black Children, (“Another
Choice”) on 14 August 1998, and named respondent as the child's
biological father on the “Acceptance of Relinquishment of Minor for
Adoption by Parent or Guardian” form. Another Choice placed the
minor child with a foster mother, petitioner Wilma Jean Hocutt, on
1 September 1998. On 15 November 2001, Hocutt filed a petition to terminate
respondent's parental rights with the aim of adopting the minor
child. Her petition alleged that, despite being contacted by
Another Choice regarding the minor child in August and September of
1998, respondent missed three scheduled appointments with the
agency in September of 1998, and thereafter “made no contact
whatsoever with that agency.” Petitioner raised the following
grounds for termination: (1) respondent's willful failure “to pay
any portion of the cost of the care and support of the minor child
since the birth of the child on the 13th day of August, 1998[,]”
and (2) respondent's willful failure to make any attempt to see or
communicate with the minor child since 7 September 1998.
Following a hearing on the petition held 18 September 2002,
the district court made the following relevant adjudicatory
findings of fact and conclusions of law by clear, cogent and
convincing evidence:
[Another Choice] and the Respondent did make
contact with each other on August 25[] 1998.
At that time the Respondent did receive
correspondence from the placement agency.
The Respondent is a member of the United
States Army and in 1998 was stationed in
Korea.
The Respondent was in the United States on
funeral leave from his assignment in Korea
with the United States Army during the first
week of September, 1998 but such leave was
limited only to the time for the funerals of
two (2) grandparents. While in the United
States on leave, appointments were made for
the Respondent to meet with . . . Another
Choice on September 2, September 4, and
September 5, 1998. [Respondent] failed to
appear or contact the agency in regards tothese appointments. Upon his return to Korea,
the Respondent had lost the telephone number
to the child placement agency.
None of the parents or siblings of the
Respondent have contacted the placement agency
regarding the minor child. There is no
indication that the Respondent has attempted
to locate the minor child since September,
1998. The Respondent indicated during
testimony that he had lost the telephone
number.
The placement agency, Another Choice, received
information that the Respondent had returned
to Korea on or about September 6, 1998 by
contacting his father . . . .
The placement agency, Another Choice, has
since 1998, maintained the same office and
address. The Respondent has not contacted the
placement agency since August or September,
1998 . . . in any attempt to seek custody of
the minor child.
The minor child was placed with the Petitioner
. . . approximately 2 weeks after his birth,
on September 1, 1998 and continues to reside
with the Petitioner. The minor child is
currently four (4) years old . . . .
The Petitioner . . . is an adoptive parent
having adopted two other minor children and
express a desire to adopt the minor child . .
. . The home of the Petitioner is an
appropriate home for the minor child.
. . .
The Respondent has at no time contacted the
Petitioner, however it is noted that the
Respondent may not have had contact with the
Petitioner because the Respondent did not know
how to contact the Petitioner.
. . .
The Petitioner has never received any
financial support for the minor child . . .
from the Respondent.
The minor child . . . was born August 13,1998, and placed with a licensed placement
agency on or about September 1, 1998. This
Petition to Terminate Parental Rights was
filed November 15[], 2001. No efforts have
been made during this time by the Respondent
to contact the minor child.
. . .
Barbara Brown from Another Choice for Black
Children testified that they have received no
funds for [sic] the Respondent to help them
care for this child.
Respondent had means to provide the cost of
care of the child as he is employed with the
Federal Government in the Armed Services.
The minor child receives assistance from
Another Choice for Black Children and receives
Medicaid.
Based on its findings, the court concluded that grounds for
termination existed under, inter alia, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(3), inasmuch as “[r]espondent has, for a continuous period
of six (6) months next preceding the filing of the petition,
willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care
for the juvenile although physically and financially able to do
so.” The court further concluded that termination of respondent's
parental rights was in the best interest of the minor child.
Respondent argues on appeal that the trial court's failure to
enter its written order within thirty days of the termination
hearing, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2003),
constitutes reversible error. He contends that the court's lengthy
delay prevented him from proceeding with his appeal and deprived
him of contact with the minor child.
We agree with respondent that the district court erred byfailing to enter its written order within thirty days of the
termination hearing. Indeed, the court did not file its order in
this case until 3 December 2003, more than fourteen months after
the 18 September 2002 hearing. However, we have previously held
that a district court's untimely entry of an order terminating
parental rights is not reversible error, absent actual prejudice to
respondent, inasmuch as an automatic reversal would tend to
contravene the legislative intent of expediting resolution of these
cases. See In re E.N.S., 164 N.C. App. 146, 153, 595 S.E.2d 167,
172 (2004), disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___,
(December 2, 2004) (No. 277P04) (“[H]olding that . . . adjudication
and disposition orders should be reversed simply because they were
untimely filed would only aid in further delaying a determination
regarding [a minor child's] custody because juvenile petitions
would have to be re-filed and new hearings conducted.”); see also
In re J.L.K., 165 N.C. App. __, __, 598 S.E.2d 387, 390, disc.
review denied, 359 N.C. 68, 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004) (finding “no
authority compelling that the TPR order be vacated as a result” of
the district court's untimely filing thereof).
We conclude the delay at issue here, while extreme, was
harmless. Given that respondent made no attempt in more than four
years to have any contact with the minor child, we reject his claim
that the district court's delay somehow prejudiced his relationship
with the child. Nor has he shown any prejudice to his instant
appeal arising from the delay. Moreover, the record on appeal
contains hand-written notations of the deputy clerk of districtcourt, which indicate that at least a portion of the delay stemmed
from the failure of respondent's counsel to respond to petitioner's
proposed written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Nothing
in the record suggests respondent ever sought relief from the
district court or alerted it to the delay. Accordingly, we
overrule this assignment of error.
Respondent next assigns error to the district court's
conclusion that he willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of
the cost of the child's care under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3),
in the absence of any findings or evidence regarding his income,
living expenses, or ability to pay child care. Because respondent
has not assigned error to the district court's individual findings
of fact, its findings “are deemed supported by competent evidence
and are conclusive on appeal.” In re Tyson, 76 N.C. App. 411, 416,
333 S.E.2d 554, 557 (1985). Accordingly, we must determine only
whether the court's findings support its conclusions of law.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3), the district court may
terminate a parent's parental rights if it finds by clear cogent
and convincing evidence that
[t]he juvenile has been placed in the custody
of . . . a licensed child-placing agency . . .
or a foster home, and the parent, for a
continuous period of six months next preceding
the filing of the petition or motion, has
willfully failed for such period to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost of care for the
juvenile although physically and financially
able to do so.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3)(2003). This Court has held that
“nonpayment would constitute a failure to pay a 'reasonableportion' if and only if respondent were able to pay some amount
greater than zero.” In re Bradley, 57 N.C. App. 475, 479, 291 S.E.
2d 800, 802 (1982).
Here, the court found by clear, cogent and convincing evidence
that (1) the minor child had been placed with Another Choice since
14 August 1998, and with petitioner since 1 September 1998, (2)
respondent had paid nothing to either Another Choice or petitioner
to defray the cost of the child's care, and (3) “[r]espondent had
means to provide the cost of care of the child as he is employed
with the Federal Government in the Armed Services.” While it is
true that the court heard no evidence related to respondent's
actual salary from the Army or the specific costs of the minor
child's care, its findings of fact are sufficient to support the
conclusion that respondent had the means to contribute some amount
more than zero to the care of the minor child but willfully failed
to do so. See In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 410-11, 546
S.E.2d 169, 175, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341-
42 (2001) (“[U]nder such circumstances, the trial court need not
make detailed findings as to the amount that would be 'reasonable'
to expect from respondent.”).
Having found a valid ground for the termination of
respondent's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3),
we need not review the remaining grounds found by the district
court. See In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230,
233-34 (1990). Moreover, although respondent has not challenged
the district court's dispositional ruling that termination of hisparental rights served the best interests of the minor child, we
find no abuse of discretion by the court, in light of respondent's
complete failure to make any attempt to contact the minor child and
the child's satisfactory placement with petitioner, an adoptive
foster parent, since 1 September 1998. See In re Howell, 161 N.C.
App. 650, 657-58, 589 S.E.2d 157, 161 (2003).
To the extent respondent fails to address his remaining
assignments of error in his brief to this Court, we deem them
abandoned pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2004).
Affirmed.
Judges McCULLOUGH and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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