WILLIAM DEAN,
Plaintiff
v
.
Mecklenburg County
No. 04-CVS-3235
CITY OF CHARLOTTE,
Defendant
William Dean, plaintiff-appellant, pro se.
Office of the City Attorney, by S. Mujeeb Shah-Khan and Anna
F. Schleunes, for defendant-appellee.
HUNTER, Judge.
William Dean (plaintiff) appeals the trial court's dismissal
of his complaint seeking a preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order to prevent the demolition of his home located in
Charlotte, North Carolina. He also sought review of the city's
decision to demolish his home. After granting the temporary
restraining order, the trial court determined plaintiff had failed
to exhaust all of his administrative remedies and dismissed his
complaint. We affirm the trial court's dismissal.
Plaintiff is the owner of a duplex located at 912 and 914
Harrell Street in Charlotte, North Carolina. On 8 May 2003, the
City of Charlotte Neighborhood Development Department notifiedplaintiff that a housing rehabilitation specialist had found
several housing code violations at his property. Plaintiff was
sent, via certified mail, a copy of a complaint, a list of the
violations, and notice of a hearing to be held on 11 June 2003.
The list of violations included, among other things, inoperable
windows, overgrown vegetation in the yard, junk, trash and debris
in the yards, porches and crawl spaces, holes in the exterior
siding, holes in the foundation, inoperable locks, damaged screen
doors, torn flooring, decayed floors, and excessive amounts of
personal belongings. Plaintiff was informed that at the hearing a
final determination would be made as to whether housing code
violations existed on the property. He was also informed that he
could make an appearance at the hearing and was provided a copy of
the housing code enforcement process summary. However, plaintiff
was unable to attend the hearing due to a family emergency in
another state. The Neighborhood Development Department did not
reschedule the hearing.
At the 11 June 2003 hearing, the Neighborhood Development
Department determined plaintiff's property was in violation of one
or more of the minimum standards of fitness and that the property
could not be repaired, altered, or improved at a cost of less than
65% of the value of the dwelling. Plaintiff was ordered to vacate
and either remove or demolish his property by Monday, 14 July 2003.
He was informed he had the option to bring his property into
compliance with the housing code. Plaintiff appealed the order to
the Housing Appeals Board. On 18 July 2003, plaintiff received a letter notifying him his
appeal would be heard on 12 August 2003, and that each side would
have ten minutes to present their argument. Plaintiff was able to
attend this proceeding, however, he contends the time limitation
deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
(See footnote 1)
The Housing
Appeals Board secretary sent plaintiff a letter on 21 August 2003
indicating the Housing Appeals Board adopted a motion on 12 August
2003 ordering him to complete the repairs on his property within
thirty days from the 12 August 2003 hearing. If the repairs were
not completed, plaintiff was informed the order to demolish would
be reinstated. Thereafter, on 27 August 2003, the code enforcement
supervisor sent plaintiff a letter clarifying that if the repairs
were not completed within thirty days of 12 August 2003, the
demolition order would be reinstated. Also, the letter informed
him he had to appeal within fifteen days from the date of the
Housing Appeals Board's decision. A copy of the Housing Appeals
Board's order was not sent to plaintiff and a copy of the order is
not in the record.
On 9 February 2004, the demolition of plaintiff's property was
authorized by an ordinance passed by the Charlotte City Council.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on 20 February 2004 requesting a
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to prevent
the demolition of his residence. In his complaint, he also
appealed the 12 August 2003 decision of the Housing Appeals Board. On 23 February 2004, a temporary restraining order was issued.
However, on 4 March 2004, plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction was denied and his civil complaint was dismissed because
plaintiff had failed to exhaust all of his administrative remedies.
The trial court granted an injunction enjoining the City of
Charlotte from demolishing plaintiff's residence during the
pendency of plaintiff's appeal.
The standard of review of an order granting a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is de novo. Fuller
v. Easley, 145 N.C. App. 391, 395, 553 S.E.2d 43, 46 (2001).
Similarly, on appeal from an order of superior court granting or
denying a preliminary injunction, an appellate court is not bound
by the findings, but may review and weigh the evidence and find
facts for itself. A.E.P. Industries v. McClure, 308 N.C. 393,
402, 302 S.E.2d 754, 760 (1983).
As explained in Monroe v. City of New Bern, 158 N.C. App. 275,
580 S.E.2d 372 (2003):
If a city wishes to destroy a dwelling
that does not pose an imminent threat to the
public, then the city must follow the
procedures required by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§
160A-441 through 160A-450.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-441 confers upon
cities and counties the power to exercise
their police powers by adopting and enforcing
ordinances ordering a property owner to
repair, close, or demolish dwellings that are
determined to be unfit for human habitation
and therefore dangerous and injurious to the
health and safety of the public.
Newton v. City of Winston-Salem, 92 N.C. App.
446, 449, 374 S.E.2d 488, 490 (1988). The
enabling legislation provides that anordinance adopted by a city to regulate
buildings unfit for human habitation must
contain certain procedures that the city must
follow prior to demolition of a dwelling
including providing the owner with notice, a
hearing, and a reasonable opportunity to bring
his or her dwelling into conformity with the
housing code. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-443.
Id. at 279, 580 S.E.2d at 375. In the case sub judice, the City of
Charlotte has adopted an ordinance pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§
160A-441 through 160A-450, setting out the necessary procedures for
the City to follow in its demolition of a dwelling.
According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-446(e) (2003), and
Charlotte Housing Code § 11-28(d), [e]very decision of the
[housing appeals board] shall be subject to review by proceedings
in the nature of certiorari instituted within 15 days of the
decision of the board, but not otherwise. Plaintiff did not
request review by the superior court within fifteen days. The 27
August 2003 letter informed plaintiff he had fifteen days in which
to seek court review of the Housing Appeals Board's decision. Even
though plaintiff was not notified of the fifteen day requirement
until the fifteen days had elapsed, plaintiff still did not seek
review in the superior court within fifteen days of notification.
Instead, nearly six months later, plaintiff sought a preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order to prevent the
demolition of his property. Plaintiffs must exhaust the
administrative remedies available to them, and they cannot be
allowed to undermine the prescribed statutory procedure set forth
in G.S. 160A-446. Harrell v. City of Winston-Salem, 22 N.C. App.386, 391-92, 206 S.E.2d 802, 806 (1974). Accordingly, the trial
court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
Even assuming, however, plaintiff's complaint was properly
before the superior court, we note the City of Charlotte complied
with the requisite procedures necessary to demolish a dwelling.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-443(5) allows a city to demolish a dwelling
if the owner fails to comply with an order to remove or demolish.
On 9 February 2004, the City of Charlotte enacted such an ordinance
regarding plaintiff's property. According to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
160A-443, [n]o such ordinance shall be adopted to require
demolition of a dwelling until the owner has first been given a
reasonable opportunity to bring it into conformity with the housing
code. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-443(5) (2003). In this case, the
City of Charlotte did not adopt a demolition ordinance until nearly
six months after the Housing Appeals Board's decision and
approximately nine months after the housing code violation
complaint was initiated. This time period was a reasonable amount
of time within which plaintiff could have corrected the housing
code violations.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not erroneously
dismiss plaintiff's complaint seeking review of the Housing Appeals
Board's decision and requesting a preliminary injunction. The
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as plaintiff failed
to exhaust all administrative remedies. Moreover, we conclude the
City of Charlotte provided plaintiff a reasonable amount of time
within which to fix any housing code violations. Affirmed.
Judges CALABRIA and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***