STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Mecklenburg County
No. 94 CRS 60232
REGINALD LAMONT CANNON
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
James M. Stanley, Jr., for the State.
Kelly Scott Lee for defendant.
McGEE, Judge.
Reginald Lamont Cannon (defendant) pleaded guilty to second
degree murder on 13 January 1995. The trial court sentenced
defendant to life in prison without making any findings regarding
defendant's eligibility for committed youthful offender status.
Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief on 30 January
2003 and argued that the trial court erred by failing to make a
finding as to whether defendant should have been considered a
committed youthful offender pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-
49.10_148-49.15 (repealed 1995). The trial court granted
defendant's motion for appropriate relief on 30 April 2003, finding
that defendant was eligible for and entitled to be considered forsentencing as a committed youthful offender. A hearing was held on
24 March 2004 to determine whether defendant was entitled to
committed youthful offender status. The trial court found that
defendant should not obtain the benefit of release as a committed
youthful offender. Defendant appeals.
The State argues that defendant's appeal should be dismissed
due to numerous violations of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
The State contends that defendant's first assignment of error
does not address the same issue as the corresponding section in his
brief. Defendant's first assignment of error asks whether "the
trial court err[ed] in finding in sentencing [sic] [d]efendant in
the aggravated range and finding as the aggravating factor the
misdemeanor charge of resist or obstruct an officer conviction in
1994[.]" However, Section I of defendant's brief contains the
heading: "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING . . . DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT A NEW SENTENCING HEARING WHEN THE ORDER OF [THE TRIAL
COURT] CLEARLY STATED A NEW HEARING AND WHEN [THE TRIAL COURT]
MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT BY SUBSTITUTING A MISDEMEANOR
CONVICTION TO ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULT. Assignment of Error No. 1."
The argument that follows this assertion supports the contention
that the trial court erred in not giving defendant a new sentencing
hearing and does not address the issue regarding the aggravating
factor.
N.C.R. App. P. 10(a) states that "the scope of review on
appeal is confined to a consideration of those assignments of errorset out in the record on appeal[.]" As a result, we are precluded
from considering defendant's argument that the trial court erred by
not giving defendant a new sentencing hearing. See Koufman v.
Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 98, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991); and State v.
Smith, 160 N.C. App. 107, 122, 584 S.E.2d 830, 840 (2003).
Furthermore, "[a]ssignments of error not set out in the appellant's
brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or
authority cited, will be taken as abandoned." N.C.R. App. P.
28(b)(6). Therefore, we deem defendant's argument that the trial
court erred by sentencing defendant in the aggravated range to be
abandoned.
The State also argues that defendant violated Rule 9(a)(3)(c),
which states: "The record on appeal in criminal actions shall
contain . . . copies of all warrants, informations, presentments,
and indictments upon which the case has been tried in any court[.]"
N.C.R. App. P. 9(a)(3)(c). The State further argues that defendant
violated Rule 9(b)(1), which requires that the record on appeal "be
arranged, so far as practicable, in the order in which they
occurred or were filed in the trial tribunal." N.C.R. App. P.
9(b)(1).
We agree with the State that defendant violated Rules
9(a)(3)(c) and 9(b)(1). Defendant failed to provide a copy of the
warrant, information, presentment or indictment in the record. In
addition, the materials in the record do not appear in the order in
which they occurred or any other discernable order. "The appellant
has the duty to see that the record on appeal is properly made up." Collins v. St. George Physical Therapy, 141 N.C. App. 82, 89, 539
S.E.2d 356, 361 (2000). Accordingly, we find that defendant
violated Rules 9(a)(3)(c) and 9(b)(1). See State v. Musumeci, 33
N.C. App. 88, 88-89, 234 S.E.2d 31, 32, disc. review denied, 292
N.C. 733, 235 S.E.2d 787 (1977).
The State next argues that defendant's assignments of error as
listed in the record violate Rule 10. The assignments of error
appear as follows:
I. Did the trial court err in finding in
sentencing [sic] [d]efendant in the
aggravated range and finding as the
aggravating factor the misdemeanor charge
of resist or obstruct an officer
conviction in 1994? (Tp. at 40, Rp. at
40.)
II. Did the trial court err in denying
[d]efendant the benefit of release under
N.C.[Gen. Stat. §] 148-49.14 (since
repealed on January 1, 1995). (Tp. at
40, Rp. at 40).
The State argues that the assignments of error violate Rule 10
since they fail to provide a supporting legal basis. Rule 10
requires that: "Each assignment of error shall, so far as
practicable, be confined to a single issue of law; and shall state
plainly, concisely and without argumentation the legal basis upon
which error is assigned." N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(1). The purpose of
this Rule is to ensure that the appellee has notice of the issues
that will be raised on appeal and can determine whether the
proposed record is sufficient. See Kimmel v. Brett, 92 N.C. App.
331, 335, 374 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1988); see also State v. Baggett &
Penuel, 133 N.C. App. 47, 48, 514 S.E.2d 536, 537 (1999). In this case, defendant failed to support his assignments of
error with any legal grounds. Therefore, defendant's assignments
of error are insufficient to meet the requirements of Rule
10(c)(1). See Rogers v. Colpitts, 129 N.C. App. 421, 422-23, 499
S.E.2d 789, 790 (1998).
Finally, the State argues that defendant violated Rule 28,
which states that an appellant's brief "shall contain . . . [a]
statement of the questions presented for review[.]" N.C.R. App. P.
28(b)(2) (emphasis added). Defendant's brief fails to contain such
a statement. Therefore, we find that defendant has also violated
Rule 28. See Atlantic Veneer Corp. v. Robbins, 133 N.C. App. 594,
598, 516 S.E.2d 169, 172 (1999); Dillingham v. N.C. Dep't of Human
Res., 132 N.C. App. 704, 707, 513 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1999).
As our Supreme Court has recently stated, "[t]he North
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure are mandatory and 'failure to
follow these rules will subject an appeal to dismissal.'" Viar v.
N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 401, 610 S.E.2d 360, 360
(2005) (quoting Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 65, 511
S.E.2d 298, 299 (1999)). Due to defendant's multiple violations of
the N.C. Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss defendant's
appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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