IN THE MATTER OF:
C.P.D., K.C.D., and T.M.D., Onslow County
Minor Children. No. 02 J 412-14 &nb
sp;
Cindy Goddard Strope and Annick Peek, for petitioner-appellee
Onslow County Department of Social Services.
Adrian M. Lapas, for respondent mother-appellant.
No brief filed on behalf of Guardian ad Litem.
LEVINSON, Judge.
Respondent mother appeals the order terminating her parental
rights over C.P.D., K.C.D., and T.M.D. entered 19 September 2003.
We affirm.
Respondent mother and her former husband, C.D. are the parents
of K.C.D. and T.M.D. Although respondent and C.D. were married at
the time of C.P.D.'s birth, respondent is not certain that C.D. is
the natural father of C.P.D. who, as respondent's oldest son, was
born in 1992; K.C.D. and T.M.D., two of respondent's daughters,
were born in 1993 and 1997 respectively. Respondent lives with her
husband M.M., by whom she has had three more children. None of
respondent's six children are currently in her custody. On 23 January 2001,the Onslow County Department of Social
Services (DSS) substantiated physical abuse and neglect of C.P.D.,
K.C.D., and T.M.D. (the children). On 12 March 2001 DSS filed a
petition for non-secure custody of the three children. An order
was entered 29 October 2001 adjudicating C.P.D. physically abused
and neglected, and both K.C.D. and T.M.D. neglected. Respondent
had left the children home alone on several occasions. By a
subsequent adjudication order, entered 28 June 2002, the trial
court concluded all three children were abused and neglected. The
court determined, inter alia, that C.P.D. had been sexually abused
by respondent's former husband, C.D.; C.P.D. had been punched and
thrown by his stepfather, M.M.; C.P.D was emotionally abused as a
result of respondent's statements to him that M.M. had killed his
father; C.P.D. lived in an injurious environment; M.M. had punched
and slapped K.C.D.; respondent had failed to protect K.C.D. and had
subjected K.C.D. to an injurious environment; T.M.D. was physically
abused as a result of being slapped and punched by M.M.; and T.M.D.
was subjected to an injurious environment by being present when one
or more of the other children were being physically abused.
Pursuant to the trial court's order of 28 June 2002, DSS retained
custody of the children, the permanency goal was changed to
termination of parental rights and adoption, and respondent's
visitation remained suspended.
DSS worker Stephanie Goodson testified. Goodson has been the
children's case worker since May 2002. Goodson has had contact
with respondent three times: on the telephone twice in August 2002and once in August 2003 when respondent brought gifts for the
children to her office. Goodson testified that prior to August
2003, the therapist had not recommended that the children receive
anything from respondent.
DSS worker Jennifer Colley testified. Ms. Colley was the
worker from April 2001 until April 2002. She supervised seven or
eight visits between respondent and the children. Colley described
her interactions with respondent. Colley testified, “[Respondent]
made comments such as 'they weren't removed from my home, they were
removed from Junior's.' Not accepting any accountability as to why
the kids were in care, . . . and when I would try to talk with her
about the visit, the conversation would escalate, we had to have
the security guard on standby at all times and then frequently she
would leave the room.” Several of Colley's telephone conversations
with respondent ended with respondent using profanity, and “yelling
and screaming.” During her visits with the children, respondent
sat on the couch and did not interact with the children.
Respondent would also tell the children of “surprises” waiting for
them at home. Colley testified the children “would get really
excited about those surprises but she wouldn't let them know what
they were and said that they had to come home to get them first.”
Respondent also told the children not to celebrate their birthdays
without her. When Colley suggested to respondent that she have a
party for the children during a visit, respondent refused.
Colley testified respondent's visits were suspended on the
recommendation of Dr. Perez. Dr. Perez had performed theComprehensive Forensic Evaluation (CFEP) on the children and, at
one point, needed background information from respondent in order
to complete the evaluation. It was several months before Dr. Perez
obtained the necessary information from respondent.
According to Colley, respondent did not accept responsibility
for the children coming into foster care, and denied that M.M. had
physically abused the children. Colley acknowledged respondent had
completed items on the case plan including the substance abuse
evaluation, the PEERS parenting class, and had obtained a mental
health evaluation.
Tyrone Maxwell testified. He was employed by DSS and was the
instructor for PEERS and the Assertive Discipline classes, both of
which respondent and M.M. completed. He noted that, while
respondent had not paid attention well during the PEERS class, she
actively participated in the “Assertive Discipline” class and had
demonstrated improvement.
Mary Goden testified. She was the therapist at Carolina
Psychological Health Services who was treating the children at the
time of the termination hearing. Goden had been treating C.P.D.
since April 2001, and K.C.D. and T.M.D. since August 2001. Goden
was seeing C.P.D. on a weekly basis, K.C.D. on a monthly basis, and
T.M.D. on an “as needed” basis. She stated that C.P.D. had been
hospitalized twice due to severe emotional and behavioral problems.
C.P.D. had been diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,
Attention Deficit Hyper-Activity Disorder, Oppositional Defiant
Disorder, and Reactive Attachment Disorder. Goden describedK.M.D. as presenting with symptoms typical for a child with Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder. T.M.D. had been diagnosed with ADHD.
Both girls had been progressing well in therapy. C.P.D.'s progress
had been less consistent. Goden testified C.P.D.'s recurrent
symptoms were triggered by external events. He had been
experiencing increasing difficulty as the time of the termination
hearing approached. According to Goden, family therapy had not
been clinically indicated because of the ongoing severity of the
children's symptoms. Goden stated that all three of the children
had mentioned being fearful of M.M. due to the physical abuse.
David Evans from Onslow County Behavioral Healthcare
testified. He is a substance abuse counselor and the Violence
Anger Management therapist. He led the violence anger management
group respondent attended. He testified respondent began the group
four to five months prior to the termination of parental rights
hearing, in March or April of 2003. According to Evans, respondent
had attended nine of the twelve group sessions and was in the
process of successfully completing the class. Evans reported M.M.
had already completed the twelve week violence anger management
group.
Respondent testified. She currently lives in a one bedroom
apartment with her husband, M.M. Their last incident of domestic
violence occurred two years ago. It is her intention to continue
living with M.M. She is employed on the weekends, during the day
and evening hours, at React Bingo. Respondent testified she had
completed a substance abuse evaluation, a PEERS parenting educationclass, and a parenting course entitled “Raising Children in a
Nonviolent Home.” She had attempted to comply with her case plan
requirement of obtaining a psychological evaluation. Respondent
had been evaluated by two different mental health professionals,
but neither evaluation met DSS requirements for a complete
psychological evaluation. Respondent's visits were ceased in July
2001. It was respondent's understanding the visits were to be
suspended temporarily until the CFEP was completed. But even after
the CFEP was completed, her visits never resumed. Respondent
testified she had made attempts to resume visiting with the
children. Respondent testified, “I called [the worker] . . .
several times and she kept informing me that the psychologist
suggested 'Not at that time.'” Respondent stated she and her
husband no longer have violent arguments. Their last serious
argument was “a month or two ago.” As a result of that argument,
M.M. left the home for two hours. Respondent testified that when
she and M.M. have arguments, typically one of them will leave the
apartment “[f]or as long as it takes to cool down.”
During her testimony, in response to questions regarding the
removal of the children from the home, respondent acknowledged
that, just prior to the children's removal, they had been living
with her and there had been domestic violence in the home between
herself and M.M. But respondent stated, “I didn't know they were
removed because of domestic violence, I was told that they were
removed from my ex-husband's home due to the fact that he called
and said he couldn't care for them any more.” Respondent explainedthat the children were taken away from her because M.M. has “an
anger problem and for the fact that I sent them to their dad, I
mean, they weren't taken out of my care, they were taken out of
their father's care.” According to respondent, M.M. did have a
problem with his anger, but that he was in the process of
addressing it. Respondent stated that, if her children were
returned to her, and M.M. was ordered not to be around them, she
would “do what [she has] to, to set goals for their day care.”
Dr. Colligan, a psychiatrist, testified in respondent's case
in chief. In addition, his report was admitted. In this report,
Dr. Colligan recommended that the children be placed back in
respondent's custody. Dr. Colligan performed a psychiatric
evaluation on respondent, interviewing her on 17 October 2002, 28
October 2002, and 4 March 2003. He conducted no additional
psychological testing on her. Dr. Colligan was not privy to any
information regarding respondent from DSS or court documents. Dr.
Colligan stated that respondent informed him during the course of
his interviews that C.P.D., K.C.D., and T.M.D. were not with her
because they had been sent to their father in Jacksonville due to
her husband's anger management issues. Dr. Colligan further
testified that he was not aware of the trial court's previous
adjudications regarding the children, or the fact they were in
foster care.
The trial court found that grounds existed to terminate
respondent's parental rights in that she had neglected the
children, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), and had failed to makereasonable progress in correcting the conditions which led to the
removal of the children from the home, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).
Upon concluding it was in the children's best interests that
respondent's parental rights be terminated, the court did so in an
order entered 19 September 2003. Respondent appeals.
___________________________________
On appeal respondent argues the trial court erred in finding
that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights based on
neglect, pursuant to G.S. 7B-1111(a)(1), because there was
insufficient evidence to support the necessary findings of fact.
For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Preliminarily, we note respondent assigns error to numerous
findings of fact, but argues only several of the challenged
findings in her brief. Assignments of error not argued in
respondent's brief are deemed abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P.
28(b)(6). Therefore, the findings of fact not assigned as error
and argued in her brief are deemed conclusive on appeal. See In re
Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003).
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2003), provides one's parental
rights may be terminated where:
(1) The parent has abused or neglected the
juvenile. The juvenile shall be deemed to be
. . . neglected if the court finds the
juvenile to be . . . a neglected juvenile
within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2003), in turn, defines a “neglected
juvenile”: (15) Neglected juvenile.-- A juvenile who does not
receive proper care, supervision, or
discipline from the juvenile's parent . . . or
who lives in an environment injurious to the
juvenile's welfare . . . . In determining
whether a juvenile is a neglected juvenile, it
is relevant whether that juvenile . . . lives
in a home where another juvenile . . . has
been subjected to abuse or neglect by an adult
who regularly lives in the home.
In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the trial
court's findings of fact must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(b) (2003). “The petitioner seeking
termination bears the burden of showing . . . that . . . neglect
exists at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re Ballard,
311 N.C. 708, 716, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984) (citations omitted).
In making its determination as to the parent's fitness, “the trial
court must admit and consider all evidence of relevant
circumstances or events which existed or occurred either before or
after the prior adjudication of neglect.” Id. at 716, 319 S.E.2d
at 232-33. When the children have been placed outside of the home
for a significant period of time, “the trial court must also
consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the
evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of
neglect.” Id. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 232.
In the instant case, the trial court made the following
findings of fact:
8. Subsequent to the adjudication, the Respondent . .
. was granted supervised visitation with the
juveniles. During these visits, [respondent] did
not make many efforts to interact with the children
or engage them in activities. Dr. Perez, the
children's therapist, at the time recommended thatvisitation between [respondent] and the juveniles
be suspended. It was also reported to the court of
[respondent's] negative behavior during the visits
which upset the juveniles. The Court at that time,
suspended the visitation . . . .
. . . .
12. [Therapist] Mary Godin [sic] never found it to be
in the children's best interest that the parents be
involved in the juvenile[s'] therapy. The
juveniles suffer from post traumatic stress
disorder as a result of the abuse and neglect that
occurred while in the care of [respondent]. The
juveniles have not seen nor had contact with
[respondent] since July 6, 2001 by order of the
Courts based on the recommendations of the
therapists, Dr. Perez and Mary Godin [sic].
13. There are still significant concerns regarding
the mental health of the juveniles due to the
abuse and the chronic neglect that they
endured while in the care of [respondent].
14. [Respondent] has three younger children who
are not in her custody. [Respondent] is
allowed liberal visitation with these children
but only visits the children when [M.M.] is
not at home since he is not allowed visitation
with these children.
. . . .
21. [Respondent] does not accept any
responsibility for the juveniles' placement in
foster care. [Respondent] does not believe the
statements of the juveniles regarding the
abuse and neglect that they have suffered,
instead she believes [M.M.]
22. Domestic violence was one of the bases for the
Department of Social Services becoming
involved with this family. [Respondent] and
[M.M.] continue to have heated arguments
between themselves because within their home
to the point where they have to separate for
sometimes hours at a time. [Respondent] does
not believe that this is a problem.
. . . .
24. [Respondent] lacks any understanding of the
seriousness of the juveniles' mental
condition.
25. The juveniles continue to be afraid of [M.M.].
The juveniles continue to have adverse
reactions when [respondent] and [M.M.'s] names
are mentioned in therapy. The Juvenile,
[C.P.D.] does not want to go back home or ever
[see respondent] or [M.M.] again.
. . . .
27. [Respondent] continues to live with [M.M.] and
it appears to the Court that she will continue
to live with him.
. . . .
29. There is no evidence that [M.M.] will not
repeat the abuse and neglect of the juveniles.
. . . .
31. That it is clear to this Court that
[respondent] has made some effort to be
reunited with the juveniles. However, there
is no evidence at all that with all her
efforts [respondent] is now or will ever be
able to provide for the juveniles in a way
that would allow the juveniles to grow up
healthy, happy and well developed; nor is
there any evidence that would give this court
the changes necessary to allow the juveniles
to be placed back with [respondent] safely.
This Court finds a probability of repetition
of neglect if the juveniles are returned to
[respondent].
Respondent argues that findings of fact numbers 8 and 12 are
unsupported by sufficient evidence. We disagree.
With respect to finding number 8, respondent contends that
there is not evidence to support the portion of this finding that
references respondent's “negative behavior.” To the contrary,
evidence was presented that, during visits, respondent told the
children there were “surprises” waiting for them at home which theycould only receive once they returned home. This information
agitated and excited the children. According to DSS worker
Colley's testimony, respondent also told the children they were not
to celebrate their birthdays without her. We conclude that finding
number 8 is sufficiently supported by record evidence.
With respect to finding number 12, respondent argues that
there is not evidence to support the portion of this finding that
“Mary [Goden] never found it to be in the children's best interest
that the parents be involved in the juvenile[s'] therapy.” On the
contrary, Goden's testimony established that she never found family
therapy between the children and respondent to be in their best
interests. Goden testified, “At my discretion and the children's
symptomatology in my opinion was still too high and we had not
dealt with those core issues. I think those core issues always
have to be dealt with before you deal with bringing the family
issues in.” We conclude that finding number 12 is sufficiently
supported by record evidence.
The assignments of error to findings of fact 8 and 12 as
unsupported by sufficient evidence are overruled.
Next, we reject as unmeritorious respondent's contention that
the trial court's findings of fact do not support its conclusion of
law that grounds exist to support termination of respondent's
parental rights pursuant to G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). This assignment
of error is overruled.
Finally, because we find grounds for termination were properly
established pursuant to G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), we need not addressrespondent's further argument regarding termination pursuant to
G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). See In re Stewart Children, 82 N.C. App.
651, 655, 347 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1986) (once one statutory ground for
termination is established, this Court need not address assignments
of error challenging other grounds.). This assignment of error is
overruled.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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