IN THE MATTER OF:
ANP and SRP Buncombe County
Nos. 03 J 207-08
Charlotte W. Nallan for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County
Department of Social Services.
M. Victoria Jayne for respondent-appellant.
Michael N. Tousey for Guardian ad Litem.
McGEE, Judge.
Respondent mother, JJP, (respondent) appeals from the judgment
of the trial court terminating her parental rights to the minor
children ANP and SRP. The judgment also terminated the parental
rights of: JDP, the father of ANP and the legal father of SRP by
marriage; JDB, the putative biological father of SRP; and the
unknown biological father of SRP. None of the male respondents
have appealed.
The record shows that ANP was born to respondent and her
husband, JDP, on 31 August 1997. The Buncombe County Department of
Social Services (DSS) received a report on 4 January 2002, that ANPwas living in an unsanitary home. DSS substantiated the complaint,
finding a "lack of proper care" for ANP in the home and an
"environment injurious" to her welfare. Respondent and JDP failed
to correct these conditions. After signing a case plan on 8 March
2002, respondent notified DSS on 11 March 2002 that JDP had moved
out of the home, leaving her without a vehicle or means of support.
Respondent later reported that JDP had "forced her to move out of
the home." The parties agreed that ANP would be placed with her
paternal grandmother and step-grandfather. Respondent signed a new
case plan agreeing to attend parenting classes, follow up with
therapy at Blue Ridge Center, and obtain stable housing and
employment.
Respondent gave birth to SRP on 27 May 2002. By July of 2002,
the respondent and JDP were living together but had not completed
their respective case plans. Based upon its findings, the trial
court adjudicated both children neglected at a hearing held 16
September 2002, and concluded that the children "lived in an
environment injurious to their welfare due to the unsanitary living
conditions and the instability of the parents." See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2004). The trial court granted DSS temporary
custody of the children.
DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights
to ANP and a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights to
SRP on 9 September 2003, alleging as grounds for termination that
(1) respondent had neglected the minor children, and there was a
reasonable probability that such neglect would continue upon theirreturn to her supervision and care, and (2) she had willfully left
the minor children in a placement outside the home for more than
twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the
conditions leading to their removal. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (2) (2004). After a hearing on 8 December 2003, the
trial court found both grounds for termination alleged in the
petition. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), the trial court
concluded that respondent had neglected the children by raising
them "in an environment injurious to their welfare due to the
unsanitary living conditions, exposure to domestic violence and the
instability of the Respondent Mother[,]" and by being "unable or
unwilling to protect" ANP from sexual abuse. The trial court found
a reasonable probability that such neglect would continue if the
children were returned to her home. As a second ground for
termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), the trial court
concluded that respondent willfully left the children in a
placement outside of the home for more than twelve months "without
showing any reasonable progress under the circumstances . . . to
correct the conditions which led to the removal of the . . .
children." The trial court further concluded that termination of
respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of each
minor child.
In both of respondent's assignments of error on appeal,
respondent contends that the ground for termination found by the
trial court "was not proved at trial by clear, cogent and
convincing evidence." In support of each assignment of error,respondent cites generally to the entirety of pages "19-121" of the
hearing transcript. It is well-established that such broadside
assignments of error do not comply with N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(1)
and are insufficient to sustain a challenge to any of the trial
court's findings of fact. See King v. Snyder, 269 N.C. 148, 151,
152 S.E.2d 92, 94 (1967); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 375-76,
325 S.E.2d 260, 266, disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d
616 (1985). Accordingly, we are bound by the trial court's
findings, which are presumed to be supported by competent evidence.
Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).
Our review is limited to determining "whether the trial court's
findings support its conclusion[s] of law." In re Beasley, 147
N.C. App. 399, 405, 555 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2001).
In support of its decision terminating respondent's parental
rights, the trial court found as follows:
11. [DSS] received a Child Protective
Services complaint on January 4, 2002. The
report alleged that ANP was living in a home
that endangered her health. . . . This
[r]eport was substantiated as neglect by [DSS]
on February 14, 2002 due to lack of proper
care and environment injurious to the welfare
of ANP.
12. . . . Respondent Mother signed a case
plan with [DSS] on March 8, 2002 agreeing to
submit to a . . . mental health assessment and
treatment . . . and anger management.
Referrals were made to these services as well
as for daycare and parenting classes.
13. [DSS] had received a prior report
involving ANP on June 9, 2001. This prior
report alleged that ANP had disclosed to her
paternal grandmother that Kevin, the twelve-
year-old son of the Respondent Mother's
boyfriend, Terry, had touched her genitals. ANP had a Child Medical Examination on July 2,
2001, but there were no specific findings
indicating sexual abuse. . . .
14. . . . In mid-March 2002, . . . due to
lack of stable housing and ANP['s] increasing
symptoms of anxiety, including biting herself
and pulling her hair out, the Respondent
Mother and [DSS] agreed that ANP would be
placed in a kinship placement with the
paternal grandmother and step-grandfather
. . . .
15. On April 20, 2002, the Respondent . . .
signed a new case plan agreeing to participate
in parenting classes. . . . [Respondent]
further agreed to locate and maintain stable
employment and housing. The Respondent Mother
agreed to follow up with her Blue Ridge Center
therapist. A visitation schedule was agreed
upon, however, the Respondent Mother . . .
w[as] inconsistent with visitation and ANP
experienced behavioral problems when visits
were missed.
16. . . . That during several investigations,
there were additional allegations of domestic
violence between the parents. At one point
during the pendency of the underlying juvenile
case, the Respondent Mother admitted that she
and the Respondent Father had physical
altercations.
17. The Respondent Mother gave birth to the
minor child SRP on May 27, 2002. . . . It was
later confirmed that the Respondent Mother was
allowing her boyfriend and his twelve year old
son, Kevin, who ANP previously alleged had
sexually abused her, to reside in her home.
[In August of 2002], the Respondent Mother
agreed to place SRP with the paternal
grandmother and step-grandfather as well.
. . .
19. . . . [O]n September 16, 2002, . . . the
Court adjudicated SRP a neglected child.
. . .
21. The Court suspended visits with the
Respondent Mother . . . until a second ChildMedical Examination on ANP . . . was completed
in early November 2002. This examination
revealed significant changes to ANP['s] hymen
indicating sexual penetration that had to have
occurred after the . . . [e]xamination in June
2001. During the time between June 2001 and
November 2002 ANP had lived with both the
Respondent Mother and the Respondent Father
. . . and the paternal grandmother and step-
grandfather and there was no evidence as to
the identity . . . of the perpetrator(s).
[DSS] placed the children in a foster home in
November 2002. . . .
22. . . . [O]n December 16, 2002 . . . [t]he
Court granted supervised visitation . . . to
the Respondent Mother and paternal
[g]randmother for one-half hour at the
Department subject to the approval of [ANP's]
therapist.
. . .
24. ANP has disclosed to her therapist that
she was sexually abused by the . . . son of
her mother's boyfriend . . . and that she has
been inappropriately touched by the Respondent
Father . . ., the Respondent Mother, . . . and
the paternal grandmother. The Respondents and
the paternal grandmother all deny that they
have abused and/or inappropriately touched the
minor . . . [children]. That there is a
history of sexual abuse in the family.
25. . . . ANP was diagnosed with ADHD and
Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Disturbances of
Conduct and Emotion and was treated in therapy
for aggressive behaviors, anger at herself and
others, butting and scratching herself and
extreme tantrums. ANP made progress in
treatment but was transferred to another
therapist for a new type of therapy program.
26. ANP has had great difficulty with
anxiety, confusion and lack of trust related
to her mother's inconsistency in parenting,
visitation and maintaining consistent contact
after the initial March 2002 kinship placement
with the paternal grandmother. The Respondent
Mother was asked by ANP['s] therapist to be
consistent with their visits and contact with
ANP. The Respondent Mother was not consistentwith her visits and contact with ANP and
. . . only attended thirty percent (30%) of
the therapy sessions although she was welcome
to participate in all of the sessions. The
therapist adjusted her focus of treatment due
to the Respondent Mother's failure to respond
consistently to ANP['s] needs to provide ANP
with the skills necessary to deal with her
mother's shortcomings. ANP benefited from
this treatment and her aggressive behavior,
self-abuse and tantrums diminished over the
course of therapy.
27. The Respondent Mother did not make any
reasonable progress in her ability to meet
ANP['s] needs and did not demonstrate the
ability to follow the treatment plan or the
therapist's instructions for the welfare of
[ANP]. The Respondent Mother's failure to
follow through with visitation and contact
with ANP had a very negative and detrimental
effect on ANP and exacerbated her behavior
disorder.
28. . . . [T]he Respondent Mother was
referred to parenting classes as ordered by
the court, to address her poor parenting
skills and the hazardous home environment.
The Respondent Mother completed parenting
classes in November 2002.
29. . . . [T]he Respondent Mother was
referred to therapy at Blue Ridge Center to
address her mental health needs as ordered by
the Court. The Respondent Mother contacted
therapist Jo Elle Steinenger at Blue Ridge
Center some time in May 2002. The Respondent
Mother did not contact the therapist again
until May 2003 and had an appointment with the
therapist on May 14, 2003. At this
appointment, Ms. Steinenger asked the
Respondent Mother what problems led to the
removal of her children. The Respondent
Mother was unable to identify reasons for DSS
involvement.
30. . . . [T]he Respondent Mother was
referred for housing and economic services.
The family received food stamps and emergency
assistance. The Respondent Mother was
referred to Joblink employment services to
assist her in obtaining stable employment asordered by the Court. The Respondent Mother
declined this service.
[31]. The Respondent Mother testified she
does not want her parental rights terminated.
Her parents have provided her financial
support and since the filing of the petition
to terminate her parental rights they have
paid her rent for a mobile home in Swannanoa,
North Carolina. Her parents pay her rent,
utilities and provide her groceries. The
Respondent Mother gave birth to a son on
October 1, 2003.
3[2]. The Respondent Mother has made progress
in that she now has an appropriate home to
live in and there is no evidence that it is
not safe or clean. However she is totally
dependent on her parents to maintain this
residence and she is unable at this time to
provide for herself, her newborn son, or
anyone else.
Although respondent's testimony differed from these findings on
certain points, the trial court, as finder of fact, was the sole
arbiter of the witnesses' credibility. See In re Gleisner, 141
N.C. App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2000) (stating: "[I]t is
the duty of the trial judge . . . to determine the credibility of
the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.").
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), the trial court may
terminate a respondent's parental rights if:
[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile
in foster care or placement outside the home
for more than 12 months without showing to the
satisfaction of the court that reasonable
progress under the circumstances has been made
in correcting those conditions which led to
the removal of the juvenile. Provided,
however, that no parental rights shall be
terminated for the sole reason that the
parents are unable to care for the juvenile on
account of their poverty.
A finding that a parent has willfully left the child in a placementoutside the home will be upheld, notwithstanding some efforts by
the parent to regain custody, if the parent fails to demonstrate
both a positive response to DSS's efforts toward reunification and
reasonable progress in correcting the problems which led to the
child's removal from the home. In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App.
434, 440, 473 S.E.2d 393, 398 (1996). Requiring both positive
efforts and positive results serves to prevent parents from
"forestall[ing] termination proceedings indefinitely by making
sporadic efforts for that purpose." In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App.
693, 700, 453 S.E.2d 220, 225 (1995).
Initially, we note that respondent surrendered ANP to a
kinship placement with the paternal grandparents in March of 2002.
After giving birth to SRP on 27 May 2002, respondent also placed
SRP with the grandparents in August of 2002. The children were
subsequently adjudicated neglected on 16 September 2003 and were
removed from the kinship placement and placed in foster care on
November of 2002, based on the physical evidence of sexual abuse
upon ANP. Both ANP and SRP had been in foster care for more than
twelve months when DSS filed the petitions to terminate
respondent's parental rights on 9 September 2003. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Petitioner's claim to the contrary is
without merit.
After reviewing the record, we conclude the trial court
properly considered respondent's steps toward compliance with her
case plan but deemed her efforts insufficient to constitute
"reasonable progress" under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Althoughrespondent completed parenting classes in November 2002, the
children's DSS Foster Care Supervisor, Susan Strickland, noted no
"significant change" in respondent's parenting skills during her
supervised visitations, which were finally suspended in May of
2003. The trial court's findings also recognized that respondent
had been living in a clean apartment "two to three months" at the
time of the termination hearing. However, respondent was
completely dependent upon her parents for her rent and living
expenses. She had refused DSS's referral for employment assistance
and had failed to obtain stable employment. More than twenty
months after signing the 20 April 2002 case plan, respondent had no
means to support herself other than her family's generosity. While
she claimed to have worked at some time during 2002, she could not
"remember what months -- dates or anything like that."
The findings further reflect respondent's refusal to
acknowledge any responsibility for the loss of custody of her
children. When asked at the hearing why DSS became involved with
her children, she testified, "Because of false allegations." Asked
on cross-examination if she could think of "any other reason" why
her children were in DSS custody other than her husband's alcohol
use, respondent replied, "No." Moreover, although DSS referred
respondent to Blue Ridge Center for therapy in March of 2002, she
waited a year to contact her therapist and attended only one
session with her. Although respondent claimed to have attended
additional therapy at Blue Ridge Center for "two or three months"
beginning in July of 2003, she conceded that she stopped attendingwhen she "felt comfortable" that she did not need therapy.
Perhaps most significantly, the trial court's findings reflect
respondent's lack of acceptance or awareness of the detrimental
effects of her behavior upon ANP. Karen Kuretsch, ANP's therapist
at Blue Ridge Center Child and Family Services from 25 March 2002
until 7 August 2003, testified that ANP had "always been a child
that's needed safety and security” and experienced anxiety, anger,
and self-abusive behavior when her needs were not met. When ANP
initially disclosed she had been sexually abused, respondent "did
not believe her[.]" Although respondent later told ANP's treatment
team "that she had begun to believe" her daughter, there was no
evidence that respondent disclosed her belief to the child. ANP
"definitely had a need to feel protected by" respondent and
"worried that her mother wouldn't be able to keep her safe."
Consistent with the trial court's findings, Kuretsch testified
that respondent attended "maybe [thirty] percent" of ANP's therapy
sessions. She noted that respondent "failed to follow through on
several things that were requested of her to do." Specifically,
Kuretsch stated that respondent "was asked to call on certain days
. . . . We talked about the need for coming to stay on consistent
nights. If she said she was going to do something to follow
through with it, and that type of thing." Kuretsch observed
respondent's inconsistency in disciplining ANP, in telephoning her,
and in attending visitations. Kuretsch explained that this
inconsistency was harmful to ANP:
[b]ecause A[NP] has issues with trusting
adults to take care of her, and just trustingpeople individually. And it was very
anxiety-provoking for her, very confusing.
She didn't understand why her mom would come
one time not another, didn't follow through,
didn't call when she was supposed to, and that
caused a lot of anxiety and a lot of
confusion, which then in young children
translates into anger, irritability and
aggressive behavior.
Kuretsch testified that when she talked to respondent about the
need to be consistent with ANP, respondent "said that she would
attempt to do those things and agreed to do those things, but yet
was not able to do those things on a consistent basis."
Respondent insisted she had attended all but one of ANP's
therapy sessions. When asked if there was "anything that you can
think of that [Kuretsch] had asked you to do, or suggested that you
could do to help A[NP] out and that you didn't," respondent
replied, "No." Respondent also denied Strickland's account of a
visitation at which respondent ignored SRP while assembling a toy
for ANP, leaving the infant "sitting on the floor crying" until the
social worker picked her up.
We hold the findings of fact support a conclusion that
respondent had not made reasonable progress in correcting the
conditions which led to the adjudication of neglect and the removal
of the children from her home. She declined to avail herself of
the referrals offered by DSS for therapy and for assistance in
obtaining stable employment, as required by her case plan. She
refused to acknowledge the basis for DSS's custody of the children,
failed to demonstrate an appreciation of the effects of her erratic
behavior on ANP, and showed no meaningful progress in correctingher behavior. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that
respondent did not show a positive response to DSS's efforts or
positive results from those efforts. See In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C.
App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93 (2004); In re Bishop, 92 N.C. App.
662, 670, 375 S.E.2d 676, 681-82 (1989). Although respondent
completed parenting classes and had been provided with an
"appropriate home" by her parents, "[e]xtremely limited progress is
not reasonable progress" for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(2). Nolen, 117 N.C. App. at 700, 453 S.E.2d at 224-25.
Having found a basis for the termination of respondent's
parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), we need not
address the remaining ground for termination found by the trial
court. See In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230,
233-34 (1990); In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133
(1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139, 74 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1983).
Upon finding at least one of the statutory grounds for
terminating parental rights, the trial court may, in its
discretion, terminate a respondent's parental rights if it finds
that it is in the child's best interest to do so. In re McMillon,
143 N.C. App. 402, 408, 546 S.E.2d 169, 174, disc. review denied,
354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341 (2001); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1110(a) (2003) (governing the disposition stage of a termination of
parental rights proceeding). Respondent does not contend that the
trial court abused its discretion in electing to terminate her
parental rights at the disposition stage of the proceedings.
Furthermore, the evidence in the record showed that the childrenwere thriving in a "very warm, loving family atmosphere" created by
their adoptive foster parents. Thus, we find no abuse of
discretion.
Affirmed.
Judges HUDSON and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***