STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Henderson County
No. 03 CRS 1662-65
GERALD VELARDI
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
John C. Evans, for the State.
William D. Auman, for defendant-appellant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Defendant was found guilty of four counts of assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill. He was sentenced to an active
term of imprisonment of a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 38
months. Three other terms of the same duration were suspended.
The State presented evidence tending to show that at
approximately 3:00 a.m. on 19 May 2002, Deputy John Johnson of the
Henderson County Sheriff's Department answered a dispatch to
Interstate 26 near the Brookside Camp Road bridge. He met Mr.
Charles Lawson, a driver for Swift Transfer, who showed him a
broken windshield on the cab of his rig. Deputy Johnson also saw
a rock on the seat near where Mr. Lawson had been seated.
The next morning at approximately 2:00 a.m. Mr. James LloydTimmons was driving his tractor-trailer rig north on Interstate 26.
As he approached the Brookside Camp Road bridge, he saw two objects
flying through the air. A rock about four or five inches in size
crashed through his windshield about eight inches to the right of
center and landed inside the cab of his truck. A cinder block
dented the hood of the vehicle and tore off the right side mirror.
He saw two or three people standing atop the bridge.
Deputy Johnson came to the scene to investigate the incident
involving Mr. Timmons's truck and a second vehicle, a recreational
vehicle. Deputy Johnson observed damage to the truck's and
recreational vehicle's windshields inflicted by a rock or other
object. Deputy Johnson at a later time investigated a fourth
incident at or near the same location involving damage and
windshield breakage to a tractor-trailer driven by Mr. Kenneth
Holcomb.
On 28 June 2002 Detective Jerry Rice of the Henderson County
Sheriff's Department, after receiving a tip, visited defendant's
residence located on Brookside Camp Road about one quarter mile
from Interstate 26. Defendant admitted to Detective Rice that he
and a friend had twice gone to the bridge and thrown rocks at
trucks traveling on the interstate highway. He stated he hit only
three semi-trucks and no cars. He denied throwing a cinder block.
Defendant testified and admitted that he threw rocks off the
bridge at Brookside Camp Road. He maintained that he did not
damage any vehicles.
On cross examination defendant was questioned about entriesmade in an internet journal maintained on his home computer. One
entry, dated 19 May 2002, states: I'm going to trash some shit
tonight, maybe my damage will be shown on the news. Another
entry, dated 22 May 2002, states: So I made the news. Did any of
you watch News 13 tonight? Catch the 11:00 news if you can. Look
for any news on windshields, overpasses, I-26, etc.
Defendant first contends that the court committed plain error
by allowing the prosecutor to cross examine him regarding the
entries in the internet journal. He argues that these entries were
obtained as a result of an illegal warrantless search of his home.
We first note that we can find nothing in the record to
indicate how the entries recorded in the internet journal were
obtained. The record does not show that defendant made any motion
to suppress or otherwise challenged any alleged improper search or
seizure. Moreover, to receive appellate relief in the absence of
an objection made in the trial court to the admission of evidence,
a defendant must show that a different result probably would have
been reached absent the error or that the error was so fundamental
as to result in a miscarriage of justice or the denial of a fair
trial. State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 385, 488 S.E.2d 769, 779
(1997). Given defendant's testimony inculpating himself and the
lack of any evidence in the record to support defendant's assertion
of error, we conclude plain error has not been shown.
Defendant's remaining assignment of error is to the denial of
his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. Upon such motion
the
trial court determines whether there is substantial evidence toestablish each element of the offense charged and to identify the
defendant as the perpetrator. State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-
66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1982).
Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 583-84, 461
S.E.2d 655, 663 (1995). The evidence must be considered in the
light most favorable to the State, giving it the benefit of every
reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence. State v.
Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984).
All of the
evidence actually admitted, whether competent or incompetent,
which is favorable to the State is considered by the Court in
ruling upon the motion. State v. McKinney, 288 N.C. 113, 117,
215 S.E.2d 578, 581-82 (1975).
The defendant's evidence which is
favorable to the State and does not conflict with the State's
evidence may be considered. State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 60, 66, 184
S.E.2d 862, 866 (1971).
The elements of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
kill are: (1) an assault; (2) employing a deadly weapon; and (3)
having the intent to kill. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32(c) (2003). Of
those three elements, defendant contends that evidence is lacking
of the element of intent to kill.
An intent to kill is a mental attitude, and ordinarily it
must be proved, if proven at all, by circumstantial evidence, that
is, by proving facts from which the fact sought to be proven may be
reasonably inferred. State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 708, 94
S.E.2d 915, 921 (1956). [T]he nature of the assault, the mannerin which it was made, the weapon, if any, used, and the surrounding
circumstances are all matters from which an intent to kill may be
inferred. State v. White, 307 N.C. 42, 49, 296 S.E.2d 267, 271
(1982).
By his own testimony, defendant admitted that on 19 and 20 May
2002, he threw rocks from atop the bridge on Brookside Camp Road at
trucks traveling on Interstate 26. He further admitted that he
knew that these vehicles were occupied by people, that the vehicles
were traveling at a great rate of speed and that a glass windshield
was in front of these people. He further acknowledged that he knew
what happens to glass when it is struck by a rock. That a person
could have been killed or seriously injured by defendant's actions
is readily apparent. One who deliberately performs an act must be
held to intend the normal and natural results of his deliberate
act. State v. Jones, 18 N.C. App. 531, 534, 197 S.E.2d 268, 270,
cert. denied, 283 N.C. 756, 198 S.E.2d 726 (1973). We overrule
this assignment of error.
No error.
Judges BRYANT and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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