STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and STATE
AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,
v
.
Wake County
No. 03 CVS 11796
CAROL B. IADANZA, ANTHONY J
IADANZA, ROBERT N HARPER, JR.,
MD, and RLI INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Henry W. Gorham
and Jacob H. Wellman, for plaintiff-appellees.
Kennedy, Covington Lobdell & Hickman, L.L.P., by John L.
Sarratt, for defendant-appellant RLI Insurance Company.
STEELMAN, Judge.
On 7 January 2003 Carol Iadanza filed a complaint in Wake
County Superior Court seeking to recover monetary damages arising
out of alleged medical malpractice against Robert N. Harper, Jr.,
M.D. and Digestive Diseases Diagnostic Center, P.A. (Wake County
action 03-228). Dr. Harper filed a counterclaim against Carol
Iadanza, and a third-party complaint against Robert Iadanza on 10
March 2003, which was amended 17 March 2003, asserting seven claimsfor relief: slander per se; unfair and deceptive trade practices;
civil conspiracy; facilitation of fraud; malicious prosecution;
abuse of process; and punitive damages. State Auto and Casualty
Insurance Company had issued a policy of liability insurance to the
Iadanzas on their primary residence in Wake County, North Carolina,
on their secondary residence in Holden Beach, and a personal
umbrella policy. Defendant, RLI Insurance Company, issued other
insurance policies to the Iadanzas. State Auto Mutual Insurance
Company and State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company
(collectively State Auto) filed this action seeking a declaratory
judgment that they had no duty to defend the Iadanzas from Dr.
Harper's claims against them; that defendant RLI had a duty to
reimburse State Auto for expenses incurred in defending the
Iadanzas; and that costs be taxed against some other party. State
Auto moved for summary judgment, asserting there was no material
issue of fact that none of the policies issued by them to the
Iadanzas provided coverage for Dr. Harper's claims, and thus they
had no duty to defend the Iadanzas in Wake County action 03-228.
From the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
State Auto, defendant RLI appeals.
Defendant RLI's brief asserts it is appealing from a final
judgment. However, the record reveals that this is not the case.
State Auto's complaint stated two distinct claims: (1) a claim for
declaratory judgment that it did not have a duty to defend the
Iadanzas as to Dr. Harper's claims; and (2) for a declaratory
judgment that defendant RLI had a duty to reimburse State Auto forall costs incurred in defending the Iadanzas. State Auto's motion
for summary judgment was limited to the first claim, and Judge
Hudson's order was expressly limited to the first claim. The
record before this court is devoid of any indication that the
second claim was disposed of by means of stipulation or order of
the trial court. Judge Hudson's order did not dispose of the
entire case, and is therefore interlocutory. North Carolina Dep't
of Transp. v. Page,
119 N.C. App. 730, 733, 460 S.E.2d 332, 334
(1995).
There is no certification by the trial court pursuant to Rule
54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and defendant
RLI does not argue that this appeal affects a substantial right.
“There is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration
of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court
piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from
intermediate orders.” Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 363, 57
S.E.2d 377, 382 (1950). This is an improper interlocutory appeal
and must be dismissed. Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115
N.C. App. 377, 444 S.E.2d 252 (1994).
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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